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The numerous, constantly evolving, systems and technologies that 
exist today allow us to continue to develop, prosper and advance humanity to 
live better connected and higher-quality lives. From nuclear power plants, 
aviation, to information system technology, humans have created wonderous 
complex systems that have had beneficial effects on our quality of life. 
However, we continue to grapple with devastating consequences and lost 
lives resulting from failures of these systems and accidents within these 
environments. For decades, scholars and practitioners from a plethora of 
disciplines have attempted to understand how to better manage safety and 
prevent accidents in countless high-risk industries worldwide. Through the 
insight gained from management and research over the years, we have learned 
a great deal about the socio-technical factors at play for safety management. 
These socio-technical factors are multifaceted and various authors have 
created frameworks and theories to give leaders and safety management 
practitioners tools to better manage safety. Despite the increasing 
sophistication in our understanding of risk and safety management, it is 
estimated that workplace fatalities are on the rise, with a recent report based 
on statistics from the International Labour Organization estimating that 2.78 
million people die every year from occupational accidents and work-related 
illnesses (Takala et al., 2017). We are still left with the challenge of better 
understanding increasingly complex systems and creating better frameworks 
and tools to avoid accidents and keep people and communities out of harm’s 
way.  
As our systems continue to become more and more complex, our 
ability to manage safety does too, because the number of interactions between 
the social system (workers) and the technical system (technologies) in an 
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organization continues to rise, making it impossible to map out every 
interaction that could happen. This rising complexity makes organizations 
more and more vulnerable to unexpected events that could lead to accidents 
and errors. Therefore, safety management theorists have started to shift their 
focus away from analysing the causes of errors and accidents (as this is 
becoming futile with rising complexity) and towards understanding how to 
build resilience in organizational systems so that unexpected events do not 
destabilise the system (Hollnagel et al., 2015). This lead scholars to study 
organizations that had very high levels of resilience, to try to extrapolate 
lessons of how to build resilience. Nuclear power plants and air traffic control 
centres immediately stood out as outliers in terms of resilience and reliability, 
as these organizations managed to operate within an exceptionally high-risk 
environment, with exceptionally low accident rates (Rochlin et al., 1987). 
They found that these organizations did experience unexpected events and 
errors, but these unexpected events and errors did not destabilise them (Weick 
et al., 1999; Schulman, 2004). Through analyses of how these organizations 
managed to achieve such high resilience and reliability, they saw that these 
organizations designed for safety on a systems level and had a very intricate 
understanding of their operations with highly mapped our procedures and 
protocols (Schulman, 2004). Beyond that, they exhibited the social and 
relational infrastructure that allowed them to expertly manage unexpected 
events (Weick & Roberts, 1993). 
When analysing this social and relational infrastructure, researchers 
discovered that these highly resilient organizations had specialised team 
dynamics characterised by mindful actions and interactions (Weick & 
Roberts, 1993). These mindful actions and interactions allowed teams to be 
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able to anticipate when something was about to go wrong, and quickly contain 
this potential problem before it caused more serious harm (Weick et al., 
1999). They called these team dynamics “mindful organising”, and since its 
inception, it has been studied in numerous high-risk environments and has 
shown to have beneficial effects on safety performance (Sutcliffe et al., 
2016). Mindful organising offers a promising framework to use to help other 
high risk organizations better manage safety. However, its current utility in 
research and practice is stunted due to a lack of clear conceptualisation of the 
construct, a lack of adequate quantitative backing, a limited understanding of 
the conditions needed to support and sustain it in organizations as well as 
limited insight into how it affects individual behaviour and attitudes (Sutcliffe 
et al., 2016). In addition, research has been criticised as not being socially 
embedded enough and too narrow in its level of analysis (Martínez-Córcoles 
& Vogus, 2020). 
The aim of this present thesis is to add to the current literature on 
“mindful organising”. The present thesis tried to explore and address some of 
the theoretical and methodological shortcomings through empirical research 
addressing the nomological network of mindful organising in high risk 
environments (namely nuclear power and chemical plants). We do so by first 
explaining the evolution of safety management theories, with special focus 
on high reliability organization theory (Chapter I), we then move onto a 
theoretical review of the concept of mindful organising (Chapter II). Chapter 
III describes the objectives of this thesis and the methodology used to carry 
out each empirical study presented within this thesis. The four studies carried 
out for this thesis are found in Chapters IV, V and VI. Our first empirical 
study validates a mindful organising measure in a nuclear power plant, 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 8 
distinguishing it from other important team-based safety variables and in 
doing so, clarifies some conceptual ambiguities in Chapter IV. We then 
expand our understanding of which team safety and communication 
conditions are needed to create and sustain mindful organising and what 
impact mindful organising may have on team satisfaction and turnover. We 
do so by testing a structural equation model in a sample of nuclear power 
plant workers in Chapter V. We go on to test two multilevel mediation models 
using workers from two separate chemical plants in chapter VI. The first 
model explores whether mindful organising mediated the relationship 
between team safety climate and individual in-role and extra-role safety 
behaviour. The second model looks at whether individual role breadth self-
efficacy mediates the relationship between mindful organising and in-role and 
extra role safety behaviours. We present a general discussion of our findings 
in Chapter VII. Finally, we finish with the most relevant conclusions drawn 



































































































This chapter will present and discuss various theories and paradigms 
used for understanding risk and safety in organizations. To do so, we begin 
by delving into where and why safety is important in organizations. Next, we 
present three significant theories used to understand safety in organizations: 
normal accident theory, high reliability organization theory as well as safety-
I and safety-II. Lastly, we conclude by extrapolating lessons that can be 
learned from these contrasting theories.  
1.2. SAFETY IN ORGANIZATIONS 
Safety is of primary concern for millions of organizations across the 
globe where the consequences of the work done pose danger to employees, 
the environment and sometimes even to the broader community in which 
these companies operate.  A few examples of industries where safety is of 
primary importance are construction, health care, manufacturing, aviation and 
nuclear power. Organizations operating in these industries have a strong 
moral and legal responsibility to do whatever they can to ensure the safety 
and wellbeing of all those that could be harmed by their operations. However, 
managing safety is not an easy feat, especially in a time where the complexity 
of technological systems are rising, making it more difficult than ever to fully 
understand and map out all of the interactions within the socio-technical 
system of an organization.  
The context and features of an industry or organization are key to 
understanding risk management, with some organizations operating in 
environments that pose far broader and more complex challenges for 
managing safety than others. It is painstakingly clear that some organizations 
manage risk and prevent accidents far better than others. This sometimes 
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extends to industries, as the lessons learned from approaches used in highly 
reliable organizations within one industry, may become implemented and 
become the safety standard in other organizations operating in the same 
industry. 
Human error has shown to be the leading cause of major accidents and 
events in many risky and complex industries, such as health care (Makary & 
Daniel, 2016), the nuclear industry (Reason, 1990), aviation (Helmreich, 
2000) and the petrochemical industry (Kariuki & Lowe, 2007). Focusing on 
human behavioural systems from a psychological perspective as the answer 
to better managing risk has been regarded as somewhat futile by certain 
scholars. For example, Perrow’s (1984) normal accident theory argues that 
accidents cannot be controlled as they are a normal consequence of complex 
systems and researchers from the discipline of engineering such as Leveson 
et al. (2009) argue for a system’s design approach to safety as the only way 
to effectively reduce human error. On the other hand, the merits and value of 
focusing on human behavioural systems have been endorsed in other theories 
such as safety-I and safety-II (Hollnagel, 2014) and High Reliability 
Organizations (HRO) theory (Rochlin, 1993; Sutcliffe, 2011; Weick et al., 
1999). These theories are discussed and contrasted in the following sections. 
1.3. NORMAL ACCIDENT THEORY 
Perrow (1984) analysed the system characteristics of large-scale 
accidents to understand how high-risk technologies and operations unravel as 
well as how to best manage these technologies. As an organizational 
sociologist, Perrow was largely interested in the system perspective in 
analysing large scale risky operations and their impact on society. Therefore, 
he analysed the details of every failure and contributing factor that caused 
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catastrophic accidents in a variety of sectors, such as aircraft crashes, the 
Three Mile Island nuclear accident, ship collisions at sea, dam collapses and 
DNA research. The analyses made and conclusions reached transformed the 
way many understood high risk organizations.   
After his extensive and detailed case study research on various 
accidents in many different sectors, he categorized an organizational system 
into four levels. Level one is a small part of a system such as rudders, tubes 
or valves. Level two is the combination of small parts that form a unit such 
as a motor or an engine. Level three refers to a subsystem, which is the 
combination of many units such as a navigation set in an aircraft. Level four 
is the entire system, which sums up all the subsystems, such as an aircraft 
carrier. Perrow used these various levels of analysis to distinguish between 
incidents and accidents. An incident is when there is a failure in a small part 
of the system (level one) or a unit of the system (level two). An accident is 
when a subsystem (level three) or the whole system (level four) fails.  
Perrow (1984) outlines two key interacting factors essential for 
understanding how organizational systems differ and how susceptible these 
organizations may be to accidents. These two factors are (1) coupling and (2) 
interactions.  
In terms of the first factor, Perrow identified that an organizational 
system can either be tightly coupled or loosely coupled. This idea was 
originally proposed by Weick (1976). In Perrow’s model (1984), he explains 
that coupling has to do with how much time or slack is tolerated between 
items within a system. He describes a tightly coupled system as rigid, 
intolerant of any delays and as having high interdependence among 
subsystems. This means that if there is a failure in one part of the system, it 
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has big ramifications for other parts of the system. Tightly coupled systems 
are rigid and not easily malleable so back up safety features need to be 
designed into the system as there is no time for on-the-spot changes and 
intervention. Loosely coupled systems, on the other hand, refer to systems 
that are more flexible in their mechanisms of control and have decentralised 
operations. This means that when changes happen in one part of the system, 
it does not necessarily affect the rest of the system, meaning that there is more 
time allowed in responding to emergencies and more flexibility in how those 
working in the system can address and tackle these emergencies.  
In terms of the second factor, Perrow identified that the interactions 
within a system could either be complex or linear. An organizational system 
with complex interactions means that all the various interactions happening 
within the system are difficult to fully conceptualise, monitor and understand. 
There are many feedback loops causing unforeseen and unplanned 
interactions. This means that complex systems inevitably experience 
unexpected events as it is impossible to monitor all the combinations of 
events that happen within the system. If an organization has linear 
interactions instead, it means that the parts of the system interact with one 
another in a sequential, straight forward and planned manner. These kinds of 
systems do not have a large number of feedback loops between parts of the 
system, which means each part of the system is easier to monitor and manage. 
From this, Perrow created a taxonomy to classify kinds of operations 
according to the type of interactions and the types of coupling, as seen in 
figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1. Perrow’s (1984) taxonomy of organizational systems according to 
the type of coupling and interactions.  
 
 










It is based on this reasoning that Perrow believes that accidents are 
normal and inevitable. He posits that in a system that is tightly coupled and 
complex, accidents cannot be avoided. This is because there are so many 
unforeseen interactions and failure in one part of the system has wide-ranging 
effects on other parts of the system. Therefore, Perrow believes that no matter 
how hard we try, we cannot stop these accidents from happening. After 
making this conclusion that all tightly coupled and complex systems will 
experience unforeseen and unavoidable accidents no matter what, Perrow 
looked at the catastrophic potential of organizations within this sphere of 
tightly coupled and complex interactions and mapped them out according to 
the cost of alternatives, as seen in figure 2 below. He then proposed 
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restrict or tolerate/ improve. It is unsurprising that in his thesis, he 
recommends abandoning nuclear-based operations, such as nuclear weapons 
and power plants. Jarringly, just two years after the release of Perrow’s book, 
the major Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster happened. 
Figure 2. Graph showing Perrow’s (1984) recommendations about how to 
deal with certain high-risk systems based on their catastrophic potential and 
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inevitably lead to failures and accidents. However, his framework has been 
criticised as oversimplifying the design of a system by not taking into account 
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various types of coupling (coupling according to time, structure, information, 
data etc.). This leads to the boundary conditions identified and comparisons 
between “types of systems” to be misguided, vague or inaccurate (Leveson et 
al., 2009).  The lack of an adequate definition of system parameters also leads 
to inappropriate comparisons and unlikely conclusions. This is seen in the 
actual rates of accidents in the technologies and systems identified. The most 
at-risk systems for “normal accidents” identified are systems that historically 
have the lowest accident rates of all industries (such as the nuclear power 
sector and aviation). Mining and manufacturing, on the other hand, have some 
of the highest accident rates and are placed in the “tolerate and improve” 
category as they appear to be less susceptible to accidents given that they are 
loosely coupled.  
Perrow also continuously attempts to absolve human error as the main 
cause of accidents in his analyses of system accidents, however, the majority 
of the patterns in situations of system accidents that he identifies are human 
errors (Leveson et al., 2009). He also goes on to pessimistically argue that 
people and organizations can never be capable of understanding and 
managing these complex technologies and therefore should abandon complex 
technologies that could lead to catastrophe if something goes wrong. This 
advice has not had much weight on a policy level, as we have seen that people 
have not been prepared to give up nuclear energy despite the potential safety 
hazards. This is largely because there are still energy shortages worldwide 
and nuclear power is a major source of satisfying energy demand. In addition, 
nuclear power has some environmental advantages as it does not emit carbon 
dioxide, which means it has a limited impact on the current climate change 
crisis. There is also still an abundant supply of uranium, which is needed for 
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nuclear power generation. Nevertheless, aside from the continuation of 
nuclear power plants, we have just seen a dramatic rise in other complex 
system technologies entering the market since Perrow came out with his 
theory, which have major risks inherent in them.  
Despite some shortsighted analyses and conclusions, normal accident 
theory was a useful starting framework for understanding the dynamics 
within an organizational system and how these may cause unexpected 
situations leading to uncontrollable accidents. However, it does not leave 
leaders and researchers of high-risk environments with much to work with in 
terms of better managing safety.  
1.4. HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATION THEORY 
High-reliability organizations are organizations that have been 
identified as hardly ever having “unwanted, unanticipated, and unexplainable 
variance in their performance” (Hollnagel, 1993, p. 51). The concept of high-
reliability organizations and the HRO paradigm was created by a team of 
researchers at the University of California, Berkeley (Rochlin et al., 1987). 
These authors wanted to understand why some organizations had 
exceptionally high safety standards and never seemed to fail. They identified 
nuclear power plants and air traffic control as two industries that managed to 
ensure safety despite continuously being exposed to high risk. Within this 
section, we will present definitions used by various authors to understand 
high reliability organizations. We will then discuss the various models created 
to summarise the defining features that make HROs so effective. We then end 
this section by discussing the main criticisms of this theory.  
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1.4.1 Definition of high reliability organizations 
Since the concept of HROs was discovered, there have been two 
major approaches to defining these kinds of organizations. The first approach 
focuses on what HROs achieve (the outcome of their operations). In fact, the 
original HRO research defined “high reliability” as the ability to maintain 
error free performance for long periods of time, in the face of consistent and 
numerous risks (Roberts, 1990; Roberts, 1993; Rochlin et al., 1987). 
Researchers then started to define HROs by looking at the statistics of failures 
over a period of time. Some authors (e.g. Hopkins, 2007) have criticised this 
approach as it does not sufficiently distinguish remarkable organizations that 
manage to ensure safety against all odds, with less remarkable organizations 
that merely manage to operate consistently without failure. Rochlin (1993) 
then argued that what distinguishes high reliability organizations from other 
types of organizations, is not necessarily only their accident rate, but rather 
the innate way in which they effectively manage risky technologies. 
Rochlin’s  (1993) newer definition suggests that perhaps a more meaningful 
way of defining HROs is by focusing on the processes these organizations 
use to successfully manage risky technologies. This second approach, of 
looking at the processes that allow HROs to successfully manage risky 
technologies has been the focal point of this research and theory going 
forward.   
1.4.2. HRO models 
Over the years, there have been various iterations of models that aim 
to capture the defining features or processes of HROs. Early research by 
Roberts and Rousseau (1989) argued that the following features distinguished 
HROs from other organizations: 
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• Following Perrow’s (1984) work, these authors argue that HROs operate 
in environments with high levels of interconnectedness between the 
components of the organization and high levels of complexity with 
various components and systems that are unpredictable and 
technologically sophisticated. 
• These organizations have clearly defined responsibilities and roles within 
a clear hierarchical structure. 
• There is redundancy designed into both human behaviour (people make 
continuous important decisions and supervise operations) and technology 
(multiple protection barriers and back-up systems that will take over if 
there is a failure of a single mechanism). 
• Strict adherence to procedures by all workers is expected at all times with 
clear expectations and high levels of accountability.  
• These organizations operate under time pressure where in the moment 
actions are needed in order to adequately manage the operation.  
Roberts and Rousseau (1989) posited that in order for an organization 
to be considered an HRO, it had to have all of these features.  
Building on this, other notable HRO processes identified by the team 
of original researchers at University of Berkeley, California (e.g. La Porte and 
Consolini, 1998; Roberts, 1990, 1993; Roberts and Bea, 2001; Rochlin, 1993) 
are:  
• HROs function in social and political environments that are unforgiving 
resulting in large pressure from internal and external stakeholders to 
achieve reliable performance above other competing demands such as 
efficiency. 
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• The technologies in HROs are risky creating constant possibilities for 
error. 
• The scale of the possible consequences of error is so large that it does not 
allow for learning through experimentation. 
• HROs use a complex system to serve and manage a complex external 
environment. 
• Decisions are made through hierarchical order during routine events, but 
deferred to those with the best expertise regardless of rank during 
emergency events. 
• There is a climate for ongoing learning and workers are continuously 
trained to increase their technical skillset and boost interpersonal trust. 
• There are many different channels to communicate safety-critical 
information to others to ensure quick access of essential information and 
pooling of expertise during emergencies.  
Further research on the organizational culture of a highly reliable Los 
Angeles nuclear submarine by Bierly and Spender (1995) confirmed the 
findings of the researchers at Berkely University. These authors found that 
the nuclear submarine had a culture that was characterised by:  
• Continuous exhaustive training capturing all potential unwanted 
scenarios, 
• a strong presence of risk and incident reporting with ongoing accident and 
landslide analysis to have an operational state of the organization, 
• rich, two-way communication between leaders and employees, and  
• decision making that is both centralised and decentralised.  
The various features described in the models above give some insight 
into system level design features as well as the social and people-related 
CHAPTER I: RISK AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT THEORIES 
 24 
processes that are said to help organizations operating in high-risk 
environments achieve high levels of reliability.  
Another well-known perspective on HRO theory is the work on high-
reliability  principles by Karl Weick and Kathy Sutcliffe and later Tim Vogus 
(e.g. Weick et al., 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001; 2007; 2015; Vogus & 
Sutcliffe, 2007; Sutcliffe, 2011; Sutcliffe et al., 2016). Weick and Colleagues 
built on the idea that effective HRO’s are successful due to their uncanny 
ability to manage the unexpected through competing approaches: anticipation 
and containment.  
First, workers in HROs organise themselves to always be anticipating 
everything that could threaten the stability and safety of the system to the best 
of their ability (Weick et al., 1999). Previous research echoes this idea as 
studies explain how HROs are committed to anticipating everything that 
could go wrong through their organizational practices and procedures. Case 
studies show that HROs are committed to designing for safety, by creating 
highly standardised working procedures, rules, routines and contingency 
plans to best guide organizational behaviour to avoid mishaps, errors and 
accidents (Hirschhorn, 1999). They create these plans and protocols after 
mapping out the events or conditions that may lead to occurrences that they 
do not want to happen (Schulman, 2004). However, case studies of various 
HROs also show that those operating within these systems know that 
adherence to rules based on what worked in the past cannot always prevent 
incidents as even detailed procedures cannot control and cover what they have 
not yet anticipated (Hirschhorn, 1999). Therefore, they organise themselves 
in a way that mapped out procedures can be carried out with flexibility, 
improvisation and adaption during novel and unexpected events by a highly 
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trained workforce (Sutcliffe, 2011). They also manage fluctuations of 
performance and human interaction to identify unforeseen circumstances that 
could destabilise the system as they occur (Weick et al., 1999; Schulman, 
2004). 
Second, HROs organise for containment, in that they are committed 
to resilient action to quickly manage, and bounce back, from the unavoidable 
fluctuations that occur in their work. According to Sutcliffe (2011): 
 “Resilience involves three abilities: (1) the ability to absorb 
strain and preserve functioning in spite of the presence of adversity 
(e.g., rapid change, ineffective leadership, performance and 
production pressures, increasing demands from stakeholders); (2) an 
ability to recover or bounce back from untoward events – as the team, 
unit, system becomes better able to absorb a surprise and stretch 
rather than collapse; and (3) an ability to learn and grow from 
previous episodes.” (pp. 136-137). 
High reliability organizations are always trying to build their 
resilience capabilities (Weick et al., 1999; Hollnagel et al., 2006) to ensure 
that they are consistently stable, as instability could lead to catastrophic 
consequences. This does not mean that HROs do not experience errors, it is 
just that errors are always controlled and do not destabilise the system 
(Sutcliffe, 2011). Resilience is created through learning from errors, training 
and simulations as well as having a wide range of responses to use in a 
flexible manner (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
Investigations into social and behavioural factors that underpin 
effective anticipation and containment by Weick and Roberts (1993) and 
Weick et al. (1999) uncovered that workers in effective HRO displayed 
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highly attentive patterns of interrelating. They called this “heedful 
interrelating”. This attentive pattern of interrelating came from each member 
of the team carefully making decisions or performing a certain action with 
the full awareness that they are operating in a system created by connected 
actions between them and their team members. They then carefully fit their 
actions into this reciprocal system with others. This attentive pattern of 
interrelating allowed for teams to better understand the complexity they faced 
which resulted in fewer errors. The capability for each team member to 
exhibit such mindful awareness of their actions and how they fit into the 
broader system allowed for more effective responses to these unexpected 
events (events not controlled for in procedures). According to these authors, 
this ability to engage in an attentive pattern of interrelating led to more 
sophisticated collective reasoning and sense-making which leads to a larger 
range of responses and actions at the team’s disposal to successfully deal with 
anything they were faced with. In environments such as this, successfully 
handling unexpected events stems more from active interpretation rooted in 
a capability to act and less from decision making (Weick & Roberts, 1993). 
Weick and Roberts (1993) called this capability a kind of “collective mind” 
(later called “mindful organising”) following theories on organizations as 
mental entities capable of collective thought (Sandelands & Stablein, 1987). 
Mindful organising is defined as the collective capability that allows teams to 
detect intricate details about possible problematic issues and act swiftly in 
response to such details (Weick et al., 1999). This follows Langer’s (1989) 
definition of mindfulness where she highlights that the action or new 
perspective that arises from a mindful state (or act of noticing) is just as 
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important as achieving that mindful state or state of awareness in the first 
place. 
There are five practices and attitudes that appear to underpin and 
reinforce “heedful interrelating” or “mindful organising” (Suctliffe, 2011). 
They are: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, 
sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise 
(Weick et al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). These five processes of 
mindful organising are enacted on a team level and present a promising 
behavioural framework to understand how collective efforts can be used to 
manage unexpected events. Advancing our understanding of mindful 
organising in high-risk environments will be the focus of this dissertation. 
The concept of mindful organising and its characteristic process will be dealt 
with in detail in the next chapter. 
1.4.3. Criticisms of the HRO paradigm 
Critics of HRO theory, such as Leveson et al. (2009), believe that 
researchers within this paradigm fall into the same traps as Perrow’s (1984) 
normal accident theory. They argue that HRO researchers oversimplify the 
causes of accidents and are too quick to find similarities between completely 
different types of systems. These critics also find fault in the interchangeable 
use of “reliability” and “safety” within this theory, when the definition of each 
of these terms is completely different. Reliability means that a part of a system 
or a system as a whole fulfils the requirements of what it was supposed to 
fulfil. Safety implies that there were no failures or unacceptable losses. The 
truth is that often perfectly reliable components of a system interact to create 
accidents in complex systems. According to Sutcliffe (2011), HRO 
researchers themselves have since acknowledged that the terminology used 
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is unfortunate, but it was needed at the time to be used as an all-encompassing 
description of systems with dynamic responses, activities and properties that 
are constantly attempting to enhance their reliability to either prevent or 
quickly recover from errors. It has also been acknowledged by the HRO 
community that pursuing and achieving both reliability and safety is elusive 
(Schulman, 2007). Therefore, it is more useful to think of the concept of high 
reliability as a dynamic process of organising rather than one of being an 
HRO because achieving reliability is a continuous, ongoing accomplishment” 
(Sutcliffe, 2011). It has also been made clear that “HROs”’ are not 
distinguished based an error and accident rates, but rather on how effectively 
these organizations can manage exceptionally risky technology very 
effectively through intensive effort and control (Weick et al., 1999).  
These critics from the engineering field (e.g. Dekker, 2004; Leveson, 
2004; Rasmussen, 1997) also argue that the best way to understand and 
manage safety is through thorough system design and focusing on 
“decentralised human action and interaction” is futile. These authors argue 
for simpler, more a full proof safety management by mapping out a system 
and designing for better safety and fewer risks. This is done by finding 
boundary conditions and leverage points within an organizational system to 
find the best conditions of safety to ensure that we design for safer responses 
and adjustments to safety. It is a top-down approach that requires a full 
understanding of a safety system and the boundary conditions and leverage 
points available. However, research shows that there are limits to logical 
prevention of safety hazards (Hirschhorn, 1993; Schulman, 2004; Weick et 
al., 1999). Procedures can never fully cover all the various situations or 
conditions that shape peoples work (Sutcliffe, 2011) 
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1.5. SAFETY-I AND SAFETY-II 
Another prominent theory which is rising in popularity is that of 
Safety-I and Safety-II. This theory, much like the HRO paradigm looks at 
positive deviance in risk management. Researchers such as Hollnagel (2014) 
have argued that every other science will analyse a certain phenomenon to try 
to understand it better. However, in safety science, researchers tend to analyse 
accidents and system failures to try to understand the phenomenon of safety, 
when accidents represent the absence of safety. He believes that if we want 
to study safety and truly understand how to lower accident rates, we need to 
research the billions of cases where there are perfect conditions of safety and 
nothing goes wrong, and from this, we should extrapolate lessons about how 
to create safer workplaces. Hollnagel believes that there are not enough 
frameworks and models that show us how to comprehend the billions of cases 
where safety is high, and nothing goes wrong.  He therefore distinguishes 
between two approaches to thinking about safety: safety-I and safety-II. In 
the Safety-I approach, safety is defined as a situation where as few things as 
possible went wrong. In safety-II, safety is defined as a situation where as 
many things as possible go right. He believes that in order to reduce accidents 
and mishaps we must dedicate more time to analyse and understand why 
things usually go right and less time to analyse why things occasionally go 
wrong, although this is also important. 
Hollnagel (1993; 2014; 2018) believes in looking at safety from a 
systems perspective through applying “resilience engineering”. He argues 
that it is problematic to think of safety in a linear way, where we believe that 
there is a cause and consequence of something going wrong, so we search for 
the cause to mitigate the consequence. Many researchers within high risk 
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environments do this, they look at certain consequences (major accidents) and 
try to find all the things that went wrong to try to change them. The problem 
with this, according to Hollnagel, is that desirable and undesirable 
consequences both result from the same thing in complex systems (the 
adjustments we make in our everyday work). When things go wrong, we must 
not try to understand the cause of the failure, but we should rather try to 
understand how things have normally gone right. In other words, to explain 
the failure of a part of a system, we need to know how it usually works. This 
approach entails analyzing the work people normally do and the adjustments 
in performance that people usually make to identify potential weak points 
across the whole system. This way we can achieve safety more easily as we 
identify and change the boundary conditions through which work adjustments 
are made to make these adjustments more favourable. 
 As figure 3 below illustrates, statistically, the probability of 
something going wrong in high-risk systems is often exceptionally low 
(around a 1 in 10 000 chance), this is illustrated by the red portion of the 
graph. However, the probability of operations going well and nothing failing 
is very high (around 9999 in 10 000 chance), this is illustrated by the green 
portion of the graph. Hollnagel et al. (2015) make a strong case for the fact 
that we need to fully analyse and understand the many times where accidents 
and failures do not occur to inform safety practice and management. Rather 
than spending all our time, resources and effort basing safety strategy on 
trying to find (often arbitrary causes) of safety failures. 
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Figure 3. Graph illustrating the imbalance between things that go right 
and things that go wrong (Hollnagel et al, 2015) 
 
Hollnagel et al. (2015) recognise that it is tempting to find a single 
well-defined problem in the safety-I approach and find solutions to fixing this 
problem, but it will never be as effective as a safety-II approach. It is 
important to note that Hollnagel does not argue for abandoning all safety-I 
efforts, as accident analysis is essential for learning and will always be 
important for identifying risk. However, the safety-II has gained great traction 
and many scholars believe this theory is more robust and effective than 
traditional methods of approaching safety (e.g. Dieckmann et al., 2017; 
Patriarca et al., 2018; Wears & Sutcliffe, 2019).  
Hollnagel’s understanding of safety recognises that systems cannot 
simply be decomposed to find causes of possible failure, as this bimodal 
understanding of systems is shortsighted and dangerous in today’s complex 
organizations and institutions. He argues that work needs to be viewed as 
variable and flexible. From a human behaviour perspective, this theory 
suggests a better way of understanding complex systems is by analyzing the 
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intricacies of work actually done instead of work as imagined. “Work as 
done” is often characterised by situations where (1) people adapt and 
rearrange their environment to reach their goals, (2) people avoid harmful 
things, (3) people know that others in their work environment are also 
adapting and avoiding harm like they are. All three of these processes are 
done unconsciously, without actively thinking about it.  He criticises how a 
safety-I approach (looking for a system or human causes of failure) does not 
consider the how and why human performance regularly is successful in 
attaining safety through people adjusting their behaviour to their 
circumstances. He argues that in a world of increasingly complex and 
uncertain systems and technology, focusing on the human behavioural 
adjustments that make systems work become crucial for managing risk and 
safety. Therefore, Hollnagel argues that we should develop more performance 
models to understand how human performance “goes right” despite the 
complexity, goal conflict and uncertainty in work situations. He highlights 
that these models are lacking in traditional safety management. Safety-I does 
not fully articulate how to prepare for unforeseen and unexpected 
circumstances that happen consistently in organizations and societies that 
require quick, real-time responses from people on the ground in order to adapt 
and contain these situations. For this reason, individual variability in 
performance is needed, to adapt their behaviours to the “unplanned event” 
and achieving safety.  
Unexpected events stemming from interactions that were not possible 
to foresee and/or properly manage are only going to be more and more 
prevalent as we create more complexity through our increasingly 
sophisticated technologies and world. What is needed when these unexpected 
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events disrupt the system is in the moment responses that can only really be 
made by human initiative and action (Hollnagel et al., 2015; Sutcliffe, 2011). 
This human initiative and action are best equipped when it is organised and 
emergent, helping the system in which it operates to quickly anticipate when 
things are about to go wrong, and then act quickly to recover damage (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2007). The revolutionary idea behind Holnagels argument, that 
many engineers may disagree with, is that most of the time people are not the 
problem when it comes to safety management, but rather, they are the 
solution. 
This is where high reliability organization theory, and especially 
Weick and colleagues mindful organizing model (Weick et al., 1999; Weick 
& Suctliffe, 2007) has some interesting points of reference in terms of the 
behavioural and organizational elements that are important for managing 
safety.  
1.6. CONCLUSIONS 
All models and theories of organizational systems are limited and do 
not take into account various ambiguities and cannot begin to define every 
factor influencing operations. However, using the insight gained from a 
psychological behavioural systems perspective is still of major value to 
scholars and organizational leaders as these theories can give us resources 
and blueprints to enhance safety management to the best of our ability. Using 
the engineering systems perspective, which entails building detailed 
operating procedures based on boundary conditions and systems analysis, is 
an essential prerequisite for designing for safety as it creates operating 
discipline (Sutcliffe, 2011). It should not be ignored, and it should be the first 
point of analysis with creating safer systems. However, as many engineers 
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agree, complex systems entail hundreds of unforeseen interactions that result 
in unexpected events which can disrupt the system at any moment (Hollnagel 
et al., 2015, Leveson et al., 2009). Moreover, over-reliance on operating 
procedures and treating individuals and teams as mostly passive agents in the 
system creates blind adherence to safety processes, which lessens people’s 
ability to respond effectively to surprises (Weick et al., 1999). Therefore, it is 
crucial for sociologists and psychologists to help inform safety management 
paradigms by illustrating the conditions under which human behaviour is able 
to successfully manage and contain unexpected events, which is the biggest 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The following chapter presents the team level capability found to 
underpin the success of high reliability organizations: mindful organising. We 
begin this chapter by first discussing the broader definition of mindful 
organising and discuss the five processes of mindful organising. We will then 
position mindful organising within other concepts of mindfulness. Thereafter, 
we will discuss the state of the literature on mindful organising, the utility of 
this research and its shortcomings. Lastly, we will conclude by briefly 
discussing future research needed to increase the impact of mindful 
organising in research and practice.  
2.2. DEFINING MINDFUL ORGANISING 
2.2.1. Initial conceptualisation 
The concept of mindful organising emerged from Weick and Roberts 
(1993) and Weick et al.’s (1999) research into how high reliability 
organizations (HROs) managed to achieve almost error-free performance 
under such trying conditions. From this, these authors observed that HROs 
had a different social and relational infrastructure to other kinds of 
organizations. Weick and Roberts (1993) discovered that teams in effective 
HROs engaged in  “heedful interrelating”. This “heedful interrelating” meant 
that teams were highly attentive in their actions and interactions with one 
another. Further research into these highly attentive actions and interactions 
showed that it allowed teams to have an expanded understanding of the 
system in which they operated (Weick et al., 1999). This expanded 
understanding of the system was also linked to a wider range of possible 
responses to novel or unexpected situations (Weick et al., 1999; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). This meant teams were able to manage the unexpected and 
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contain errors far more effectively than teams operating in other high-risk 
environments (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). They called this team phenomenon 
mindful organising.  
Mindful organising was then defined as “the collective capability to 
detect discriminatory detail about emerging issues and act swiftly to respond 
to such details” (Weick et al., 1999, p. X). The detection of discriminatory 
detail about emerging issues allowed teams on the front line to anticipate 
potential errors, anomalies or unexpected events (Wick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
The ability to act swiftly in responding to these errors, anomalies or 
unexpected events allowed these teams to recover from, or contain, these 
possibly problematic events (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). These definitions 
appear to conceptualise mindful organising as a two-factor variable, with the 
ability to anticipate errors, anomalies and unexpected events as the first factor 
and the ability to act swiftly to contain these events as the second factor. 
However, the analysis into this collective capability through case study 
analyses of effective HROs showed that mindful organising was enacted by 
five interrelated practices and attitudes (Weick et al., 1999). They are: (1) a 
preoccupation with error, (2) a reluctance to simplify interpretations, (3) a 
sensitivity to operations, (4) a commitment to resilience and (5) deference to 
expertise. It appeared that the first three processes underpinned a team’s 
capability for anticipation and the last two processes underpinned a team’s 
capability for containment and recovery (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
2.2.2. The five processes of mindful organising 
Most theoretical and empirical articles outlining the five processes of 
mindful organising offer short definitions of each dimension, with little 
conceptual coherence among the various explanations of these processes. The 
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most detailed description of the five processes of mindful organising comes 
from the three editions of the management book “Managing the unexpected” 
written by the original authors of this concept Weick and Sutcliffe (2001; 
2007; 2015). However, even in these accounts of the five processes of 
mindful organising, there are some conceptual ambiguities and there appear 
to be overlapping ideas between the five constructs. Through analyzing the 
current literature on mindful organising from theoretical articles (LaPorte & 
Consolini, 10991; Sutcliffe, 2011; Reb & Choi, 2014; Vogus, 2011; Vogus & 
Sutcliffe, 2012), case studies (Schulman, 1993; Weick et al., 1999; Weick & 
Roberts, 1993), empirical studies (Hoy et al., 2006; Mu & Butler, 2009; Ray 
et al., 2011; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) to the management books on mindful 
organising by Weick and Sutcliffe (2001; 2007; 2015), we have attempted to 
clarify the definitions and theoretical models of each of the five processes of 
mindful organising (Renecle & Gracia, in preparation). These concepts are 
explained below.  
Teams that engage in mindful organising are preoccupied with 
errors. This means that teams are always concerned about potential or actual 
errors. After an extensive review of theoretical and conceptual accounts of 
preoccupation with error, it appears as if this process of mindful organising 
is manifested through four main behavioural indicators in a team. The team:  
1. is always aware of the high potential for errors or unexpected events in 
their work environment,  
2. spends time and effort trying to anticipate everything that could go wrong,  
3. places continuous importance on detecting and reporting errors, and  
4. takes any error or near-error very seriously as it could indicate larger 
problems.  
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A preoccupation with error is an essential practice for anticipating 
potential threats and unexpected events within a system. The four behavioural 
indicators encompass both attitudes and actions/practices. The first indicator 
of preoccupation with error describes an attitude, where team members 
remain cautious and attentive at all times that something could potentially go 
wrong in their work since they are operating in a dangerous high-risk 
environment (Schulman, 1993). The second indicator describes a practice, 
where teams work hard to anticipate and specify what could go wrong as well 
as identify the mistakes they do not want to make (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
The third indicator also refers to practices, where teams will make sure to 
identify and report errors of all size (Rochlin, 1993; Westrum, 1992). The 
fourth indicator is an attitude, where teams will always treat small deviations 
and mistakes seriously, as it could potentially mean a bigger problem 
elsewhere in the system (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). 
Mindful organising also requires teams to be reluctant to simplify 
interpretations. This means that the group tries to actively avoid simple 
analyses of complex phenomena as it could lead to incorrect conclusions. Our 
review of the concept of reluctance to simply interpretations showed that it 
encompassed the following four behavioural indicators. The team:  
1. will refrain from making assumptions or drawing conclusions too quickly 
when interpreting and diagnosing what is happening in their environment,  
2. pays attention to new evidence or information that a situation has changed 
rather than relying on old explanations when making sense of something 
new or unexpected at work,  
3. will encourage rich exchanges of points of view to be able to have a more 
complete picture of what is happening in their work environment, and  
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4. encourages a questioning attitude and ongoing scepticism when 
interpreting what is happening in their environment.  
This component of mindful organising helps teams to gain as much 
information about what is going on in their work, before creating labels or 
conclusions about an unexpected event or error (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
This safeguards teams, to a certain extent, from coming to incorrect 
conclusions about the causes or consequences of errors or unexpected events. 
The four behavioural indicators within this process of mindful organising 
encompass practices and attitudes to do with communication and sense-
making within the team. The first indicator has to do with resisting possible 
assumptions made by others by challenging one another when an assumption 
is made too quickly or a deep analysis of the situation has not yet taken place 
(Schulman, 1993). The second indicator describes the practice of paying 
attention to any new cues that something has changed when trying to 
understand a novel situation (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). It also entails 
discussing the unique aspects of a situation before relying on past 
explanations of this situation. In fact, according to Weick & Sutcliffe (2007) 
when teams recognise familiarity in a new situation that could signify 
something they have already experienced and controlled before, this is a sense 
of concern rather than comfort for them. This has to do with the fact that 
superficial similarities between the past and present may mask the more 
fundamental differences in the information that could ultimately lead to a 
catastrophe (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). The third indicator describes the 
practice of teams getting together and gathering various points of view of 
what is happening at work by encouraging different explanations of what is 
happening among themselves (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). The fourth indicator 
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has to do with ensuring team members remain sceptical and continuously ask 
questions to try to diagnose and better understand novel situations at work 
(Rochlin, 1993).  
Teams that organise mindfully are also sensitive to operations. This 
means that teams and leaders remain aware of the reality of what is happening 
in operations at any given moment. After consulting the current literature on 
mindful organising, it appears as if sensitivity to operations is manifested by 
three core behavioural indicators. In showing sensitivity to operations, teams 
will:  
1. be constantly aware of the details of current operations and the big picture 
status of their work, and  
2. constantly communicate and update management on the intricacies of 
current operations. 
Sensitivity to operations is also sustained from management actions, 
where managers: 
1. are in touch with the reality of operations happening on the front-line 
Sensitivity to operations allows for teams to remain aware of the 
important intricacies of operations within the system, especially those that 
affect their work (Weick et al., 1999). The connectedness of the team with 
others in the system coupled with an awareness of what is happening 
elsewhere in the system, allows team members and leaders to quickly detect 
and communicate any important information as it happens (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). The three indicators of sensitivity to operations have to do 
with team communication practices and entail contact and communication 
with leaders and managers. The first indicator has to do with gathering and 
synthesizing information about operations happening beyond the teams work, 
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that is important for the team’s work (Rochlin, 1997). This is often 
accomplished through various practices such as frequent operations meetings, 
wide dissemination of operational measures of performance and continuous 
face-to-face interactions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). The second indicator has 
to do with team members sharing possible anomalies or strange events with 
managers and leaders. It entails teams informing leaders of the procedures 
and policies that do not reflect the realities of operations. This has similarities 
with the concept of “work as done” versus “work as imagined” discussed by 
Hollnagel (2014) as workers will constantly update management on the 
realities of how work is actually done. The last indicator has to do with 
management accessibility and contact with teams. Teams that are sensitive to 
operations have leaders that are accessible when important issues develop, 
have close and continuous contact with the team and are quick to adapt 
procedures to reflect the reality of what is happening in operations (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Teams that engage in mindful organising are committed to 
resilience. Resilience means being able to bounce back from adverse events 
and continue to operate normally. Our extensive review of the mindful 
organising literature shows that teams that are committed to resilience both 
prepare for resilience and act resiliently.  
1. Preparing for resilience means teams will develop their ability to be 
resilient through different practices. Some important practices to prepare 
for resilience are training, simulations and learning from errors.  
2. Teams also act resiliently when faced with unexpected events and errors. 
This is seen in teams being able to quickly recover and maintain the 
stability of the system through flexibly using a wide range of responses.  
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Commitment to resilience has to do with essential actions and 
practices that help teams in recovering from mishaps, errors or unwanted 
surprises (Weick et al., 1999). The first indicator (preparing for resilience) 
encompasses practices that are carried out to expand team members 
knowledge, skills and capabilities to better deal with unexpected events so 
that they are better equipped to correct and contain these events before they 
destabilise the system (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). The second indicator 
(acting resiliently) has to do with teams having the resources and flexibility 
to be able to bounce back from errors or unexpected events as they arise to 
maintain stability within the system (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
Engaging in mindful organising also means that teams defer to 
expertise. This means that when facing unexpected events, decision-making 
migrates to those in the team with the best expertise rather than those with the 
highest rank. From the extant literature on mindful organising, it appears as 
if deference to expertise encompasses four behavioural indicators. When 
faced with an unexpected event or novel situation:  
1. team members know each person’s knowledge and capabilities, so they 
know who to call on to help make decisions, 
2. “experts” within the system may be called upon to help make decisions, 
3. those closest to the potential problem could become the sense makers and 
experts in certain cases, and 
4. expert decision making sometimes comes from informal networks of 
people with a diversity of expertise making decisions together.  
Deference to expertise refers to the practice of decisions migrating to 
those with the best expertise rather than the highest rank in the face of 
unexpected events or crises. This expertise could come in the form of first-
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hand knowledge, previous experience and educational expertise or even 
pooling of various capabilities in informal networks. Deference to expertise 
is an essential component of recovery and containment. The first and second 
indicators of deference to expertise speak to the practice of exposing team 
members to the human capital available within the system so that team 
members are aware of the skillsets of accessible people within the system 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). The third indicator of deference to expertise has 
to do with the practice of paying close attention to what people on the front-
line are seeing and experiencing and empowering them to make decisions 
during unexpected events (Roberts et al., 1994; Weick et al., 1999). The 
fourth indicator explains the practice of collective pooling expertise to make 
better decisions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
By delving into the five processes of mindful organising, it becomes 
apparent that it is a complex team level capability which entails various 
practices, attitudes and norms. It appears, theoretically, that mindful 
organising comprises of two overarching factors: anticipation and 
containment. Within these two overarching factors, there are five subfactors. 
Despite the multifaceted nature of this team variable, research and 
measurement of mindful organising have tended to oversimplify the model, 
limiting its impact and validity.  
2.3. MINDFUL ORGANISING WITHIN THE BROADER CONCEPT 
OF MINDFULNESS 
Individual mindfulness as a concept was originally taken from Eastern 
practices to do with meditation. It is most widely defined as having two 
components: (1) present moment awareness of events happening internally 
and externally and (2) a stance of non-judgement of what is noticed (e.g. 
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Sheldon et al. 2015). Individual mindfulness is an intrapsychic state of 
consciousness whereby attention is focused on events occurring in the present 
moment. Since making its way into western society, research and practice 
into individual mindfulness have exploded as it has shown to have wide-
reaching positive implications for wellbeing, emotion regulation and life 
satisfaction (Keng et al., 2011) to name a few. Although mindful organising 
is vastly different from the mainstream definition of individual mindfulness, 
mindful organising was conceptualised using Langer’s (1989) definition of 
individual mindfulness. Langer posits that a mindful state comes from 
actively differentiating and clarifying existing categories and distinctions, 
creating new disconnected categories out of the connected series of events 
that happen in one’s work or life. From this, a more nuanced appreciation of 
context, and alternative ways of dealing with one’s context, arises. Mindful 
organising is characterised by noticing weak signals, critically analysing and 
reframing such signals leading to an enlarged understanding of what is 
noticed (Weick et al., 1999). This enlarged understanding of what is noticed 
is closely linked to an enlarged or wider repertoire of action capabilities 
(Westrum, 1988).  
Despite the similarities in Langer’s definition of individual 
mindfulness and mindful organising, labelling mindful organising as a form 
of mindfulness has been met with scepticism. This may be because the 
mainstream understanding of mindfulness is the ability to be present in the 
current moment, non-judgementally (Dane, 2011). Mindful organising 
researchers have argued that it is a form of mindfulness, but it is rather seen 
in actions and interactions among team members, rather than an intrapsychic 
process that happens in the minds of individuals (Morgeson & Hofmann, 
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1999). Some have also argued that the fact that mindful organising is 
conceptually so much more complex than individual mindfulness merely 
represents the richness and versatility at the core of the mindfulness construct 
(Sutcliffe et al., 2016). Despite this, some reviewers believe that the concept 
of mindful organising is too safety specific and that it cannot be considered 
as a widely useable team form of mindfulness. Some authors argue that team 
mindfulness should represent the more mainstream concept of individual 
mindfulness (present-moment attention to events happening in a team, non-
judgementally). For example, Yu and Zellmer-Bruhn (2017) argue that team 
mindfulness is a set of shared practices among members of a team 
characterised by awareness and attention to events happening in the moment 
and non-judgementally processing experiences happening within the team. 
Although mindful organising is said to represent a team form of 
mindfulness, it does not stay close to the original concept of mindfulness 
enough to be accurately called “team mindfulness”. Mindful organising is 
more of a niche concept as it refers more to safety management capabilities 
in teams that require ongoing mindful interactions. Although it is different to 
the current research on “team mindfulness”, we argue that it is it also a shared 
unit property that emerges from individual behaviours and perceptions to the 
team level (Renecle et al., 2020). Vogus and Sutcliffe (2012) posit that it is 
through task interdependence (working closely with one another) and 
attraction-selection-attrition processes (Schneider, 1987) that behaviours and 
perceptions to do mindful organising are likely to align among teammates. 
Researchers within the HRO paradigm (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012) also 
introduced another form of mindful organising that extended to the norms and 
practices to do with the five processes of mindful organising on an 
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organizational level, they called this construct organizational mindfulness. 
These researchers posit that organizational mindfulness encompasses much 
of the same content as mindful organising, but its referent and level of 
analysis is different. Organizational mindfulness is a top-down construct that 
is more enduring than mindful organising (which is said to be a bottom-up, 
fragile capability). The focus point of organizational mindfulness is top 
management and it is brought about through policies procedures and 
strategies enacted by these managers (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012). Although 
organizational mindfulness represents an interesting concept and appears to 
be a concept that would help to lay the infrastructure and culture to sustain 
and encourage mindful organising, there has not been much attention or 
research on organizational mindfulness, except conceptual studies from those 
who introduced it initially (e.g. Sutcliffe et al., 2016). 
2.4. THE STATE OF THE LITERATURE ON MINDFUL 
ORGANISING  
Since its inception, mindful organising research has been welcomed 
by some as an exciting new team construct to help us better understand team-
based risk management and criticised by others as being unclear and 
impractical. In this section, we will discuss the state of the mindful organising 
literature.  
2.4.1. Antecedents and consequences of mindful organising 
The current literature identifies three main influences that are 
important for fostering mindful organising, they are: leadership behaviour, 
organizational practices and information technology. Most empirical research 
on mindful organising has been done in the medical sector, this is 
unsurprising as it is a sector that continues to grapple with safety issues 
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related with human error and mismanagement of unexpected events (Makary 
& Daniel, 2016) 
In terms of leadership behaviour, research has shown leaders that 
exhibit a clear purpose and use clear language enabled mindful organising in 
perinatal units (Knox, Simpson & Garite, 1999). Studies show that trust in 
leadership appears to be an important prerequisite for mindful organising in 
a school setting and nursing units of hospitals (e.g. Hoy, Gage & Tarter, 2006; 
Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). Ausserhofer et al. (2013) found that perceived 
leader supportiveness in general positively predicted mindful organising in 
nurses in hospitals. Similarly, Madsen et al. (2006) found that leadership 
support of front-line decisions had a positive impact on mindful organising in 
a paediatric intensive care unit. Madsen et al (2006) also found that leaders 
trained in HRO principles positively predicted mindful organising. More 
traditional, draconian leadership was found to negatively impact mindful 
organising in paediatric intensive care units (Roberts et al., 2005). A recent 
study by Gracia et al. (2020) showed that empowering leadership had a 
positive impact on mindful organising in a nuclear power plant. These studies 
show that although mindful organising is a bottom-up, team-level construct, 
leadership behaviour towards teams is an important condition to consider 
when trying to foster mindful organising, the above studies suggest that 
leaders need to take on more trusting, empowering and supportive leadership 
approaches to set the right conditions for mindful organising to develop.  
In terms of organizational practices, active socialization of individuals 
and teams into the principles of HROs and mindful organising has been 
suggested as antecedents of mindful organising in traditional HROs through 
case study evidence (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Participatory communication 
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(receiving information, sending information and organizational openness) 
was also found to positively predict mindful organising in a food processing 
plant (Novak & Sellnow, 2009). It was also found that post-event debriefs 
lead to higher mindful organising in paediatric intensive care units (Madsen 
et al., 2006). In all, these findings suggest that creating practices that 
encourage on-going, open communication within the organization could be 
important for mindful organising. 
In terms of technology, in two case studies Valorinta (2009) found 
that information technology (IT) systems can increase mindful organising as 
it can help increase team’s attention and awareness of IT risks, aid in the 
careful analysis of issues and can help with stimulating organizational 
collaboration. This author also argues that IT systems can expand a team’s 
action repertoires by providing a platform for mandating change or 
innovation. However, Valorinta (2009) also found that in some ways IT 
systems can inhibit mindful organising by routinising and automating work, 
limiting the flexibility of teams to take ownership of emerging issues and act 
to contain them. This research suggests that organizations looking to foster 
mindful organising in their teams could use their IT systems as tools to help 
facilitate the processes of mindful organising. However, creating IT systems 
to facilitate mindful organising could bring greater complexity into the 
organizational system, creating more organizational system interactions that 
are difficult to understand, inevitably increasing unexpected events. 
Most research on the outcomes of mindful organising has looked at 
the effect of mindful organising on performance. Mindful organising has been 
shown qualitatively to result in higher reliability in traditional HROs (LaPorte 
& Consolini 1991), more effective response to disasters and traumas in fire 
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departments (Bigley & Roberts., 2001) and lead to fewer mortality rates 
(Madsen et al. 2006; Roberts et al. 2005) in medical settings. Quantitative 
studies also show that mindful organising leads to fewer medication errors 
(Ausserhofer et al. 2013; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007), patient falls (Vogus & 
Sutcliffe, 2007) and workarounds leading to fewer safety failures (Dierynck 
et al., 2016) in studies done in hospitals. Hales et al. (2012) found that a 10-
day mindful organising intervention led to fewer failed nurse inspections, a 
reduction of negative incidents between nurses and patients families and even 
a small increase in the number of patients discharged alive. Mindful 
organising also decreased the likelihood of aviation teams losing control of 
aircrafts in commercial aviation during unforeseen events (Oliver et al., 
2019). Further studies found it has the potential to lead to better performance 
in sectors beyond traditional high-risk industries. It has shown to positively 
impact operational performance in a business unit (Su, 2017). Unsurprisingly, 
in non-high risk settings, mindful organising was found to be more beneficial 
for organizations in uncertain environments than those in stable 
environments. Finally, research by Kudesia et al. (2019) showed that mindful 
organising was associated with more effective problem solving and higher 
individual mindfulness. Taken together, these studies back up the original 
claims made by HRO researchers that mindful organising leads to enhanced 
performance.  
Apart from the performance benefits, mindful organising may have 
benefits for workers’ affective states and wellbeing. However, Vogus et al. 
(2014) argue that a complex relationship between mindful organising and 
worker wellbeing exists where mindful organising can be taxing for workers 
(negatively impacting wellbeing), however, it gives workers resources to 
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cope in adverse circumstances. In their study with nurses, these authors found 
that mindful organising had a positive impact on wellbeing if nurses worked 
in environments with many adverse events, but it negatively impacted 
wellbeing in nurses that worked in environments with fewer adverse events. 
This has been reiterated by other authors such as Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) 
and Levinthal and Rerup (2006) who suggest that mindful organising is 
demanding for those who engage in it but it can be especially helpful in 
difficult circumstances (Levinthal & Rerup 2006, Schulman 1993, Weick & 
Sutcliffe 2001). 
It is evident that of the current research on mindful organising, that 
although research in this area is growing, there is a basic understanding of 
what leads to mindful organising and what benefits can be seen from it.  
2.4.2. Major research gaps and disputes  
At present, research into mindful organising continues to thrive as 
more and more scholars and practitioners apply the five principles that are 
said to underlie higher reliability and better management of the unexpected. 
However, this body of work still faces major research gaps and criticisms, 
limiting its utility and applicability in research and practice as well as keeping 
it on the outskirts of more mainstream safety research. Issues to do with 
mindful organising’s conceptualization, nomological network and 
measurement will be discussed in this section.  
2.4.2.1. Conceptualization issues 
The conceptualization of each of the five processes of mindful 
organising currently lacks clarity because the various accounts of each of 
these processes by the original authors of mindful organising merely present 
loose descriptions of each of the five processes, which change from one paper 
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to the next (e.g. Weick et al., 1999; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007; Sutcliffe et al., 
2016; Sutcliffe, 2011). Weick and Sutcliffe (2007; 2015) attempt to provide 
models for each of the five processes in their management books, however, 
there is some conceptual ambiguity in these models and there are many 
overlapping concepts across the five dimensions. Moreover, these models 
from the management books have not been translated into empirical research 
as most authors continue with the approach of briefly describing each of the 
five processes, often changing the main points in the definitions. Given the 
complexity and differences between the five processes, it becomes clear that 
mindful organising scholarship is in dire need of agreed upon, clearly outlined 
definitions and models for each of the five processes of mindful organising. 
2.4.2.2. Limited nomological network  
Although progress has been made in showing which leadership 
behaviours, organizational practices and technological factors can positively 
affect mindful organising, as seen in the section before, we still do not know 
enough about the predictors of mindful organising to understand the 
conditions that are important to create and sustain it in practice. Of particular 
relevance, is the lack of research on team norms and conditions that may be 
important for sustaining mindful organising. It is argued that mindful 
organising research doesn’t show how it can be socially embedded in an 
organization (Martínez-Córcoles & Vogus, 2020). It is for this reason that 
building our understanding of mindful organising’s nomological network is 
so important, because the model of mindful organising is complex and relies 
on certain conditions, leadership characteristics and organizational norms to 
be created and sustained in practice.  
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Some authors posit that a good starting point for understanding the 
conditions needed for mindful organising is to properly examine the 
communication norms and climates that are important for limiting and 
sustaining organising mindfully (Ford, 2018), as communication and 
conversations between team members are said to be a vital driver of the five 
processes of mindful organising (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). Other than Novak and 
Sellnow’s (2006) paper looking at the impact of a few information sharing 
and communication practices on mindful organising, there has not been much 
investigation into communication norms and climates that could help in 
predicting mindful organising.  
Of particular relevance, is the lack of research positioning team 
mindful organising within other important safety-related variables. One of the 
biggest contributions to safety management from the social sciences in recent 
years is the concept of safety culture and safety climate (Zohar, 1980). From 
this, it has been widely shown that group safety climate is a powerful driver 
of safety behaviour (e.g. Clarke, 2006; Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016). However, 
the nature of the relationship between safety climate and mindful organising 
has never been studied. This is interesting because early theorizations of 
mindful organising spoke of the five processes of mindful organising as the 
“enactment of safety climate” (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). The underlying 
premise of this idea was that mindful organising was the team attitudes and 
practices that facilitated a prioritization of safety. Previous literature has not 
looked at the nature of the relationship between mindful organising and safety 
climate. This is interesting because mindful organising is described as 
somewhat unstable, and in need of constant reinforcement, therefore the team 
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level normative conditions (such as safety climate) should be important 
drivers of mindful organising. 
In terms of outcomes of mindful organising, there is still much work 
to be done to fully understand the utility of mindful organising in safety 
research and practice. There is evidence that it can lead to better safety 
performance in medical settings (e.g. Madsen et al., 2006) and better 
performance in various other settings (e.g. Su, 2017). However, there is 
controversy about the impact of mindful organising on worker wellbeing 
(Vogus et al., 2014) and few studies have looked at how mindful organising 
impacts affective responses (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). This leaves us to speculate 
about the sustainability of mindful organising, as it could be taxing and 
unpleasant for employees and that could be the reason for its fragility and 
need to be constantly reinforced.  
We also do not know much about the impact of mindful organising on 
more general, individual safety behaviours and attitudes. Except for one study 
that looks at the impact of mindful organising on safety compliance and 
participation (Gracia et al., 2020), there has been no enquiry on how mindful 
organising may affect individual proactive safety behaviours such as safety 
citizenship behaviours (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2006; Curcuruto et al., 2015; 
Curcuruto et al., 2019). We also do not yet understand how mindful 
organising may affect individual motivational states. Without further insight 
into how mindful organising may affect individual safety behaviours, we may 
end up drawing incorrect conclusions about how mindful organising leads to 
better objective safety outcomes (such as fewer accidents or errors). In other 
words, it may be through important individual safety behaviours that mindful 
organising leads to higher reliability in teams.  
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2.4.2.3. Measurement issues 
The major instability within mindful organising research at the present 
moment largely comes from the way it has been measured. Majority of the 
enquiries into mindful organising have been qualitative in nature (Martínez-
Córcoles & Vogus, 2020; Sutcliffe et al., 2016), opening up the research 
stream for greater conceptual ambiguities and subjective conclusions. 
Qualitative studies have been, and will continue to be, valuable in setting the 
groundwork needed to better understand mindful organising through 
identifying the behavioural indicators that make up mindful organising as 
well as identifying the emergent barriers and facilitative factors of this 
construct in various settings. However, these kinds of limit our understanding 
of the validity of mindful organising or show us anything about the strength 
and nature of the relationships between mindful organising and other key 
organizational factors. There is a clear need for more quantitative enquiries 
into mindful organising. However, quantitative research on mindful 
organising has been criticised as being too narrow in its level of analysis and 
its focus (Martínez-Córcoles & Vogus, 2020).  
Mindful organising is a social construct that can be seen in the actions 
and interactions of team members (Sutcliffe et al., 2016; Vogus and Sutcliffe, 
2012; Weick et al., 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). Therefore, it is “a 
shared unit property”, which means that individual behaviours and 
perceptions will emerge to form a team level phenomenon. This emergence 
of mindful organising from the individual level to a shared unit construct 
happens through isomorphism (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000). Vogus and 
Sutcliffe (2012) argue that the behaviour and attitudes that sustain mindful 
organising are likely to merge into team level shared norms through both 
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attraction-selection-attrition processes (Schneider, 1987) as well as through 
social learning within task interdependence.  
Most of the quantitative research into mindful organising do not look 
at the cross-level effects of mindful organising on individual variables, which 
also limits our understanding of how the team norms may impact, and be 
impacted by, individual-level variables. In addition, the current tool most 
widely used to measure mindful organising in the extant literature is a 9-item, 
unidimensional scale introduced by Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007). This scale 
does not fully and comprehensively measure the five processes of mindful 
organising as its length inevitably leads to only certain aspects of each of the 
processes being included. The one-factor structure limits the diagnostic 
capability of the scale and our ability to individually study the various 
processes of mindful organising and how these processes may predict certain 
outcomes. However, the one-factor structure has shown to be statistically 
valid and can give an overall score of mindful organising, which has clear 
benefits for quicker assessment and for analysis of an overall mindful 
organising score.  
2.4.3. Mindful organising’s utility in research and practice 
Despite the current shortcomings of mindful organising research, the 
model represents a promising framework to understand and enhance team-
based safety management. Practically, this model is growing in utility, with a 
rising number of intervention projects taking place in the medical sector, 
especially in the US, which has shown that implementing the five processes 
of mindful organising can lead to a significant reduction in safety events 
ranging from 55% to 100% in some cases (Veazie, 2019). The approaches 
behind the success of these interventions are yet to be fully reported on, but 
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some preliminary studies appear to show that these projects have yielded 
valuable insight for the organizations taking part in them (e.g. McFarland & 
Doucette, 2018). Theoretically, the concept of mindful organising has gained 
rising attention in various industries as researchers and leaders try to better 
manage risk and enhance their safety management systems. Mostly, studies 
published in this area confirm that mindful organising is living up to its hype 
in positively influencing safety outcomes.  
2.5. CONCLUSIONS 
It is becoming clear that we are moving into an era where the biggest 
threats to safety and reliability in organizations will increasingly come from 
their vulnerability to unexpected events, as the rising complexity of our socio-
technical systems of safety cannot foresee every interaction, threat or issue at 
play (Furuta, 2015). From this, we will need to build organizational 
capabilities for resilience, so that in the face of these unexpected events, these 
organizations are able to keep functioning and hopefully thrive. Mindful 
organising could help to set up the social and relational infrastructure needed 
to enhance organizational resilience if we manage to increase its validity and 
usefulness through ongoing research in this area.  
To increase the utility of mindful organizing as a concept in research 
and in practice we need to continue to enhance our understanding of its 
nomological network. In doing so, we need to empirically investigate this 
novel construct using quantitative research and find ways to clarify the 
conceptualization of the five processes of mindful organising. The present 
research has attempted to tackle some of these issues 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The following chapter describes the methodology and analyses used 
to carry out the research work of this thesis through four main sections. First, 
we start by outlining the main objectives of our research. Second, we describe 
the samples used and data collection procedures followed to carry out our 
studies. Third, we describe the measures used to answer our research 
questions. Lastly, we present the analyses conducted in each of the included 
studies.  
3.2. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
This thesis aims to build on our current understanding of mindful 
organising’s nomological network through empirical research using both 
team and individual data conducted with workers in high-risk industries. 
Mindful organising offers scholars and leaders a promising framework to use 
to enhance team-based safety management. Nevertheless, mindful organising 
has not been a large feature in mainstream safety research as yet. This may 
be because mindful organising research has been criticised for being too 
narrow in focus, too linear in its level of analysis and not socially embedded 
enough, making it difficult to create and sustain in practice (Martínez-
Córcoles & Vogus, 2020). Mindful organising was discovered in the unique 
organizational context of high reliability organizations, with various 
conditions and practices that allow for this team level capability to be 
constantly enacted and re-enacted in teams. To advance our understanding of 
mindful organising, we need to attempt to build a map of key factors and 
organizational practices that are important for creating and sustaining mindful 
organising.  
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In high-risk environments concerned with safety, we have empirical 
evidence that specific leadership characteristics and certain practices such as 
training can have a positive impact on mindful organising (Sutcliffe et al., 
2016). However, there have hardly been any investigations into the team level 
conditions and norms that are important for mindful organising, even though 
it is described as a bottom-up, fragile emergent property in teams (Vogus & 
Sutcliffe, 2011). We also know that mindful organising leads to better safety 
performance by looking at objective safety indicators and safety reports in 
high-risk settings (e.g. Oliver et al., 2019; Ausserhofer et al. 2013), but we 
still have a very limited understanding of how it impacts individual safety 
behaviours and attitudes. Examining these relationships empirically will 
allow us to understand whether the safer practices found in teams that engage 
in mindful organising come just from mindful organising, or whether mindful 
organising promotes better safety practices on an individual-level too.  
Therefore, our research has three overarching main objectives: (1) To 
clarify the concept of mindful organising by theoretically and empirically 
differentiating it from related team level constructs, (2) to understand which 
team level climates and norms to do with safety and communication are 
important for mindful organising and (3) to understand the impact of mindful 
organising on individual safety behaviour and commitment while 
investigating motivational and affective mechanisms that may act as 
mediators of these relationships.  
As discussed in chapter II, there has recently been an increasing 
number of quantitative studies into mindful organising, but, our 
understanding of mindful organising comes largely from case studies and 
qualitative investigations. This leaves those interested in mindful organising 
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with many questions about its conceptualisation as there has been limited 
testing of the psychometric properties of mindful organising scales and it has 
not been empirically differentiated from related team safety variables. Earlier 
research into mindful organising described it as “the team level enactment of 
safety culture” (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007), as these authors claimed that 
mindful organising represents the team level behaviours that drive safety 
culture in organizations”. However, the conceptualisation of safety culture 
(e.g. Zohar, 2008) differs substantially from mindful organising. Later 
Sutcliffe et al. (2016) recognised that mindful organising needs to be 
differentiated empirically from constructs that measure the team or 
organizational prioritisation of safety such as safety culture and safety 
climate. These authors also highlighted that mindful organising needs to be 
differentiated from other related team level behaviours such as team learning 
too.  
Therefore, this is the first overall research question we wanted to 
answer: Is mindful organising a distinct construct from other important 
team safety variables?  
We attempt to answer this question in study 1 where we validate a 
measure of mindful organising (in Spanish), exploring its factor structure, 
whether it can be reliably aggregated to a team level as well as its 
distinctiveness from team safety climate, organizational safety climate and 
team learning. We also looked at the incremental validity of mindful 
organising in predicting safety outcomes (safety compliance and 
participation) over and above these three important safety variables. 
Mindful organising is said to be observed in the actions and 
interactions of team members, with conversations between team members 
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described as an important driver each of the five processes (Sutcliffe et al., 
2016). However, little is known about which communication conditions and 
norms are important for mindful organising to develop. This led us to ask our 
second overall research question: Which team level participatory 
communication conditions are important for mindful organising to 
develop? 
The impact that mindful organising has on employee’s wellbeing and 
affective responses at work is a subject of some controversy. It is expected 
that in intensive, high-risk environments (nursing units in hospitals), mindful 
organising gives teams’ resources to cope which positively impacts their 
well-being, however, it negatively impacts wellbeing in less intensive 
environments as it is taxing making it difficult to maintain (Vogus et al., 
2014). This raises important questions about the sustainability of mindful 
organising in high-risk environments that experience less consistent adversity 
than some medical settings as it could be too taxing for employees to 
consistently engage in. This led us to ask a third overall research question: 
What impact does mindful organising have on team’s subjective 
experience at work and individual’s propensity to leave their 
organization? 
Study 2 attempts to answer our second and third research question by 
drawing on the current theory about engagement, voice and psychological 
safety to propose two specific participatory communication predictors of 
mindful organising: participation climate and perceived safety for upward 
dissent. We also draw on the job demands-resources model (Bakker & 
Demerouti, 2006) and traditional needs theory (Maslow, 1981) to extend 
theory and test the impact of mindful organising on team’s job satisfaction 
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and individual’s turnover intention. We do so by testing a time-lagged 
multilevel structural equation model using data from 47 teams working in a 
nuclear power plant. 
Study 1 showed us that mindful organising is related to, but distinct 
from, team safety climate. It is argued that mindful organising may have a 
reciprocal relationship with safety climate (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). However, 
the nature and direction of the relationship between team safety climate and 
mindful organising have virtually been unexplored. This led us to ask our 
fourth overall research question: Can team safety climate aid in fostering 
mindful organising? 
Various studies have shown that mindful organising improves 
objective indicators of safety in high-risk environments (e.g. Vogus & 
Sutcliffe, 2007; Ausserhofer et al. 2013). Although useful in showing us the 
objective value of mindful organising in enhancing safety, these models do 
not test which individual safety behaviours are stimulated by team level 
mindful organising leading to increased reliability and fewer accidents. 
Models using objective indicators of safety (e.g. medication errors) are also 
specific to certain environments and industries, not offering much insight to 
other organizations about how mindful organising may effect more 
generalisable, individual behaviours. We also do not know which cognitive-
motivational mechanisms mindful organising may impact leading to 
individual safety behaviours. This leads us to have an incomplete 
understanding of the impact of team mindful organising on individual 
performance in high-risk industries. Therefore, our fifth overall research 
question is: Does mindful organising increase individual in-role and 
extra-role safety behaviours? 
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And if so, it leads us to the formulation of our and sixth overall 
research question: Do capability motivational drivers mediate the 
relationship between mindful organising and individual safety 
behaviours? 
We attempt to answer the fourth, fifth and sixth research questions by 
two studies (study 3 and 4) within a sample of chemical workers in Russia 
and Ukraine. Study 3 will assess whether mindful organising mediates the 
relationship between team safety climate and safety citizenship behaviours. 
Study 4 will explore whether mindful organising affects worker’s capability 
motivational state (role breadth self-efficacy), leading to increased safety 





























































3.3. SAMPLES AND DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
The four studies within this thesis have been carried out with three 
different samples in two types of high-risk industries: nuclear power plants 
and chemical plants. The data has been collected in three different countries: 
Spain, Russia and Ukraine.  
3.3.1. Samples 
3.3.1.1. Study 1 
The first study included a sample of 573 Spanish nuclear power plant 
workers, who made up 47 teams. The response rate for this study was 72.5%. 
The age distribution of the sample was as follows: 64.4% of the sample were 
over the age of 45, 27.4% were between 30 and 45 years old, 5.1% were 
below the age of 30 and 3.1% of respondents did not indicate their age. The 
average group size was 12.19 (SD = 10.83). The largest team size included 
48 members and the smallest team size included three members.  
3.3.1.2. Study 2 
Study 2 utilised a time-lagged design, so there were two data 
collection points (in 2014 and 2016) using the same teams from a Spanish 
nuclear power company. In 2014 (Time 1), 58 teams comprising of 615 
employees participated in the study, yielding a response rate of 76.3%. In 
2016 (Time 2), 54 teams comprising of 607 employees participated in the 
study, yielding a response rate of 72.5%. The final sample included 47 teams 
(comprising 425 employees), which were those that answered both in 2014 
(N = 427) and in 2016 (N = 425) and had at least 2 subjects each time 
(Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). The average group size was 9.06 (SD = 5.67). The 
largest team size included 28 members and the smallest team size included 3 
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members. Regarding participants’ age, at Time 1, 3.3% were under 30 years, 
19.1% were between 30 and 45 years, and 77.6% were older than 45 years. 
At Time 2, 2% were under 30 years, 25.5% were between 30 and 45 years, 
and 72.5 % were older than 45 years.  
As our sample showed participant withdrawal from Time 1 to Time 
2, we conducted a response-nonresponse analysis. First, we tested for mean 
differences on two of our study variables ‘participation climate’ and 
‘perceived safety for upward dissent’ (see study model in figure 1 above) 
among the subjects collected in 2014 that were included in the sample of the 
study (individuals who responded in both Time 1 and Time 2) and the ones 
that were not included in the study (those who responded only at Time 1). 
Results of a t-test indicated that respondents did not differ from non-
respondents in participation climate (t (615) = −0.04, p > 0.05) and perceived 
safety for upward dissent (t (615) = −0.59, p > 0.05). Further, we compared 
subjects collected in 2016 that were included in the sample of the study 
(individuals who responded at both Time 1 and Time 2) to those who were 
not included (individuals who only responded in Time 2) with respect to our 
study variables collected at Time 2 (mindful organising, job satisfaction and 
turnover intention, see study model in figure 1 above). Results of the t-test 
indicated no differences on mindful organising (t (604) = 0.99, p > 0.05), job 
satisfaction (t (603) = 1.73, p > 0.05), and turnover intention (t (538) = 0.84, 
p > 0.05). 
3.3.1.3. Study 3 
As mentioned previously, the data used in study 3 was collected 
within a sample of Russian-based chemical plant workers (N = 1112) 
comprising of 98 teams. This study did not analyse participants ages, 
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however, tenure and job function were recorded and analysed. The average 
length of tenure was 4.7 years (SD = 9.58). Participants were employed in 
production (49.2%), chemical treatment (24.5%), packaging (22.1%) or 
maintenance (4.3%). Employees in the sample worked in various departments 
within the plant such as secondary production (42%), primary production 
(18.5%), filter making (16.8%), in the warehouse (13.7%), quality assurance 
(3.6%), engineering (3%) or other areas (2.4%). In terms of safety roles, 11% 
of respondents were either a team safety head or manager and the majority of 
participants were ordinary workers (88.1%).  
3.3.1.4. Study 4 
The data for study 4 came from a sample of Ukraine-based chemical 
plant workers (N = 443) comprising of 50 teams, from the same parent 
company as study 3. As in study 3, this study did not analyse participants 
ages, however, tenure and job function were recorded and analysed. 
Regarding tenure, majority of participants (59.7%) had been working in the 
company for more than 10 years, 32.7% had been working in the company 
for 5 to 10 years, 2.7% had been working in the company for 2 to 5 years and 
2% had been in the company for less than 5 years. Regarding job function, 
participants were employed in primary and secondary production (30.4%), 
the filter production workshop (12.1%), the warehousing department 
(15.4%), quality assurance department (12.8%), the engineering department 
(7,8%) and 21.5% came from other departments.  
3.3.2. Data collection procedures 
All four studies were conducted in accordance with international 
ethical guidelines, which are consistent with the American Psychological 
Association (APA) guidelines. The data captured and utilized in this thesis 
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formed part of two big safety research projects. The first project was an 
ongoing safety behaviour and culture study conducted within a Spanish 
nuclear power company with two separate plants. The data collected and used 
for study 1 and 2 were from this Spanish nuclear power plant research project. 
The second project was a broad-based safety behaviour project for a 
multinational chemical company with chemical plants all across Europe. The 
data collected and used for study 3 and 4 were taken from the Russian and 
Ukraine plants of this multinational chemical company research project. 
These two plants were chosen over other samples (such as the German or 
Italian samples) largely due to their sample size, as the Russian and Ukraine 
samples had a large enough sample of teams (50 and higher) to enable us to 
have enough statistical power to perform our multilevel analyses. The data 
collection for each study is described in more detail below: 
For study 1 and study 2, our study variables formed part of a battery 
of questionnaires designed to assess different constructs related to safety 
culture. This battery was administered annually, and the data used in our two 
studies came from the questionnaires administered in time 1 (study 2 
predictor variables) and time 2 (study 1 variables and study 2 outcome 
variables). For both data collection time points, researchers were on site at 
the nuclear power plant to inform participants about the purpose of the study 
and to provide instructions about the way the questionnaires should be 
completed. Researchers administered the questionnaires and addressed any 
questions and concerns as participants completed the questionnaires. The 
administration of the questionnaires took place in small groups during work 
time, in a quiet room. Participants were encouraged to answer honestly, and 
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it took around 30 minutes to complete the questionnaires. Participation was 
voluntary and confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed. 
Although study 3 and 4 used data collected at different workplaces, 
the data collection procedure was the same for both. Hard copy questionnaires 
were administered to workers during work time in each of the plants (Russian 
based and Ukraine based). Participation was voluntary and confidentiality 
was guaranteed. All workers were informed that the data would be used for 
scientific research and to gain insight into safety culture improvements in 
each plant. 
3.4. VARIABLES USED 
This research measured a total of sixteen variables across the four 
studies. The scale that remained the same in terms of content was the mindful 
organising scale (used in all 4 studies), taken from Vogus and Sutcliffe 
(2007). Since the first two studies were conducted with Spanish nuclear 
power workers, we translated the Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) mindful 
organising scale from English to Spanish for these studies. Likewise, since 
the last two studies were conducted with Russian and Ukrainian chemical 
workers, we translated the Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) mindful organising 
scale from English to Spanish for these studies. Translations were done using 
the back translation method with a certified translator and subject matter 
expert. All scales for study 1 and 2 (apart from the mindful organising and 
team safety climate scale) were originally written in Spanish and translated 
in the academic papers (including this thesis) for ease of understanding. The 
original scales for both study 3 and 4 were in English, so all questionnaires 
administered in these two studies were translated from English (the original 
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versions) to Russian using the back-translation methods with two bilingual 
experts and industry personnel.  
All the scales below used a five-point Likert scale.  
3.4.1. Common measures  
3.4.1.1. Mindful organising 
The scale used to measure mindful organising in all four studies is a 
9-item validated scale taken from Vogus and Sutcliffe’s (2007b) original 
scale. The questions asked participants to rate the extent to which they agree 
that their team does the following. The scale ranged from one (completely 
disagree) to five (completely agree). Some sample items are: “When 
discussing emerging problems with co-workers, we usually discuss what to 
look out for”, “We talk about mistakes and ways to learn from them”, “When 
a crisis occurs, we rapidly pool our collective expertise to attempt to resolve 
it.” Internal consistency reliability of the scale was high for all four studies 
with values of .94 for study 1, .95 for study 2, .93 for study 3 and .94 for study 
4.  
3.4.2. Study 1 measures 
3.4.2.1. Team safety climate 
Team level safety climate was measured with a fifteen-item scale 
originally adapted from Zohar and Luria (2005) into Spanish by Latorre, 
Gracia, Tomás and Peiró (2013). Sample items are “we make sure we have 
everything we need to do the job in a safe way” and “my direct line manager 
frequently tells us about the hazards in our work”. The scale ranged from one 
(completely disagree) to five (completely agree). This team safety climate 
scale had a Cronbach alpha value of .96. 
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3.4.2.2. Organizational safety culture 
Safety culture was measured with the Safety Culture Enactment 
Questionnaire (López de Castro, Gracia, Tomás & Peiró, 2017). It is a twenty-
one-item scale where participants are asked to rate the level of importance 
given to nuclear safety within the practices of the organization. The scale 
ranged from one (not at all) to five (quite a lot). A sample item is “to what 
degree is safety important in the process of making decisions about work?” 
This safety culture scale had a Cronbach alpha value of .96. 
3.4.2.3. Team learning 
Team learning was measured with a twenty-item scale which asks 
participants to rate the extent to which their team engages in behaviours and 
activities to encourage the development of competencies (such as knowledge, 
skills and attitudes) and better functioning of the team over time (Bresó et al., 
2008). Participants are asked to rate how often certain situations occur within 
their team on a scale from one (never or almost never) to five (always or 
almost always). A sample item is “knowledge is shared among the different 
team members”. This team learning scale had a Cronbachs’ alpha value of 
.93. 
3.4.2.4. Safety compliance 
The Spanish version (Martínez-Córcoles et al., 2013) of the scale 
developed by Neal and Griffin (2006) was used to measure compliance with 
safety rules and procedures. This scale is made up of the following three 
items: ‘I use the correct safety procedures for performing my job’; ‘I use all 
the necessary safety equipment to do my job’; and ‘I ensure the highest levels 
of safety when I do my job’. Items are answered on a 5-point Likert response 
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scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The safety 
compliance scale had a Cronbach alpha value of .89. 
3.4.2.5. Safety participation 
This variable was measured by means of the Spanish version 
(Martínez-Córcoles et al., 2013) of the scale developed by Neal and Griffin 
(2006). The scale is made up of three items rated on a 5-point Likert response 
scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). Scale 
items were the following: ‘‘I promote the safety program within the 
organization’’; ‘‘I voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that help to improve 
workplace safety’’; and ‘‘I make extra effort to improve safety in the 
workplace’’. The safety participation scale had a Cronbach alpha value of .88. 
3.4.3. Study 2 measures 
The participation climate, perceived safety for upward dissent, job 
satisfaction and turnover intention scales were created by the research team. 
Since limited previous validation tests have been conducted for these scales, 
confirmatory factor analyses were conducted in the present study.  
3.4.3.1. Participation climate 
Participation climate was measured using a three-item scale and asked 
participants to rate the extent to which teams perceived that the organization 
encourages their participation and opinion in the running of everyday 
operations. The items in the scale are: “this company sincerely encourages 
the employees’ participation in its daily functioning”, “this company 
encourages its staff to express their ideas and suggestions”, and “this 
company is interested in listening to its employees’ opinions”. The scale 
ranged from one (completely disagree) to five (completely agree). Internal 
consistency reliability was .93. 
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3.4.3.2. Perceived safety for upward dissent 
Perceived safety for upward dissent was measured using a three-item 
scale and asked participants to rate the extent to which they felt safe to 
challenge, or disagree with, their supervisor without fear of backlash. The 
items in the scale are “I can freely express any disagreements I have with my 
supervisor”, “I can tell my supervisor when things are not going well” and “I 
feel free to talk to my supervisor about any problems and difficulties I have 
in my job without any fear at all”. The scale ranged from one (completely 
disagree) to five (completely agree). Internal consistency reliability was .94.  
3.4.3.3. Job satisfaction 
This scale consists of three items that assess participant’s global levels 
of satisfaction with their job, team and the company as a whole. The items in 
the scale asked participants to “please indicate, in general, how satisfied you 
are…” “with your job” “with your work unit or team” and “with your 
company”. The scale ranged from one (completely dissatisfied) to five 
(completely satisfied). This scale was found to have discriminant validity 
from related constructs in a recent study by López de Castro, Gracia, Tomás 
and Peiró (2017). Internal consistency reliability was .85. 
3.4.3.4. Turnover intention 
A one-item scale which states “I would leave this organization if I 
could” was used to measure turnover intention. It focuses on the desirability 
to leave the organization (“I would leave this organization”) and controls for 
the ease of leaving the organization (“if I could”). The scale ranged from one 
(completely disagree) to five (completely agree). Internal consistency could 
not be calculated as this is a single item measure. 
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3.4.4. Study 3 and 4 measures 
Study 3 and 4 both looked at the same outcome variables (safety 
compliance, safety violation, and safety citizenship behaviours). Study 3 also 
measured team safety climate and study 4 measured role breadth self-
efficacy. 
3.4.4.1. Safety compliance and safety violation 
 Safety compliance is the degree to which an individual 
complies with the safety protocol of the chemical plant. Safety Violation is 
the extent to which an individual violates safety protocol. Both scales were 
taken from Hansez and Chmiel (2010). Safety compliance was measured 
using a 5-item scale (study 3 α = .81; study 4 α = .82), an example item is 
“rate the extent to which you voluntarily use protection, even if it is hard to 
find.” Safety violation was measured using a 5-item scale (study 3 α = .91; 
study 4 α = .94) and is inversely scored, an example item is “rate the extent 
to which you neglect some safety rules when performing familiar or routine 
work.” Both scales ranged from one (never) to five (very frequently). 
3.4.4.2. Safety citizenship behaviours 
 Safety citizenship behaviours are discretionary and prosocial 
activities essential for managing risk in safety-critical industries (Curcuruto, 
Conchie & Griffin, 2019). For study 3 and 4, we analysed three SCBs, 
namely: voice, initiative and helping. Voice was measured using a 4-item 
scale (study 3 α = .91; study 4 α = .92), an example item is “rate the extent to 
which you voluntarily raise safety concerns in planning sessions” Initiative 
was measured using a 4-item scale (study 3 α = .84; study 4 α = .87), an 
example item is “rate the extent to which you voluntarily try to make policies 
and procedures safer”. Helping was measured using a 6-item scale (study 3 α 
CHAPTER III: THESIS OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 82 
= .90; study 4 α = .90), an example item is “rate the extent to which you 
voluntarily help teach safety procedures to new crew members”. All scales 
ranged from one (never) to five (very frequently). 
3.4.4.3. Team Safety Climate 
Team level safety climate was measured in study 3 with the sixteen-
item scale originally developed by Zohar and Luria (2005). An example item 
is “My direct line manager frequently tells us about the hazards in our work”. 
The scale ranged from one (completely disagree) to five (completely agree). 
This team safety climate scale had a Cronbach alpha value .94 in study 3. 
3.4.4.4. Role-based Self Efficacy 
Role-based self-efficacy is the confidence individuals have in their 
own ability to carry out a more participative and broader in safety processes, 
beyond formalised role requirements. It was measured in study 4 using a 5-
item scale (α = .93) taken from Curcuruto, Mearns and Mariani (2016). An 
example item is “Feeling confident in devising new methods to improve 
safety in my work area”. The response scale ranged from one (never) to five 
(very frequently). 
3.5. ANALYSIS OF DATA 
3.5.1. Analysis of preliminary data  
3.5.1.1. Confirmatory factor analysis 
In all four studies, confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were run 
using the programme Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2010) to validate the 
factorial structure of the questionnaires used. Each CFA differed depending 
on the study model and are therefore described separately, the criteria used to 
evaluate the CFA’s was the same for all models. 
CFA Evaluation Criteria 
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For each of the CFAs, model fit was evaluated by considering the chi-
square statistic as well as a few other goodness of fit indices, namely: the root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990), the 
comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), and the Tucker Lewis index (TLI; 
Tucker & Lewis, 1973). RMSEA values of .10 or more indicate poor fit, 
values between .08 and .05 indicate moderate fit, and values below .05 
indicate good fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). CFI values close to 1 indicate 
good fit, with values above .95 considered acceptable fit (Hu & Bentler, 
1999). TLI values near 1 indicate good fit and values approaching 0 indicate 
poor fit, with the conventional cut off used being .90 for acceptable fit 
(Tucker & Lewis, 1973).  
We also used the following criteria for comparing alternative nested 
models: (1) whether the differences between TLI and CFI values of the 
competing models were larger than .01 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; 
Widaman, 1985), and (2) whether the differences between RMSEA values 
were larger than .015 (Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby & Paxton, 2008). These 
criteria indicate whether there is a notable disparity between the models and 
when these differences in practical fit indices are detected, the model showing 
better fit will be selected. Complementarily, the difference in chi-squared 
statistics along with the difference in degrees of freedom for competing 
models, was checked manually for significance using a χ2 table. If the 
difference is significant, the model with the smaller chi-square value is argued 
to have a better fit to data (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). 
Study 1 
The main aim of the CFA conducted in study 1 was to test the internal 
factor structure of the mindful organising scale. A CFA was run using Mplus 
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(Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2010) with individual-level responses. 
Additionally, as part of the hypothesis testing (as explained in the following 
section), a CFA was run to test the discriminant validity of the mindful 
organising scale in relation to the other variables included in the model (team 
safety climate, organizational safety culture and team learning).  
Study 2 
Given that three of the measures in study 2 were created by our 
research team and were not validated elsewhere, confirmatory factor analyses 
(CFA) of the four scales (participation climate, perceived safety for upward 
dissent, mindful organising, and job satisfaction) were carried out to gain 
evidence of the validity of these measures. This was done by testing the 
measurement model at the individual-level using Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 
1998–2010). Two alternative CFA models (a one-factor model with all the 
items loading onto one single factor, and a two-factor model with all the items 
loading onto two separate factors namely the participation climate scale and 
the perceived safety for upward dissent scale) were conducted and compared 
for the 2014 data.  
Likewise, two CFA models (a one-factor model with all the items 
loading onto one single factor, and a two-factor model with all the items 
loading onto two separate factors namely the mindful organising and job 
satisfaction scale) were conducted and analysed for the 2016 data. The 
turnover intention scale was omitted since it is a one item measure.  
Study 3 
To test the discriminant validity of variables included in study 3, we 
ran five CFAs with the seven scales (team safety climate, mindful organising, 
safety compliance, safety violation, and the three safety citizenship 
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behaviours (initiative, helping and voice)) to gain evidence of the validity of 
these measures. First, we ran a CFA with the seven-factor model where all 
the items loaded onto seven separate factors using individual-level data. 
Thereafter, four alternative CFA models were conducted, and the fit of these 
models was compared with the seven-factor model. The alternative models 
are: (1) a model with all the items of the seven scales loading onto one single 
factor, (2) a six-factor model with all items loading onto their corresponding 
factor but with team safety climate and mindful organising loading onto one 
single factor, (3) a five-factor model with all items loading onto their 
corresponding factor and the three SCBs (helping, initiative and voice) 
loading onto one single factor, and (4) a six-factor model with all items 
loading onto their corresponding factor but with safety compliance and safety 
violation loading onto one single factor. These models were then compared 
using the criteria stipulated above. 
Study 4 
To test the test the discriminant validity of the variables included in 
study 4, we also ran five CFAs with the seven scales (mindful organising, role 
breadth self-efficacy, safety compliance, safety violation, and the three safety 
citizenship behaviours (initiative, helping, voice)) to gain evidence of the 
validity of these measures. Just like study 3, we ran a seven-factor model with 
all the items loading onto seven separate factors using individual-level data 
with Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2010). Thereafter, four alternative 
CFA models were conducted, and the fit of these models was compared with 
the seven-factor model. The alternative models are: (1) a one-factor model 
with all the items of the seven scales loading onto one single factor, (2) a six-
factor model with mindful organising and role breadth self-efficacy both 
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loading onto the same single factor and all the other items loading onto their 
corresponding factors (3) a five-factor model with the three SCBs (helping, 
initiative and voice) loading onto the same single factor and all the other items 
loading onto their corresponding factors (4) a six-factor model with safety 
compliance and safety violation both loading onto the same single factor and 
all the other items loading onto their corresponding factors. These models 
were also then compared using the criteria stipulated above. 
3.5.1.2. Descriptive and reliability analyses 
For each of the four studies enclosed within this thesis, various 
preliminary descriptive analyses were conducted. Descriptive statistics were 
calculated and reported for the data within each study (e.g. means and 
standard deviations). The reliability of each of the scales (as reported above) 
was also calculated using Chronbach’s alpha coefficient (1951).  
For study 1, which entailed the validation of a Spanish version of the 
mindful organising scale, various other reliability analyses were carried out, 
over and above the Cronbachs alpha coefficient. The average variance 
extracted (AVE) value and composite reliability value (rho) were also 
examined to ascertain the internal consistency of the scale. For AVE, values 
of .50 or greater indicate satisfactory reliability as the variance of the 
construct is greater than the error variance (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). For 
composite reliability (rho values), a score of .70 or greater indicates good 
reliability (Raykov, 2001). 
3.5.1.3. Aggregation indices 
Mindful organising is a team construct, therefore for every study in 
this thesis individual’s scores were aggregated to form a team mindful 
organising score as is common practice in measuring this variable (e.g. 
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Ausserhofer et al. 2013; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007b). Likewise, team safety 
climate (measured in study 1 and study 3), organizational safety culture and 
team learning (both measured in study 1), as well as participation climate, 
perceived safety for upward dissent and job satisfaction (all measured in study 
2), were also analysed at the team level by aggregating individual scores.  
Before aggregating the scores of these seven variables (mindful 
organising, team safety climate, organizational safety culture, team learning, 
participation climate, perceived safety for upward dissent and job 
satisfaction), we had to calculate the aggregation indices for each of these 
variables. Calculating aggregation indices are essential to demonstrate that 
each member’s score was similar enough to those within their team, and 
different enough from those not in their team, to justify aggregating these 
scores. Therefore, in every study, we calculated various aggregation indices 
such as the average deviation index (ADI; Burke, Finkelstein, & Dusig, 
1999), the intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC; Bliese, 2000), the rwg(j) 
statistic (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984) and the analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) scores. Average Deviation Indices (ADIs), intra-class correlation 
coefficients (ICC1 and ICC2) and rwg(j) statistics were computed and 
analysed to ensure within-team agreement. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
was computed to ascertain the between-team distinctiveness of scores. Since 
items were measured using a 5-point Likert response scale, the cut-off value 
for the ADI was .83 (Burke & Dunlap, 2002), consequently, we concluded 
that there was within-team agreement when the ADI value was ≤ .83. ICC 
provides an estimate on the proportion of total variance attributable to within-
team homogeneity, that is, it indicates to what extent the studied variables are 
shared within teams. Recommended cut-off values for ICC(1) typically range 
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between .05 and .20 (Bliese, 2000), with values within, or above, this range 
deemed as acceptable. The rwg(j) statistic shows evidence of within team 
agreement and scores need to be above the cut-off of .70 to justify aggregation 
of team member scores.  Finally, we also carried out a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) to determine whether there was statistically significant 
between-team discrimination in mindful organising among teams. If the 
ANOVA values were significant, we would conclude that there was enough 
difference among teams.  
3.5.2. Data analysis for hypothesis testing 
3.5.2.1. Correlation, data aggregation and CFA 
Study 1 aimed to validate a measure of mindful organising. To do so, 
mindful organising was correlated with team safety climate, organizational 
safety culture, and team learning. This analysis was done with the aggregated 
group level scores. Thereafter, a CFA was run with Mplus to show the 
distinctiveness of mindful organising compared with the other three variables 
included in the study (team safety climate, organizational safety culture, and 
team learning). We compared two alternative models: a one-factor model 
(with all items loading in a single factor), and a four-factor model (with items 
loading in their corresponding scale). For running the CFA individual-level 
scores were used, as a large number of items prevented us from using scores 
aggregated to the team level. WLSMV was used as the method of estimation, 
considering the ordinal nature of data. Model fit indices were analysed 
according to the criteria mentioned at the beginning of the CFA section.  
3.5.2.2. Hierarchical regression analyses 
Finally, we tested the criterion-related validity of the Mindful 
Organising Scale by demonstrating the utility of the scale in predicting 
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various workplace safety outcomes. We tested the incremental validity of the 
scale by checking if mindful organising added more explained variance to 
two workplace safety outcomes (safety compliance and safety participation) 
after controlling for other constructs (safety culture, team safety climate and 
team learning). With this purpose, we run hierarchical regression analyses 
using safety compliance and safety participation as dependent variables. We 
then introduced the control variables (safety culture, team safety climate and 
team learning) as independent variables. Thereafter, we introduced mindful 
organising. The hierarchical regression analyses were carried out at both, 
individual and team level. 
3.5.2.3. Multilevel Structural equation models 
Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to test a multilevel structural equation model (MSEM) 
of predictors and outcomes of mindful organising with two time points. The 
model chosen is a moderated mediation model. The proposed model wanted 
to test whether the interaction of participation climate and perceived safety 
for upward dissent leads to mindful organising (hypothesis 1) and whether 
job satisfaction mediates the relationship between mindful organising and 
turnover intention (hypothesis 2). All variables were measured at the team 
level, except turnover intention, which was measured at the individual-level. 
The model was tested using a robust maximum likelihood estimation (RML).  
To test the first hypothesis, the statistical significance of a3 (the 
coefficient estimating the moderator effect of perceived safety for upward 
dissent in the relationship between participation climate and mindful 
organising) was tested. To further probe the interaction effect we used the 
Process macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2018) to estimate the slopes of the 
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relationship between participation climate and mindful organising at high and 
low values (one standard deviation above and below the sample mean) of 
perceived safety for upward dissent and to plot the corresponding regression 
lines. 
To test the significance of the indirect effect stated in the second 
hypothesis, we used bias-corrected (BC) bootstrap confidence interval (CI) 
method (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004) as implemented in 
Mplus. A bootstrap sample size of 5000 was used. The b1c1 indirect effect 
was calculated, where b1 is the coefficient estimating the relationship between 
mindful organising and job satisfaction, and c1 is the coefficient estimating 
the relationship between job satisfaction and turnover intention. Mediation is 
supported when the BC bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect 
does not include the zero value. 
Finally, to test the conditional indirect effect stated of our study 
model, we also used BC bootstrap confidence interval method as 
implemented in Mplus. The (a1+a3W)b1c1 conditional indirect effect was 
calculated, where W is the moderator variable (perceived safety for upward 
dissent), a1 is the coefficient estimating the relationship between participation 
climate and mindful organising, and a3, b1 and c1 are the coefficients 
estimating the relationships previously stated. The conditional indirect effect 
is supported when the BC bootstrap confidence interval for the difference in 
the indirect effect (diff_IE) among different levels of the moderator does not 
contain zero (Preacher et al., 2007), which implies that the strength of the 
indirect effect (a1b1) depends on the level of the moderator variable (W). 
Study 3 
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To test our proposed model in study 3, we ran a multilevel structural 
equation model (MSEM). This model wanted to ascertain whether mindful 
organising mediated the relationship between team safety climate and five 
individual safety behaviours. Team safety climate and mindful organising 
were analysed at the team level and the five individual safety behaviours 
(safety compliance, safety violation, and the three SCBS (voice, initiative and 
helping)) were analysed at the individual-level. To confirm the proposed 
model, we first analysed the model fit indices (using the same criteria 
indicated for the CFA stipulated in the previous section). If the model fit was 
satisfactory, we considered the pathway estimates by looking at whether they 
were significant and the strength of each pathway. Thereafter, Monte Carlo 
(MC) confidence intervals were used for testing the significance of the 
indirect effects, as it is argued to be a more viable and robust method for 
calculating confidence intervals for complex and simple indirect effects when 
working with a multilevel model (Preacher & Selig, 2012).  
Study 4 
For study 4 we also ran a multilevel structural equation model 
(MSEM) to assess our proposed mediation model and the pathways between 
our variables. This model wanted to test whether role breadth self-efficacy 
mediated the relationship between mindful organising and the five safety 
behaviours (safety compliance, safety violation, and the three SCBs (voice, 
initiative and helping)). For this analysis, mindful organising was aggregated 
to the team level, and role breadth self-efficacy and the five safety behaviours 
were operationalised at the individual-level. To confirm the proposed model, 
we first analysed the model fit indices (using the same goodness of fit indices 
criteria indicated  in the previous section). If the model fit was satisfactory, 
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we considered the pathway estimates by looking at whether they were 
significant and the strength of each pathway. Monte Carlo (MC) confidence 
intervals were used for testing the significance of the indirect effects, as it is 
argued to be a more viable and robust method for calculating confidence 
intervals for complex and simple indirect effects when working with a 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Mindful organising is the collective capability to discern 
discriminatory detail about emerging issues and act swiftly in response to 
such details (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006; Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). The concept first came into fruition when 
researchers such as Weick et al. (1999) started investigating social processes 
that allow high-reliability organizations (hereinafter HROs) such as air traffic 
control centres and nuclear power plants to operate almost flawlessly when 
the potential for catastrophe is so high. These researchers discovered that in 
these organizations, employees engage in mindful organising allowing them 
to anticipate, detect, and recover from, errors. In such dynamic and intense 
environments, this capability could be the difference between life and death. 
Research in this area has thrived as mindful organising has shown to result in 
fewer accidents and safer performance, especially in the health care sector 
(Sutcliffe, Vogus & Dane, 2016). Teams engaging in mindful organising were 
found to have fewer occupational safety failures and errors in studies done 
with nurses (Ausserhofer et al., 2013; Dierynck, Leroy, Savage & Choiz, 
2017; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). Other studies also show mindful organising 
leads to better responses to adversity in firefighters (Bigley & Roberts, 2001) 
and higher reliability in air traffic controllers (Weick et al., 1999).  
Research on mindful organising is still in its infancy and the majority 
of the studies done to try to understand it have been qualitative in nature. 
More research needs to be done for mindful organising to be empirically and 
theoretically considered a distinct construct from other team and safety-
related variables (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). At the heart of gathering empirical 
evidence to further the case of studying and fostering mindful organising in 
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modern organizations is the validation of measures for its assessment. There 
are a few articles validating mindful organising measures, but many of these 
articles do not show sufficient evidence of sound psychometric properties of 
their scales (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). Furthermore, validated scales to measure 
mindful organising are offered in English (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007), French, 
German and Italian (Ausserhofer et al., 2013), but no Spanish validated 
version of the scale exists. This not only means all Spanish speaking 
organizations in the 20 countries where it is an official language do not have 
a validated mindful organising scale to use for empirical research, but it also 
leaves the question as to whether mindful organising is manifested in the 
same way in a Spanish cultural context as it is in other contexts where it has 
been studied (such as the United States). In addition, although the theoretical 
paradigm of mindful organising is based on qualitative research in traditional 
HROs, of the validation studies that do exist, most research is not conducted 
in traditional HROs (e.g. Ausserhofer et al., 2013; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Validating a measure of mindful organising in a traditional HRO setting will 
be valuable as it is within these high-reliability contexts that the construct was 
discovered. Therefore, within traditional HROs, there is likely to be a truer, 
more accurate embodiment of this collective capability than in non-traditional 
HRO contexts.  
The main purpose of the present study is to translate Vogus and 
Sutcliffe’s (2007) “Safety Organising Scale” (later referred to as the “Mindful 
Organising Scale”) to Spanish and to validate this new version of the scale. 
We attempt to provide evidence of the validity and reliability of the Spanish 
version of the scale by testing its unidimensional factor structure and 
checking the internal consistency. In addition, we attempt to justify the 
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aggregation of individual scores to group scores by testing whether there was 
group consensus among team member’s mindful organising scores. We also 
examine the relationships between team’s mindful organising scores and their 
safety culture, team safety climate and team learning scores to gain further 
evidence of convergent validity. Additionally, we gather evidence of 
discriminant validity by checking the distinctiveness of individual-level 
mindful organising with other team level constructs considered important for 
safety (safety culture, team safety climate and team learning scales). Finally, 
we test for evidence criterion-related validity for the Spanish version of the 
mindful organising scale, by testing the predicting incremental validity of the 
scale in predicting workplace safety variables (safety compliance and safety 
participation). 
4.1.1. Mindful organising 
In line with the positive psychology movement, there has been a body 
of safety researchers that have begun to shift the focus of their research away 
from accidents and mistakes to rather analysing the billions of cases where 
safe performance is consistently achieved (Dekker, 2015; Hollnagel, 2014; 
Rochlin, La Porte & Roberts, 1987; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Hollnagel 
(2014) argues that trying to uncover safety lessons through only analysing 
accidents and mistakes is not always useful as these situations represent an 
absence of safety. He argues that the high-risk environments where safe 
performance is desired are usually complex with many different variables and 
unexpected events at play. This results in acceptable and unacceptable 
outcomes often stemming from the same practice or behaviour. Hollnagel 
(2014) believes more models, ideas and frameworks are needed to understand 
the many cases where safety is present, and nothing goes wrong despite high-
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risks as these are the cases where we can extrapolate lessons about how to 
achieve consistently safe performance. A useful source of insight into 
consistently safe performance is HROs as these organizations manage to 
operate almost error-free when there is constant potential for catastrophe 
(Rochlin et al., 1987).  
As HRO research was initially starting to accelerate, Weick and 
Roberts (1993) wanted to uncover which team characteristics and capabilities 
existed in HROs that enabled these organizations to respond so effectively to 
unexpected events and maintain unwavering performance when the risks for 
error were so high. These authors conducted extensive field research in an 
aircraft carrier. Here, they discovered that the teams in this setting organised 
themselves in such a way that they were able to engage in a pattern of highly 
attentive interrelations of actions among each other which allowed them to 
better understand the adversity they faced and respond more effectively to 
unexpected events. They called this capability collective mindfulness (later 
called mindful organising) following Langer’s (1989) conceptualisation of 
individual mindfulness which emphasizes that the new perspective or action 
that arises from a mindful state (or act of noticing) is just as important as 
achieving that mindful state. The collective form of mindfulness seen in 
HROs involves noticing weak signals, then critically analysing and reframing 
these signals leading to an expanded understanding of what is noticed. This 
greater understanding of what is noticed is closely linked to a wider repertoire 
of action capabilities which is a defining feature of what makes HROs 
effective. 
Later, Weick et al. (1999) analysed various case studies of HROs with 
the aim of creating a clear specification of the behaviours and processes that 
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constituted this team level capability to anticipate and recover from, 
unexpected events. They found that there were five interrelated processes that 
underlie mindful organising, namely preoccupation with failure, reluctance to 
simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience 
and deference to expertise (Weick et al., 1999). It is through the first three 
processes that rich discriminatory detail about current operations is created (a 
capability to anticipate unexpected and potentially risky events) and through 
the last two processes that unexpected events are contained through a 
collective ability to pool resources in a flexible manner (a capability for 
resilience) (Vogus, 2011). These five processes are seen in the actions and 
interactions of team members on the front line. It is a fragile process that is 
constantly enacted and re-enacted by those on the front line.  
Preoccupation with failure means teams are constantly paying 
attention to, and worrying about, any small error that has occurred or may 
occur (Weick et al., 1999). They treat these potential or actual errors as 
possible indicators of bigger problems (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). This 
manifests in teams consistently searching for any anomalies that occur during 
operations as well as routinely checking weak, mixed or routine signals as 
evidence of potential failures (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). This preoccupation 
with failure also means that teams are suspicious during quiet periods where 
there are no unexpected events as this may indicate that they have missed 
something (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Preoccupation with failure also means 
that teams treat near misses as failures and lessons to be learned rather than a 
success (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). 
Reluctance to simplify interpretations means teams try to understand 
the full, detailed picture of an unfolding event, rather than jumping to 
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conclusions or using simplified models to explain operations (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2015). Teams will question received wisdom and look for 
alternative explanations to try to uncover potential weak points, not allowing 
past information or assumptions to cloud their judgement of new events 
(Weick et al., 1999). They allow uncertainty to build up before labelling a 
situation preventing them from incorrectly diagnosing an unexpected event 
before they have enough information to understand it. 
Sensitivity to operations means teams are constantly monitoring and 
updating their current understanding of the human, technical and 
organizational factors that affect operations so as to build an integrated and 
up-to-date picture that represent the overall situation and operational status of 
their work (Weick et al., 1999). Through constant interaction, everyone in the 
team has a shared understanding of the intricacies of their current operations 
and each team member’s unique skills (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). An 
important part of sensitivity to operations is that it focuses on understanding 
what is actually happening on the front line, regardless of intentions, designs 
and plans (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). 
Commitment to resilience involves always trying to grow employee 
and organization-wide capabilities to best learn, adapt and improvise to 
bounce back from unexpected events (Van Dyck, Frese, Baer & Sonnentag, 
2005). A commitment to resilience means teams will pay attention to which 
capabilities, knowledge and resources are most important when responding 
to unwanted surprises (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). It also means that teams 
will analyse previous mistakes and setbacks for their lessons in order to use 
these as opportunities to grow team-wide capabilities (Weick et al., 1999). A 
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commitment to resilience also requires quick, real-time feedback so teams are 
best equipped to deal with surprises as they unfold (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015).  
Deference to expertise means that during unexpected events, 
decisions are made by those best equipped to deal with the current situation, 
rather than those with the highest hierarchical rank (Weick et al., 1999). This 
requires that team members have a good understanding of each other’s 
expertise, so they know who to call on during unexpected events (Roberts, 
Stout & Halpern, 1994). It also means that all team members feel the same 
responsibility to contribute to safety performance regardless of how many 
years of experience they have (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Deference to 
expertise also means that those closest to the potential problem become the 
sense makers of that problem and experts will listen to new employees with 
humility (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015) 
4.1.2. Mindful organising’s nomological network 
 Vogus and Sutcliffe (2012) stress the importance of distinguishing 
mindful organising from related mindfulness concepts such as organizational 
mindfulness and individual mindfulness, as they may seem similar but are 
theoretically and operationally different. Mindful organising also bears some 
similarities to other team-related variables that are known to be important for 
predicting safety performance such as transactive memory systems and team 
situational awareness. In order to deepen the conceptualization of mindful 
organising, the following section will distinguish mindful organising from 
other mindfulness variables (individual and organizational mindfulness) as 
well as other similar team-related constructs (transactive memory systems 
and team situational awareness). 
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Individual mindfulness is the most widely studied and best understood 
of all the mindfulness constructs. It refers to a state of consciousness where 
attention is focused on events occurring in the present moment: both 
internally and externally (Dane, 2011). It is a mental activity or a state of 
concentration that occurs in one’s mind. Mindful organising is different from 
individual mindfulness as it is not an intrapsychic process that occurs in the 
mind of individuals or teams (Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999). Rather, mindful 
organising is a social process of organising in such a way that sustains 
attention to salient stimuli that may pose a threat to the operation of the 
organization, sparking corrective action (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012). It can be 
seen and recorded in the conversations, interactions, and actions of team 
members. 
Mindful organising is also different from organizational mindfulness 
(Vogus & Sutcliffe 2012). Organizational mindfulness is more similar to 
mindful organising than individual mindfulness as it is also a collective 
capability to anticipate and recover from unexpected events. However, 
organizational mindfulness is a strategic top-down construct which is more 
enduring in an organization as it is brought about through the practices, 
strategies, and structures put in place by top management (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 
2012). In contrast, mindful organising is a bottom-up collective process 
enacted by those on the front line; it is fragile and needs constant 
reinforcement (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
An interesting team-related variable that bears some similarities to 
mindful organising is transactive memory systems. Transactive memory is a 
shared memory system where knowledge is collectively stored, encoded and 
retrieved among pairs or groups (Wegner, 1987). This develops when people 
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in close relationships are aware of the content of each other’s knowledge and 
therefore use one another as memory storage locations (Xiao, Moss, 
Mackenzie, Seagull & Faraj, 2002). In teams, group-level transactive memory 
can be formed where team members rely on each other’s knowledge to reduce 
their cognitive load and deepen their own area-specific knowledge, 
depending on one another for information retrieval when needed (Lewis, 
2003). This group-level transactive memory is seen when teams (1) show a 
differentiated structure of members specialised knowledge (specialization), 
(2) believe in and trust in the legitimacy of each other’s expertise (credibility) 
and (3) have an effective coordinated way of processing knowledge 
(coordination) (Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000). This transactive memory 
system is believed to allow teams to combine their expertise and coordinate 
their actions better (Lewis, 2003).  
Transactive memory systems largely focus on the coordinated storage 
and processing of knowledge and information among teams bearing some 
similarities to two elements of mindful organising: sensitivity to operations 
and deference to expertise. Sensitivity to operations has to do with teams 
having a thorough, up-to-date understanding of the human factors that affect 
operations (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). This is similar to specialization in 
transactive memory systems which speaks to team members understanding 
their and other team members specialised skills. In addition, deference to 
expertise speaks directly to decision making power being transferred to those 
with the best expertise at hand as well as pooling collective expertise to best 
deal with unexpected events (Weick et al., 1999) which bears some 
similarities to drawing on others differentiated knowledge to increase 
collective expertise for effective knowledge processing. Although transactive 
CHAPTER IV: SPANISH VALIDATION OF THE MINDFUL ORGANISING SCALE 
 
 106 
memory systems focus on the division of labour according to expertise and 
do not directly speak to pooling of collective expertise.  
Despite these interesting overlaps, the two variables have key 
differences in the way they are defined and operationalised. The main goal of 
mindful organising is achieving safer and more reliable performance by 
anticipating, and recovering from, unexpected events (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001). Three of the five processes of mindful organising (preoccupation with 
failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations and sensitivity to operations) 
have to do with anticipating events, or information, which is largely future-
oriented. The main goal of transactive memory systems seems to be achieving 
greater efficiency and effectiveness through storing, sharing and processing 
of knowledge. This process is largely based on recovering past knowledge or 
know-how, therefore, it is largely past-oriented. Mindful organising is also 
focused on error anticipation, detection, and recovery, which does not feature 
in the definition and operationalisation of transactive memory systems. 
Transactive memory systems have to do with the collective storing, sharing 
and processing of previous knowledge (Lewis, 2003), which is important for 
certain elements of mindful organising (e.g. sensitivity to operations) but is 
not central to the construct’s core.  
Mindful organising also places importance on teams always 
considering alternative explanations and new ways of working and resisting 
the temptation to use old strategies to face familiar problems (reluctance to 
simplify interpretations). Transactive memory systems aim for efficiency and 
rely on trusting each other’s expertise in knowledge processing (Lewis, 2003) 
and may even have risks of simplified interpretations as teams are likely to 
rely on solutions that worked in the past to solve problems. Mindful 
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organising is also largely focused on constantly growing team and system-
wide capabilities to better adapt to unexpected events (commitment to 
resilience) (Van Dyke et al., 2005). Transactive memory systems rely on 
expected well-established roles of members and their corresponding 
expertise, without attention put on continuously enhancing and growing this 
expertise by monitoring external demands.  
Another team-related variable which has some similarities to mindful 
organising is team situation awareness. Team situation awareness is defined 
as two or more people actively constructing a situation together by partly 
sharing the sensemaking and partly distributing it and, therefore, they are able 
to anticipate important upcoming states in the future (Salas, Prince, Baker & 
Shrestha, 1995). It is the shared understanding of a situation among team 
members at a given point in time (Salas et al., 1995). It requires all team 
members to exhibit individual situational awareness and team processes that 
facilitate information exchanges and team coordination (Schwartz, 1990).  
Team situational awareness bears some similarities to the 
“anticipation” part of mindful organising as Vogus (2011) argues that 
preoccupation with failure, sensitivity to operations and reluctance to 
simplify interpretations allows teams to generate a rich awareness of 
discriminatory detail of their current operations to best anticipate unexpected 
events. In addition, both mindful organising and team situational awareness 
have been studied in high-risk environments with the goal of achieving safe 
performance. The time orientation of team situational awareness and mindful 
organising are also somewhat similar, with mindful organising being largely 
future-oriented and team situational awareness being present to short term 
future-oriented. Teams engaging in mindful organising maintain an acute 
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awareness of any potential errors or anomalies through proactive and pre-
emptive discussion and analysis of their current operations (preoccupation 
with failure). In addition, teams actively maintain a constant up-to-date 
understanding of the human and organizational factors that affect their 
operations through their actions and interactions with one another (sensitivity 
to operations).  These two processes of mindful organising are similar to the 
individual and collective sense making in the moment to best anticipate 
upcoming future states which is central to team situational awareness. In fact, 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2015) argue that situational awareness is an important 
prerequisite for “sensitivity to operations”.  
Even within the processes of mindful organising that have to do with 
“anticipation”, there are important distinctions with team situational 
awareness. Reluctance to simplify interpretations means teams constantly 
interpret new cues updating previous assumptions, which is similar to the 
sensemaking in team situational awareness. However, this process 
(reluctance to simplify interpretations) puts a strong emphasis on questioning 
previous ways of working and not allowing previous assumptions to cloud 
new interpretations of cues (Schulman, 1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). 
Team situational awareness does not emphasize questioning assumptions and 
looking at alternative ways of working or tackling a problem.  Instead, it 
speaks to the immediate use of pre-dispositions and pre-existing assumptions 
in the sensemaking process (Salas et al., 1995). Mindful organising also 
places specific emphasis on constantly focusing on error detection and system 
weaknesses (preoccupation with failure), whereas team situational awareness 
is more generally focused on collectively developing a deep understanding 
the intricacies of a situation to anticipate events in the future.  
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Team situational awareness may have some similarities to the 
“anticipation” part of mindful organising, but it does not include the action 
component of mindful organising. Through the processes of commitment to 
resilience, teams generate a capacity for action during unexpected events. 
Through deference to expertise, teams learn who to call on during unexpected 
events. The scope of team situational awareness seems to largely focus on 
sensemaking as teams create moment-to-moment assessments of a situation 
and does not speak to actively growing team capabilities to increase team 
effectiveness or understanding which team members to call on during these 
unexpected events.  
4.1.3. Mindful organising correlates 
A comprehensive review of the current literature on the antecedents 
and consequences of mindful organising can be found in the meta-analysis by 
Sutcliffe et al. (2016). In this paper, we aimed to provide evidence of validity 
by examining the relationship between mindful organising and concepts that 
have been theoretically and empirically associated with mindful organising 
in previous studies, such as safety culture (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007), team 
safety climate (Knight, 2004) and team learning. Additional evidence of 
validity was shown by checking the discriminant validity of mindful 
organising with these related constructs. The below section presents the 
similarities and key distinctions between mindful organising and safety 
culture, team safety climate and team learning. This section also describes 
how these concepts are related and how mindful organising can uniquely 
predict safety performance in high-risk environments, above and beyond 
these variables.  
CHAPTER IV: SPANISH VALIDATION OF THE MINDFUL ORGANISING SCALE 
 
 110 
Safety culture is defined as a subset or facet of the organizational 
culture where safety has an overriding priority (IAEA, 1991). Following the 
classical conceptualization of organizational culture by Schein (1985), safety 
culture can be defined as stable and shared basic assumptions, beliefs, values 
and norms regarding the importance of safety at work (López de Castro, 
Gracia, Peiró, Pietrantoni & Hernández, 2013). In Vogus and Sutcliffe’s 
(2007) original validation paper of the Mindful Organising Scale, these 
authors suggest that mindful organising is the behavioural enactment of safety 
culture. Although the nature of the relationship between mindful organising 
and safety culture is not yet fully understood, Sutcliffe et al. (2016) argue that 
mindful organising and safety culture may have a relationship that is 
reciprocal. They believe that on the one hand, the bottom-up social actions 
and interactions that occur during mindful organising, such as constant 
questioning of received wisdom and deferring decision-making power based 
on the best expertise, may amplify and reinforce safety norms and values. On 
the other hand, the top-down effects of strong safety culture on determining 
how things are done may boost teams’ capability to anticipate and recover 
from unexpected events concerning safety. It is therefore likely that safety 
culture and mindful organising will be positively related.  
Although teams that exhibit mindful organising are likely to work in 
organizations that exhibit a strong value for prioritising safety, mindful 
organising encompasses more than just prioritising safety. Mindful 
organising details the team behaviours and processes needed to anticipate, 
contain and bounce back from events that could threaten safety. It is possible 
to have high safety culture in an organization without strong mindful 
organising. This is because mindful organising speaks to front-line team level 
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actions and interactions where teams notice weak signals and analyse these 
signals leading to a broader understanding of what is noticed which then 
widens the repertoire of action capabilities at the team’s disposal (Weick et 
al., 1999). It is possible to have a high safety culture but not understand the 
team processes needed to achieve safe performance. Mindful organising 
should be a more powerful team level predictor of safety performance than 
organizational safety culture in high-reliability settings rife with unexpected 
events as it encompasses more intricate details of team dynamics that are 
needed to best comprehend and respond to these unexpected events. 
Safety climate has been defined as employees’ shared perceptions 
about safety policies, procedures, and practices at any given moment in time 
(Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Safety climate is a manifestation or 
‘snapshot’ of safety culture (Flin, Mearns, O´Connor & Bryden, 2000; 
Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 1998); therefore, it is more transient and 
less stable than safety culture. Just like mindful organising, safety climate has 
long been considered a predictor of safety in organizations (Hofmann, 
Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003: Zohar, 1980). Knight (2004) found that mindful 
organising is positively related to safety climate. His measure of safety 
climate was on the organizational level. Zohar and Luria (2005) found 
alignment between organizational safety climate and group-level safety 
climate in their multilevel study. It is expected if a team perceives that there 
is a high value placed on safety within their team at a given point in time, they 
are more likely to engage in collectively mindful actions and interactions. 
Therefore, it is expected that the team safety climate may also be strongly 
positively related to mindful organising.  
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Mindful organising bears some similarities to team safety climate as 
it is a team level construct that prioritises safety. It is also fragile and needs 
constant reinforcement by team members. However, team safety climate is 
about shared perceptions of the importance of safety and mindful organising 
speaks to a set of team level practices that allow for teams have a deeper, 
more nuanced comprehension of potential safety risks and to act swiftly in 
response to these risks. Teams that have high levels of mindful organising are 
likely to have strong perceptions of safety climate. Nevertheless, the ability 
to mindfully organise is likely to uniquely predict safety performance in 
HROs rife with unexpected events. This is because the manner in which teams 
proactively comprehend and respond to potential errors is critical, above and 
beyond the shared team perception that safety policies, procedures and 
practices should be prioritised.  
Team learning can be defined as regular activities and behaviours 
carried out by teams to acquire and develop competencies (e.g. knowledge, 
skills and attitudes) and achieve better performance over time (Bresó, Gracia, 
Latorre & Peiró, 2008). Gärtner (2013) found that mindful organising leads 
to a greater learning orientation in workers. However, to the knowledge of 
the authors, the relationship between mindful organising and learning in 
teams has never been tested. Teams scoring highly in mindful organising are 
committed to developing capabilities that will enable them to more quickly 
detect, contain and bounce back from errors that have occurred and have the 
potential to cause more harm (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). As a team, those that 
are collectively mindful are likely to grow their knowledge and capabilities 
together. Therefore, mindful organising is expected to be positively related to 
team learning.  
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Mindful organising does encompass elements of team learning, but 
engaging in activities to grow team-wide capabilities to best respond to 
unexpected events is just one element of mindful organising. The construct 
also encompasses other important team practices to do with anticipation and 
recovery from unexpected events in volatile environments. Although team 
learning is an invaluable part of building capable teams that are more likely 
to have highly reliable performance, this one aspect alone is unlikely to be as 
strong of a predictor of safety performance as mindful organising is, given 
the wider scope and depth of the mindful organising construct. 
4.1.4. Mindful organising questionnaires 
There are a large number of qualitative studies in mindful organising 
research, so not many quantitative instruments used in the literature. Of the 
questionnaires that are used, there is much variation among them. 
Quantitative measures of mindful organising normally take on two forms; 
multifactor scales (which try to encompass a separate factor for each of the 
five processes of mindful organising) or unidimensional scales (which treat 
mindful organising as one underlying dimension). Nevertheless, there are few 
studies that show sound psychometric properties of mindful organising 
measures (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). These questionnaires are described below. 
Multifactor questionnaires of mindful organising have been used in 
many different industries and vary in length and focus. Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2001) initially proposed a 47-item mindful organising questionnaire that 
encompasses the five processes of mindful organising (preoccupation with 
failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, 
commitment to resilience and deference to expertise) for managers to assess 
how mindful their organizations were. Ray, Baker and Plowman (2011) then 
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sought to gain evidence of the validity of this scale by refining and slightly 
adapting this questionnaire to a 43-item questionnaire, to be used in a business 
school setting. These authors managed to successfully validate this scale as it 
emerged to have the five interrelated factors proposed by Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2001). These factors were different perceptually but highly related to one 
another. Before this, Mu and Butler (2009) created a 38-item questionnaire 
of mindful organising for student and professional service organizations 
based on the same five factors proposed by Weick and Sutcliffe (2001). These 
authors successfully validated the five-factor structure of the scale in their 
study which compared the difference between senior management and 
workers perceived importance of each of the five mindful organising 
dimensions.  
There have been a few two-factor scales that have emerged, such as 
the 20-item scale created by Hoy Gage and Tarter (2004) to be used in 
schools. These authors validated their scale to compose of two factors: 
mindful organising of principals and mindful organising of the faculty. They 
successfully aggregated individual scores to the group-level and linked 
mindful organising to dimensions of trust. Barrett, Novak, Venette and 
Shumate (2006) created their own 10-item Mindful Organising Scale for 
firefighters and called it the measure of high-reliability organization (HRO) 
perceptions scale. These authors also proposed that this HRO perceptions 
scale consisted of two factors: the perceived capacity for avoiding crises (self-
efficacy) and the perceived ability to communicate in a way that avoids or 
responds well to crises (organizational risk response). These authors found 
their measure of mindful organising was positively linked to self-efficacy and 
risk responsiveness. However, the scale was not aggregated to the group-level 
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and these authors did not manage to find an adequate fit in the confirmatory 
factor analysis for their proposed two-factor model. 
Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) validated the first unidimensional 
questionnaire in their research on mindful organising in the medical sector. 
The scale was originally developed by these authors and they based the items 
on theorised behavioural markers of “collective mindfulness” (Weick et al., 
1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) as well as detailed case studies of HROs such 
as aircraft carriers (Weick & Roberts, 1993) and nuclear power plants 
(Schulman, 1993). These authors also used case studies from health care 
organizations following the principles of HROs (Roberts et al., 1993; Wilson, 
Burke & Priest, 2005) This nine-item scale depicts the five interrelated 
processes of mindful organising (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) with one to two 
items for each process. It is one of the few measures of mindful organising to 
show sound psychometric properties in terms of (1) evidence of validity based 
on relationships with other variables (e.g., discriminant and criterion), (2) 
sound reliability and (3) evidence justifying the aggregation of individual 
scores to the group-level. Evidence of discriminant validity was obtained by 
running a factor analysis of the mindful organising items with the items of 
other scales measuring related but differentiated constructs, such as trust in 
leadership and effective commitment. Evidence of criterion validity was 
shown by testing the relationships of mindful organising with individual and 
organizational outcomes such as exhaustion and turnover.  
Ausserhofer et al. (2013) also validated Vogus and Sutcliffe’s (2007) 
Mindful Organising Scale in French, German and Italian, with all these scales 
emerging as unidimensional scales. Both the original validation of the 
Mindful Organising Scale by Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) and the translated 
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versions of the scale by Ausserhofer et al. (2013), were conducted with 
samples of nurses. Later, Magnano et al. (2017) validated an Italian version 
of the scale. These authors confirmed a unidimensional structure of the scale 
and showed sound internal consistency of the scale and concurrent validity of 
mindful organising from commitment to change and perceived organizational 
support. These authors, however, omitted one item from the scale, did not 
show any evidence for aggregating scores to a team level and used a sample 
of individual Italian workers from different organizations not within high-
reliability.  
The multidimensional scales are useful as they offer richer diagnostic 
value so researchers and practitioners can comprehensively see which aspects 
of each of the five mindful organising processes are lacking. However, having 
larger scales can be challenging in applied research. Studies that measure 
mindful organising will almost always measure other variables too (such as 
safety performance, safety culture, leadership practices, etc.) and presenting 
participants with long and time-consuming questionnaires can lead to 
response biases due to fatigue as well as take more time away from people 
doing their job. Therefore, it is unsurprising that in the extant literature to do 
with empirical research in various different contexts on mindful organising, 
the nine-item scale by Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) is one of the most widely 
used scales (e.g. Ausserhofer et al., 2013; Dierynck, Leroy, Savage & Choi, 
2016; Magnano et al., 2017; Zaheer, 2017). The wide use of the scale by 
researchers is likely to also stem from its focus and quality. The original scale 
items, which encompass all five of the mindful organising dimensions 
(Vogus, 2011), were clearly worded and not specific to a certain industry or 
sector, making it easy to adapt to other sectors. It is also the only mindful 
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organising scale that has shown sound psychometric properties in all the 
needed aspects (reliability, discriminant validity, criterion validity and 
successful aggregation of scores to the group-level) (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). 
However, in terms of gaining further evidence of sound psychometric 
properties of a mindful organising scale, there is a need for further evidence 
of the discriminant validity of mindful organising from related concepts such 
as safety culture and climate and other group processes (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). 
This will expand our understanding of mindful organising’s nomological 
network and distinguish it as a unique construct from these related variables.  
Interestingly, to the knowledge of the authors, no study to date has 
empirically tested the reliability and factor structure of a mindful organising 
measure in more traditional HRO settings like nuclear power plants. Instead, 
samples have come mostly from reliability seeking organizations such as 
hospitals (e.g. Ausserhofer et al., 2013; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) and fire 
departments (Barrett et al., 2006), or non-traditional HRO industries like 
information technology firms (e.g. Mu & Butler, 2012) and educational 
institutions (e.g. Hoy et al., 2004; Ray et al., 2011). This is especially 
interesting as the original conceptualization of mindful organising by Weick 
et al. (1999) bases much of the theoretical foundations of the construct on 
HROs following the safety research paradigm interested in understanding the 
human factors in organizations where safety is consistently achieved. 
Validating an instrument to measure this team level capability in 
organizations that fully embody the characteristics of an HRO, such as 
nuclear power plants, is likely to add real value as it is within these 
environments that mindful organising is most accurately represented.  
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Besides the impact of organizational norms on how mindful 
organising is manifested, national cultures are also likely to have a 
noteworthy impact on how this construct plays out in teams. An English, 
Italian and German version of Vogus and Sutcliffe’s (2007) mindful 
organising scale exist; the English version of the scale was validated in the 
United States and the French, German and Italian versions of the Scale were 
validated on French, German and Italian samples (Ausserhofer et al., 2013; 
Magnano et al., 2017).To our knowledge, there have not been any attempts 
to create and validate a Spanish version of the scale. Even if the Vogus & 
Sutcliffe (2007) scale has been validated in these other languages and 
countries, it does not mean that it is valid for a Spanish sample as cross-
cultural differences may affect the way mindful organising is manifested. In 
fact, Noort, Reader, Shorrock and Kirwan (2015) found that differences in 
cultural dimensions such as Hofstede’s (2001) uncertainty avoidance (where 
people prefer sticking to rules, avoid confrontation and dislike change) across 
countries have an impact on attitudes and practices for managing safety (e.g. 
reliance on protocols, openness to different perspectives and concerns over 
reporting incidents). This is noteworthy given that Spain is an uncertainty 
avoidant (score of 81) nation, which is slightly higher than three of the four 
other countries the mindful organising scale has been validated (the United 
States scores 46, Germany scores 65, Italy scores 75, France scores 86) 
(Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, a Spanish version of a mindful organising scale 
validated with a culturally Spanish sample will add to our understanding of 
whether mindful organising is embodied in the same way in Spain as it is in 
other countries and thus provides some evidence for whether the construct is 
relevant across cultures.   
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Mindful organising can be seen in the actions and interactions of team 
members and is a bottom-up construct that is fragile and continually re-
enacted by those on the front line (Sutcliffe et al., 2016; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 
2012; Weick et al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Mindful organising is a 
shared unit property, meaning it emerges from individual perceptions and 
behaviours to a team level phenomenon. The assumption is that shared unit 
constructs manifest between organizational levels (individual and team 
levels) through isomorphism (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000).  Therefore, shared 
unit construct scores have the same content, meaning and construct validity 
on both the individual-level and the team level (Jones & James, 1979; 
Kozlowski & Hults, 1987).  Vogus and Sutcliffe (2012) argue that behaviour 
in line with, and perceptions about, mindful organising are likely to coalesce 
and converge among members of a team due to attraction-selection-attrition 
processes (Schneider, 1989) and due to task interdependence. These authors 
argue that attraction-selection-attrition processes can strengthen and reinforce 
similarities in mindful organising among team members as members that 
exhibit similar behaviours are favoured in selection and retention. They also 
posit that task interdependence and the influence of social learning that is 
facilitated through ongoing social interactions during the time teams work 
together can create greater convergence in mindful organising among team 
members.  
The subject and content of all mindful organising scale items refer to 
team level practices and behaviours but are rated by individuals about their 
team (e.g. Vogus & Sutcliffe, Ray et al., 2011). Due to the fact that mindful 
organising is conceptualised as a shared unit property, an essential part of 
creating empirical evidence to back up the theoretical understanding of 
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mindful organising is to show that individual team member’s mindful 
organising scores can be aggregated to the group-level (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). 
Aggregating individual responses about team level practices and behaviours 
to create a team score is meaningful provided that adequate consensus is 
found between scores.  
4.1.5. The aims 
This paper aims to validate a Spanish version of the Vogus and 
Sutcliffe (2007) unidimensional Mindful Organising Scale using a sample 
from a nuclear power plant in Spain. It will be done by (1) providing evidence 
of internal structure validity (2) providing evidence of reliability of the scale 
(3) testing the appropriateness of aggregating mindful organising scores to a 
group-level, (4) providing evidence of convergent validity based on the 
relationship of mindful organising with other team-related variables (safety 
culture, team safety climate and team learning), (5) providing evidence of 
discriminant validity with these concepts by checking the distinctiveness of 
the scales, and (6) collecting evidence of criterion-related validity in 
predicting workplace safety outcomes (safety compliance, safety 
participation). 
4.2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
4.2.1. Procedure and sample 
This study was conducted in accordance with international ethical 
guidelines, which are consistent with the American Psychological 
Association (APA) guidelines. Data collection took place in 2016. The 
Spanish version of the Mindful Organising Scale was part of a battery of 
questionnaires designed to assess different constructs related to safety culture. 
Researchers were on site at the nuclear power plant to inform participants 
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about the purpose of the study and to provide instructions about the way the 
questionnaires should be completed. Researchers administered the 
questionnaires and addressed any questions and concerns as participants 
completed the questionnaires. The administration of the questionnaires took 
place in small groups during work time, in a quiet room. Participants were 
encouraged to answer honestly, and it took around 30 minutes to complete 
the questionnaires. Participation was voluntary and confidentiality and 
anonymity were guaranteed. 
The sample in the present study comprises of 573 workers from 47 
different teams working in a Spanish nuclear power plant, yielding a response 
rate of 72.5%. A team was considered as 2 or more staff working toward a 
common goal (Kozlowski & Bell, 2003).  These teams worked in all 
functionalities within the nuclear power plant (e.g. Operation, Maintenance, 
Engineering, Radiological Protection, Chemistry, etc.). Regarding age 
distribution, 64.4% of the sample were over the age of 45, 27.4% were 
between 30 and 45 years old, 5.1% were below the age of 30 and 3.1% of 
respondents did not indicate their age. The average group size was 12.19 (SD 
= 10.83). The largest team size included 48 members and the smallest team 
size included three members.  
4.2.2. Measures 
4.2.2.1. Mindful organising 
Mindful organising was measured by means of nine items that assess 
the extent to which teams pay attention to discriminatory detail of emerging 
issues and act swiftly in response to such details (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012; 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006; Weick et al., 1999). Participants rate the extent to 
which the nine items accurately describe their team on a five-point Likert 
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scale ranging from one (completely disagree) to five (completely agree). The 
scale was taken from the Mindful Organising Scale by Vogus and Sutcliffe 
(2007). A complete list of the items can be found in Table 1. The scale was 
translated into Spanish following established guidelines for test translation 
and adaptation from one culture to another (Balluerka, Gorostiaga, Alonso-
Arbiol, & Haranburu, 2007; Muñiz, Elosua, & Hambleton, 2013). In doing 
so, we chose the back-translation method, where our measure was translated 
from the original English version to Spanish and then the Spanish version was 
translated back to the English. This technique was chosen as it is the best way 
to ensure the translated words and sentences are conceptually and 
functionally equivalent. This back translation was performed by two separate 
certified translators. One of these translators had wide experience within 
academia and the other translator had wide experience in the nuclear industry. 
One translator did the original translation from English to Spanish and the 
other did the back translation from Spanish to English. Thereafter, the two 
translators met to analyse any discrepancies in the original scale, the Spanish 
version and the back-translated version. The translators then came to a 
consensus on a translation that accurately depicted the intent and wording of 
the original scale. 
4.2.2.2. Team safety climate  
Team level safety climate was measured with a fifteen-item scale 
originally adapted from Zohar and Luria (2005) into Spanish by Latorre, 
Gracia, Tomás and Peiró (2013). The scale asks respondents to rate the extent 
to which they agree with each item on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 
one (completely disagree) to five (completely agree). A sample item is “we 
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make sure we have everything we need to do the job in a safe way.” This team 
safety climate scale had a Cronbach alpha value of .96. 
4.2.2.3. Organizational safety culture 
Safety culture was measured with the Safety Culture Enactment 
Questionnaire (López de Castro, Gracia, Tomás & Peiró, 2017). It is a twenty-
one-item scale where participants are asked to rate the level of importance 
given to nuclear safety within the practices of the organization on a five-point 
Likert scale ranging from one (not at all) to five (quite a lot). A sample item 
is “to what degree is safety important in the process of making decisions about 
work?” This safety culture scale had a Cronbach alpha value of .96. 
4.2.2.4. Team learning 
Team learning was measured with a twenty-item scale which asks 
participants to rate the extent to which their team engages in behaviours and 
activities to encourage the development of competencies (such as knowledge, 
skills and attitudes) and  better functioning of the team over time (Bresó et 
al., 2008). Participants are asked to rate how often certain situations occur 
within their team on a scale from one (never or almost never) to five (always 
or almost always). A sample item is “knowledge is shared among the different 
team members”. This team learning scale had a Cronbach’s alpha value of 
.93. 
4.2.2.5. Safety compliance 
The Spanish version (Martínez-Córcoles et al., 2013) of the scale 
developed by Neal and Griffin (2006) was used to measure compliance with 
safety rules and procedures. This scale is made up of the following three 
items: ‘I use the correct safety procedures for performing my job’; ‘I use all 
the necessary safety equipment to do my job’; and ‘I ensure the highest levels 
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of safety when I do my job’. Items are answered on a 5-point Likert response 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The safety 
compliance scale had a Cronbach alpha value of .89. 
4.2.2.6. Safety participation 
This variable was measured by means of the Spanish version 
(Martínez-Córcoles et al., 2013) of the scale developed by Neal and Griffin 
(2006). The scale is made up of three items rated on a 5-point Likert response 
scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). Scale 
items were the following: ‘‘I promote the safety program within the 
organization’’; ‘‘I voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that help to improve 
workplace safety’’; and ‘‘I make extra effort to improve safety in the 
workplace’’. The safety participation scale had a Cronbach alpha value of .88. 
4.2.3. Analyses 
First, a CFA was run using Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2010), 
to test the internal factor structure of the Mindful Organising Scale. 
Individual-level responses were used (N = 573), and considering the ordinal 
nature of the items, the robust weighted least square (WLSMV) estimator was 
chosen. Model fit was evaluated by considering the chi-square statistic as well 
as a few other goodness of fit indices, namely: the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990), the comparative fit index (CFI; 
Bentler, 1990), and the Tucker Lewis index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973). 
RMSEA values of .10 or more indicate poor fit, values between .08 and .05 
indicate moderate fit, and values below .05 indicate good fit (Browne & 
Cudeck, 1993). CFI values close to 1 indicate good fit, with values above .95 
considered acceptable fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). TLI values near 1 indicate 
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good fit and values approaching 0 indicate poor fit, with the conventional cut 
off being .90 for acceptable fit (Tucker & Lewis, 1973).  
Second, the reliability of the Mindful Organising Scale was assessed 
using individual scores by computing the Cronbach alpha coefficient ( ). The 
average variance extracted (AVE) value and composite reliability value (rho) 
were examined to ascertain the internal consistency of the scale. The average 
variance extracted values of .50 or greater indicate satisfactory reliability as 
the variance of the construct is greater than the error variance (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). For composite reliability (rho values), a score of .70 or greater 
indicates good reliability (Raykov, 2001). 
Third, aggregation indexes were calculated for team level scores. 
Mindful organising is a social construct that operates within the actions and 
interactions of teams, therefore individuals’ scores were aggregated to form 
a team mindful organising score. Before this, it was essential to demonstrate 
that each member’s score was similar enough to those within their team, so 
as to justify aggregating these scores. Therefore, the average deviation index 
(ADI; Burke, Finkelstein, & Dusig, 1999) and the rWG(J) (James, Demaree, & 
Wolf, 1984) were computed and analysed for the Mindful Organising Scale 
to ensure within-team agreement. Since items were measured using a 5-point 
Likert response scale, the cut-off value for the ADI was .83 (Burke & Dunlap, 
2002); rWG(J) values above .70 are considered to provide evidence of 
agreement (Bliese, 2013). We also computed the intraclass correlation 
coefficients (Bliese, 2000): ICC (1) indicates the level of consistency of 
responses among team members; ICC(2) estimates the reliability of the team 
means. Recommended cut-off values for ICC(1) typically range between .05 
and .20 (Bliese, 2000); LeBreton and Senter (2008) have suggested that an 
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ICC(1)=.05 (which indicates that 5% of the variance in the variable is 
explained by the clustering structure of the data) represents a small to medium 
effect, suggesting further investigation concerning the viability of 
aggregating scores within groups is needed. Bliese (2000) also suggests that 
values of ICC (2) above 0.70 should be considered acceptable. Finally, we 
also carried out a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine 
whether there was statistically significant between-team discrimination in 
mindful organising among teams. All other variables in the study (safety 
culture, team safety climate, team learning, safety compliance, and safety 
participation) were also operationalised by aggregating team members’ 
scores, and therefore, the aforementioned aggregation indices were also 
estimated for them. Aggregation indices and ANOVA were estimated with R 
3.5.0 (R Core Team, 2018). 
Fourth, to show evidence of validity, mindful organising was 
correlated with safety culture, team safety climate and team learning. This 
analysis was done with the aggregated group-level scores. The correlation 
analysis was also used to collect evidence of discriminant validity. It is widely 
accepted that factor discrimination can be established when inter-factor 
correlations are below .85 (Kline, 2005).  
Thereafter, a CFA was run using individual scores (N = 573) to show 
the distinctiveness of mindful organising compared with these three variables 
(safety culture, team safety climate and team learning). Two alternative 
models were compared: a one factor model (with all items loading in a single 
factor), and a four-factor model (with items loading in their corresponding 
scale). WLSMV was used as the method of estimation, considering the 
ordinal nature of data. Model fit indices were analysed according to the 
CHAPTER IV: SPANISH VALIDATION OF THE MINDFUL ORGANISING SCALE 
 
 127 
above-mentioned criteria. Regarding the practical fit indices based on 
modelling rationale, the following criteria were used to compare the 
alternative models: (a) if the difference between the NNFI values or between 
the TLI values of the competing models is less than .01, it is considered 
practically inconsequential (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Widaman, 1985), (b) 
support for a more parsimonious model can be claimed when the RMSEA 
increases by less than .015 (Chen, 2007). Both CFA’s were run using 
individual-level scores due to the size of our sample. The sample size affects 
the stability of the parameter estimates. Different studies (e.g., MacCallum et 
al., 1999; MacCallum et al., 2001), have pointed out that using small sample 
sizes, implies a considerable risk of misspecification of the model. Although 
the recommended “cutoff value” varies widely, scholars appear to agree that 
a sample size of at least 200 cases is recommended to evaluate the factorial 
structure of a test (Ferrando & Anguiano-Carrasco, 2010; Lloret et al., 2014). 
For this reason, carrying out the CFA at the team level (n = 47) was not 
possible in the present study.  
Finally, we tested the criterion-related validity of the Mindful 
Organising Scale by demonstrating the utility of the scale in predicting 
various workplace safety outcomes. We tested the incremental validity of the 
scale by checking if mindful organising added more explained variance to 
two workplace safety outcomes (safety compliance and safety participation) 
after controlling for other constructs (safety culture, team safety climate and 
team learning). With this purpose, we run hierarchical regression analyses 
using safety compliance and safety participation as dependent variables. We 
then introduced the control variables (safety culture, team safety climate and 
team learning) as independent variables. Thereafter, we introduced mindful 
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organising. The hierarchical regression analyses were carried out at both, 
individual and team level. 
4.3. RESULTS 
4.3.1. The internal structure of the mindful organising scale 
The results of the CFA indicated that the proposed unidimensional 
model indicated satisfactory fit ( 2 = 157.84, df = 27, p < .01; RMSEA = 
.092; CFI =.988; TLI =.984). All items had a statistically significant factor 
loadings with values ranging from .89 to .96, which is well above the 
recommended cut off of .72 (Stevens, 2002). 
4.3.2. Descriptive statistics and reliability of the mindful organising scale 
The wording of the items and their corresponding descriptive statistics 
(mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis) can be found in Table 1. 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of the translated scale was .94, providing 
evidence of satisfactory reliability. Corrected item-scale correlations ranged 
from .72 to .83, showing strong internal consistency for the scale. The AVE 
value was .70 and the rho value was .95, which are above the cut-off values 
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics and item-total correlations for the items of the mindful 
organising Scale 







Preoccupation with failure      
a. Cuando surgen problemas, 
hablamos con los compañeros 
sobre qué cosas deberíamos tener 
en cuenta. (When discussing 
emerging problems with co-
workers we normally discuss what 
to look out for.) 
4.26 .87 .82 -1.32 1.82 
b. Pasamos tiempo identificando 
actividades que no queremos que 
vayan mal. (We spend time 
identifying activities we do not 
want to go wrong.) 
3.98 .88 .75 -.75 .43 
Reluctance to simplify 
interpretations 
     
c. Discutimos alternativas sobre 
cómo realizar nuestras actividades 
laborales normales. (We discuss 
alternatives as to how to go about 
our normal work activities.) 
3.92 .95 .80 -.79 .27 
Sensitivity to operations      
d. Tenemos un buen “mapa” de las 
capacidades y competencias de 
cada persona. (We have a good 
“map” of each person’s talents and 
skills.) 
3.74 1.04 .72 -.72 .12 
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e. Hablamos acerca de nuestras 
competencias únicas de forma que 
sabemos quién tiene destrezas y 
conocimiento especializado. (We 
discuss our unique skills with each 
other so that we know who has 
relevant specialised skills and 
knowledge.) 
Commitment to Resilience 
3.82 .98 .82 -.74 .27 
f. Hablamos acerca de errores y 
maneras de aprender de ellos. 
(We talk about mistakes and ways 
to learn from them.) 
4 .96 .83 -.84 .26 
g. Cuando aparecen errores, 
hablamos sobre cómo podríamos 
haberlos impedido. (When errors 
happen, we discuss how we could 
have prevented them.) 
4.23 .85 .83 -1.22 1.78 
      
Deference to Expertise      
h. Cuando tratamos de solucionar 
un problema, aprovechamos las 
competencias únicas de nuestros 
compañeros. (When attempting to 
solve a problem, we take 
advantage of the unique skills of 
our colleagues.) 
4.03 .92 .76 -.92 .72 
i. Cuando ocurre una crisis, 
rápidamente unimos nuestro 
conocimiento experto colectivo 
para intentar resolverlo. (When a 
crisis occurs we rapidly pool our 
collective expertise to attempt to 
resolve it.) 
4.29 .90 .79 -1.29 1.22 
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4.3.3. Justification for aggregating individual scores to collective/group 
scores 
The Mindful Organising Scale had a mean ADI score below the 
proposed cut off of .83 with low variability among the scores (M = .68, SD = 
.18). Likewise, the ADI scores were well below the cut-off with low 
variability for safety culture (M =.60, SD = .16), team safety climate (M = 
.60, SD = .22), team learning (M =.73, SD = .16), safety compliance (M = 
.37, SD = .23), and safety participation (M = .57, SD = .19). The rWG(J)  values 
were all above the cut-off of .70 for mindful organising (rWG(J) = .88), safety 
culture (rWG(J) = .97), team safety climate (rWG(J)  = .92), team learning (rWG(J) 
= .89), safety compliance (rWG(J) = .92), and safety participation (rWG(J) = .85). 
This suggests there is strong agreement among the members within each 
team. The ANOVA values indicated significant differences among team’s 
scores for mindful organising (F(46,525) = 1.67, p < .01), safety culture 
(F(46,518) = 1.65, p < .01), team safety climate (F(46,523) = 2.33, p < .01), 
team learning (F(46,460) = 1.48, p < .05), safety compliance (F(46,525) = 
1.67, p < .01), and safety participation (F(46,525) = 1.62, p < .01). The ICC(1) 
for the variables included in the model were all above .05 (except for team 
learning and safety participation), indicating that 5.2% of the variance of 
mindfulness, 5.1% of the variance of safety culture, 9.9% of the variance of 
team safety climate, 4.3% of the variance of team learning, 5.2% of the 
variance of safety compliance, and 4.9% of the variance of safety 
participation, were respectively explained by the clustering structure (i.e., 
team) of the data. ICC(2) values where the following: mindful organising 
(ICC(2) = 0.40), safety culture (ICC(2) = 0.39), safety climate (ICC(2) = 
0.57), team learning (ICC(2) = 0.33), safety compliance (ICC(2) = 0.40), and 
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safety participation (ICC(2) = 0.38). ICC(2) values indicated low interrater 
reliability. However, ICC(1) values indicated a small to medium effect, 
suggesting that additional investigations concerning the viability of 
aggregating scores within groups would be justified. Finally, following 
LeBreton and Senter (2008), interrater agreement indices (ADI and rWG(J)) 
indicated strong agreement in our data for all the measured variables. In 
summary, the above indices all together provided a reasonable justification 
for data aggregation. 
4.3.4. Evidence of validity based on relationships with other variables 
The aggregated team level scores of mindful organising were 
correlated with the aggregated team level scores of safety culture, team safety 
climate, and team learning. Pearson correlations between each of the 
variables are presented in Table 2. The results were as expected, with all 
correlations being positive and statistically significant. Mindful organising 
was positively related to safety culture, team safety climate and team learning 
at the group-level. Table 2 also shows the relationships between mindful 














Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among the Study Variables at The 
Group-level 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Mindful Organising 4.03 .30         
2. Safety Culture 4.11 .28 .67**       
3. Team Safety Climate 4.24 .29 .72** .59**     
4. Team Learning 3.81 .35 .77** .50** .69**   
5. Safety Compliance 4.71 .21 .58** .45** .63** .53**  
6. Safety Participation 4.39 .29 .59** .43** .68** .53** .70** 
 
Note. **p < .001, all variables are at the group-level. 
 
As shown in Table 2, correlations between mindful organising and the 
other team-related variables (safety culture, team safety climate and team 
learning) were high, ranging from .67 to .77. However, these values did not 
exceed the accepted cut-off (Kline, 2005), thus supporting factor 
discrimination. In terms of the CFAs, as mentioned above, two models using 
individual-level scores were tested to show further evidence of discriminant 
validity between the Spanish version of the Mindful Organising Scale and 
safety culture, team safety climate and team learning. The goodness of fit 
indices were compared for both the four-factor model and the one-factor 
model as shown in Table 3.  
  
Table 3 
The Goodness of Fit Indices for the Competing Models 
Model χ² df RMSEA CFI TLI 
1 factor  13046.29 2015 .098 .862 .857 
4 factor  5851.61 2009 .058 .952 .950 
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In the one-factor model, the items of all four scales loaded onto one 
factor. In the four-factor model, all the items of safety culture loaded onto one 
latent factor, all items of team safety climate loaded onto one latent factor, all 
items of team learning loaded onto one latent factor and all items of mindful 
organising loaded onto one latent factor. The one-factor model indicated poor 
fit and the four-factor model provided evidence for satisfactory fit within the 
recommended cut-offs previously stipulated. The differences between the two 
models were substantial (ΔRMSEA = .040, ΔCFI = .090, ΔTLI = .093).  
4.3.5. Evidence of criterion validity in predicting workplace safety 
outcomes 
Results of the hierarchical regression analyses carried out at the team 
level indicated that the percentage of explained variance that mindful 
organising added to safety compliance ( R2 = 0.13, p> .05) and safety 
participation ( R2 = 0.15, p> .05) controlling for safety culture, team safety 
climate, and team learning was not statistically significant. That is, the 
percentage of explained variance that the other variables added to safety 
compliance ( R2 = 0.09, p> .05) was not statistically significant. However, 
the percentage of explained variance that the other variables added to safety 
participation ( R2 = 0.14, p< .05) was statistically significant. Nonetheless, 
we should remark that we are comparing one variable against three altogether 
with a small sample size. 
When the hierarchical regression analyses were carried out at the 
individual-level, results indicated that the percentage of explained variance 
that mindful organising added to safety compliance ( R2 = 0.03, p< .01) and 
safety participation ( R2 = 0.04, p< .01) was statistically significant when 
controlling for safety culture, team safety climate, and team learning . This 
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gives some evidence of incremental validity of mindful organising, as it 
seemed to have a unique contribution in prediction of workplace safety 
outcomes on an individual-level (safety compliance and safety participation) 
over and above three important team variables to do with safety. 
4.4. DISCUSSION 
The present study set out to validate an adapted version of the Vogus 
and Sutcliffe (2007) Mindful Organising Scale. This adapted version 
translated the Mindful Organising Scale from English into Spanish to be used 
in HROs in Spain. Given the notable lack of validation studies of mindful 
organising measures, this paper contributes to the current literature through 
providing evidence of sound psychometric properties of the Spanish version 
of Vogus and Sutcliffe’s (2007) Mindful Organising Scale.  To do so, we 
provided evidence of internal factor structure validity, reliability of the 
scores, convergent validity and discriminant validity with related variables, 
as well as incremental validity in predicting workplace safety outcomes 
(safety compliance and safety participation) above and beyond other team-
related variables. The present study also provided evidence of within and 
between team agreement of mindful organising scores, adding to the case that 
mindful organising is a social construct that operates within the actions and 
interactions of teams.  
4.4.1. Theoretical contributions 
The present study has been useful in refining the definition and 
conceptualization of the construct of mindful organising when compared with 
other related constructs, clarifying its similarities but also its specificities. We 
started with theoretically expanding our understanding of mindful 
organising’s nomological network. To do so, we first conceptually 
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differentiated mindful organising from individual mindfulness and 
organizational mindfulness (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2012).  Then we 
conceptually differentiated mindful organising from other team-related 
variables that appear to be theoretically and operationally similar such as 
transactive memory systems (Lewis, 2003) and team situational awareness 
(Salas et al., 1995). When compared with constructs such as organizational 
mindfulness, mindful organising’s bottom-up and collective nature (as seen 
in the high consensus among team member scores) is important to consider 
to better understand its relationships with antecedents and outcomes, as well 
as other emergent and unfolding processes. When compared with constructs 
such as transactive memory systems (Lewis, 2003) and team situational 
awareness (Salas et al., 1995), what is unique about mindful organising is the 
combination of the five processes carried out by teams. These processes 
facilitate rich pathways and team dynamics that lead to a present and future 
mindful orientation towards safety (including a genuine interest of learning 
from failure, a shared reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to 
operations, showing resilience in the face of difficulties and deferring to 
decision making power to those with the best expertise). These five critical 
processes strengthen the group ability to consistently ensure safe performance 
in a complex sociotechnical context. We argue that the depth and versatility 
within mindful organising go beyond the scope and possible benefits of 
transactive memory systems or team situational awareness.  
We have theoretically discussed the main similarities and differences 
between mindful organising and safety culture, team safety climate and team 
learning. We also provide an explanation of how mindful organising can 
uniquely predict safety performance in high-risk environments above and 
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beyond these variables. Our empirical analysis confirmed that mindful 
organising is positively related to safety culture, team safety climate and team 
learning, but they are distinct variables from one another. This is notable as a 
recent review of mindful organising by Sutcliffe et al. (2016) highlights that 
there is a critical lack of discriminant validation of mindful organising from 
related constructs such a safety climate and other teamwork behaviours. 
 The current study builds on our empirical understanding of mindful 
organising by validating a mindful organising measure in a traditional HRO 
setting in a new cultural context. It also shows that mindful organising 
uniquely predicts safety compliance and safety performance over and above 
safety culture, team safety climate and team learning on an individual-level. 
Through this, we demonstrate the value of these five critical processes that 
enable mindful interactions and actions in individuals in the HRO setting. 
This is especially relevant as these environments do not allow for trial and 
error learning and require vigilant and highly coordinated processes within 
work units. Unsurprisingly, the Spanish version of the Mindful Organising 
Scale is also measuring one latent variable, just like studies conducted by 
Vogus & Sutcliffe (2007) and Ausserhofer et al. (2013). We were also able 
to show that mindful organising can reliably be aggregated to a group-level.  
Sutcliffe et al. (2016) argue that this kind of validation is vital for mindful 
organising research to keep progressing significantly in mainstream 
organizational psychology and organizational behaviour. 
4.4.2. Practical applications 
The present validation of the Spanish version of the Mindful 
Organising Scale has notable practical implications. We have developed a 
tool that can be used globally in Spanish speaking organizations interested in 
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testing the level of mindful organising among teams, which has been shown 
to lead to safer and more reliable performance (Ausserhofer et al., 2013; 
Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Vogus & Sutcliffe 2007; Weick & Roberts 1993). 
Since Spanish has the second most native speakers in the world next to 
mandarin (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018), a Spanish version of the 
Mindful Organising Scale could be hugely valuable for organizations looking 
to measure this construct in the 20 countries where Spanish is an official 
language. The Spanish version of the mindful organising scale provides HRO 
practitioners with a short tool for evaluating this collective capability to 
anticipate and recover from errors and unexpected events that leads to safer 
performance. The length of the instrument has obvious advantages in the high 
pressure and fast-paced environments inherent in most HROs. The shorter 
scale leaves space in questionnaires for important antecedent or outcome 
variables and it minimises the risk of biases due to response fatigue. This 
scale can also be used for multiple purposes such as diagnosing the strength 
of overall mindful organising in teams, detecting training needs in mindful 
organising or evaluating training actions designed to improve mindful 
organising. Moreover, we have presented the procedure and statistical 
analyses to be computed to use the team level indicators of this construct 
which are essential in tackling the improvement of mindful organising.  
4.4.3. Limitations and future research 
The current study has some limitations. Firstly, the sample size for the 
team-level analyses was small (47 teams).  Although this sample size was 
close to the minimum of 50 teams recommended in the literature (e.g., Hox, 
2010; Maas & Hox, 2005), it did reduce the power of the statistical tests 
carried out. For this reason, some of the analyses were conducted using 
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individual-level scores (n = 573 workers). Team-level scores were used to 
test the relationship (correlations) between mindful organising and other 
team-related variables (safety culture, team safety climate and team learning), 
providing initial evidence of convergent validity.  The CFA conducted to 
provide evidence of discriminant validity with respect to the other related 
variables (safety culture, team safety climate, and team learning) was carried 
out with individual-level scores. Furthermore, hierarchical regression 
analyses to test for the incremental validity of mindful organising in 
explaining variance in safety participation and safety compliance above and 
beyond safety culture, team safety climate and team learning were conducted 
both at the team and the individual-level. Although team level analyses would 
have been preferable in all the cases, it was not possible given the small 
sample of teams. Future studies should replicate the findings that support the 
distinctiveness of the scales using team-level scores (with a larger team 
sample size). Secondly, the Spanish Mindful Organising Scale has been 
successfully validated in a sample from the nuclear power industry, which 
may jeopardize its generalizability to other industries. That being said, the 
item content is general and does not focus on any specific issues or 
idiosyncrasies of the nuclear power industry. In addition, the English version 
of the scale has also been successfully used in hospitals (e.g. Vogus & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). 
4.4.4. Conclusion 
More work still needs to be done in order to understand the true 
influence and potential of mindful organising. Future research needs to 
continue to test models of antecedents and consequences of mindful 
organising in various organizational contexts to gain a fuller picture of how 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern organizations are operating in increasingly volatile, 
uncertain, complex and ambiguous environments and their success in these 
environments becomes contingent on their ability to effectively adapt to, and 
recover from, unexpected events and demands (Bartscht, 2015; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2015). Researchers have identified a set of organizations called 
High-reliability Organizations (HROs) that manage to operate almost error-
free under trying conditions rife with unexpected events (Rochlin, La Porte 
& Roberts, 1987; Rochlin, 1993; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999). 
Scholars and practitioners have thus turned to HROs (such as air traffic 
control centres and nuclear power plants) to extrapolate lessons about how 
these organizations manage to hardly ever have unwanted, unanticipated, and 
unexplainable variance in their performance (Hollnagel, 1993). Through 
observational research and numerous case studies on how HROs operate, 
researchers found that at the heart of this highly reliable performance is a 
form of collective mindfulness (or mindful organising) allowing teams to 
anticipate, and recover from, any errors or unexpected events that arise 
(Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick et al., 1999)  
Since its discovery, research into mindful organising has thrived as 
this collective capability has been found to result in many positive 
organizational outcomes such as higher reliability and better performance 
(e.g. Knight, 2004; Rerup, 2009; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick & Roberts, 
1993). Still, research into mindful organising is in its infancy as there is a 
notable lack of quantitative empirical evidence to support the validity and 
usefulness of this construct (Ray, Baker & Plowman, 2011). The current 
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theory on mindful organising is mostly informed by qualitative studies 
(Sutcliffe, Vogus & Dane, 2016), which has provided rich detail about the 
behaviours associated with mindful organising and the conditions under 
which it thrives. However, there is a need for greater quantitative 
investigations into mindful organising to further advance our understanding 
of mindful organising’s nomological network so that it can have more impact 
in organizational scholarship and practice.  
Of the few documented antecedents of mindful organising, the focus 
has been largely on leadership approaches and organizational practices (such 
as training and socialization) (Sutcliffe, et al., 2016). The specific 
communication practices and participatory conditions needed to foster 
mindful organising has largely been unexplored (Ford, 2018). However, the 
importance of corrective feedback (or voice) on the front line as a mechanism 
through which mindful organising is formed and sustained is stressed in most 
of the mindful organising theory (Sutcliffe et al., 2016; Vogus & Rerup, 2017; 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Similarly, active engagement and participation 
from all team members is referenced to in observational research and 
theoretical arguments about mindful organising (Weick & Roberts, 1993; 
Weick et al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). However, there are barely any 
quantitative investigations testing which communication and participatory 
mechanisms are important for mindful organising (Ford, 2018). Examining 
the impact of these conditions on mindful organising could add to our limited 
empirical understanding about team-level communication conditions that are 
important for mindful organising. These conditions have the potential to be 
greatly impactful as mindful organising is said to be a fragile construct, 
CHAPTER V: DEVELOPING MINDFUL ORGANISING IN TEAMS: A 
PARTICIPATION CLIMATE IS NOT ENOUGH, TEAMS NEED TO FEEL SAFE TO 
CHALLENGE THEIR LEADERS 
 
 147 
needing constant reinforcement by those on the front line (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 
2012).  
In terms of outcomes of mindful organising, there is a growing body 
of evidence in various organizations showing the positive impact mindful 
organising has on performance and safety-related behaviours such as 
decreased occupational safety failures (Dierynck, Leroy, Savage & Choi, 
2017), more effective response to disasters and traumas (Bigley & Roberts., 
2001; Klein, Ziegert, Knight & Xiao, 2006) and fewer errors in hospitals 
(Ausserhofer et al. 2013; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). Not much is known about 
the effects of mindful organising on team’s affective and attitudinal responses 
at work, such as team job satisfaction or turnover intention. This is interesting 
because on the one hand, the process of engaging in mindful organising gives 
teams collective and personal resources to cope in a demanding work 
environment (Vogus, Cooil, Sitterding & Everett, 2014; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007; Sutcliffe et al., 2016), which should positively impact team’s affective 
and attitudinal responses at work.  However, mindful organising can also be 
taxing and costly as it requires continuous, emotionally demanding effort 
from those on the front line (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006; Vogus, Cooil, 
Sitterding & Everett, 2014; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001). Some authors have pointed out the need to more closely study the 
attitudinal and affective outcomes (such as job satisfaction and turnover 
intentions) of mindful organising to shed light on these competing notions 
(Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012). This has consequences for the performance and 
safety benefits of mindful organising as it will not be sustainable if the 
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demands mindful organising places on teams outweighs the resources it gives 
them in a high-risk environment. 
In our paper, we build on and extend the current mindful organising 
theory which focuses mainly on top-down predictors and performance 
outcomes of mindful organising. We draw on current theory about 
engagement, voice and psychological safety in the literature and propose two 
specific participatory communication predictors of mindful organising: 
participation climate and perceived safety for upward dissent. We also draw 
on the job demands-resources model (Bakker & Demerouti, 2006) and 
traditional needs theory (Maslow, 1981) to extend theory and test the impact 
of mindful organising on team’s subjective experience at work and 
individual’s propensity to leave their organization.  
We will investigate the above research questions through testing a 
time-lagged multilevel structural equation model using data from 47 teams 
working in a nuclear power plant. By testing our proposed model, we 
contribute in two specific ways to the mindful organising literature. First, we 
gain insight into specific participatory communication conditions that may be 
important in fostering mindful organising. This adds to the current limited 
understanding of the communication conditions that predict mindful 
organising within its nomological network. This knowledge could help 
decision makers in HROs and in the growing number of modern organizations 
operating in increasingly uncertain and fast-changing environments to create 
more meaningful changes, interventions, and management approaches to 
foster mindful organising in their teams, which is at the heart of reliable 
performance. Second, we will shed light on the impact of mindful organising 
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on team’s satisfaction in their job, and through this, the impact on individual’s 
intention to leave the organization. This advances our theoretical knowledge 
of mindful organising by offering some insight into the current controversy 
around whether the taxing nature of mindful organising outweighs the 
benefits employees gain from an enhanced ability to perform their job.  
5.2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
5.2.1. Mindful organising  
Weick and Roberts (1993) wanted to uncover what made HROs 
operate almost error-free when the potential for catastrophe is so high. 
Through extensive field research in an aircraft carrier, these authors found 
that teams exhibited a pattern of highly attentive interrelations of actions. 
Building on previous theories of organizations as entities capable of thought 
(e.g. Sandelands & Stablein, 1987), Weick and Roberts (1993) called these 
patterns of attentive interrelations of actions a kind of “collective mind”. This 
is because they represented aggregated mental processes, which appeared to 
be more developed in these HROs than in organizations primarily focused on 
efficiency. Later, Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld (1999) did case study analyses 
of various high reliability organizations and showed that in these contexts 
there exists a joint capability to bring about both a rich awareness of 
discriminatory detail and a capacity for action in teams. They finally coined 
this capability “mindful organising” (also referred to as collective 
mindfulness). Mindful organising is characterised by noticing weak signals, 
then critically analysing and reframing such signals, leading to an enlarged 
understanding of what is noticed (Weick et al., 1999). This enlarged 
understanding of what is noticed is closely linked to a larger repertoire of 
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action capabilities which is a defining feature of what makes HROs effective 
(Westrum, 1988). As Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) explain, mindful organising 
is a stable and consistent way of organising a team’s behaviour that leads to 
greater variability in performance. This allows teams to respond to, and 
contain, unexpected events in a dynamic environment effectively. Mindful 
organising is not a static characteristic that teams have, rather, it is something 
that teams do. It is also not an intrapsychic process that happens in the minds 
of team members, rather, it is seen in the actions and interactions of team 
members. Therefore, it is a fragile capability that needs constant 
reinforcement.  
Through investigations of accidents and accounts of effective practice 
in HROs, Weick et al. (1999) found that mindful organising appeared to be 
created by five interrelated processes. These five processes, which were later 
refined, are: a preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify 
interpretations, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and 
deference to expertise (Weick et al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2007). Preoccupation with failure involves constantly worrying 
about and paying attention to, any error or failure that may occur or has 
occurred as well as treating any small mistake as a possible indicator of bigger 
problems (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). Reluctance to simplify interpretations 
involves trying to uncover potential weak points by constantly questioning 
received wisdom and looking for alternative explanations (Schulman, 1993). 
Sensitivity to operations means teams are involved in the creation and 
maintenance of an integrated and up-to-date understanding of their work 
operations within the moment, paying special attention to events happening 
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in the front line (Weick et al., 1999). Commitment to resilience involves 
attempts to always grow employee and organization-wide capabilities to best 
adapt, learn and improvise in order to recover from unexpected events (Van 
Dyck, Frese, Baer & Sonnentag, 2005). Finally, deference to expertise means 
that decision making power goes to those with the best expertise to solve the 
problem at hand, rather than those with the highest rank, especially in 
situations where unexpected events take place (Roberts, Stout & Halpern, 
1994). It is through the first three processes that the collective capability to 
anticipate unexpected events is created, and it is through the last two 
processes that the collective capability to contain and overcome these 
unexpected events is formed (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
The five processes of mindful organising are said to underpin the 
success of high-reliability organizations (Weick et al., 1999). This is because 
these organizations operate in complex, dynamic and interdependent 
environments under time pressure (Vogus, 2011), which requires teams to 
consistently be anticipating and recovering from any unexpected events that 
arise. Complexity comes from the intricate technical knowledge that is 
needed to operate in HROs. Dynamism comes from the fact that the 
knowledge used, and needed, is constantly evolving as new problems are 
always emerging. Interdependence comes from the fact that the organization 
is run by employees working together collectively and not through the sum 
of individual achievements. The time pressure comes from action having to 
happen in the moment without being put off. In these environments, 
mindlessness can be dangerous. Mindlessness can be seen in teams tending 
to operate on “automatic pilot” as they rely on past categories and exhibit a 
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lack of awareness of alternative explanations to rationalise a given situation 
and only consider a single perspective (Weick et al., 1999). Mindlessness 
leads to a limited range of cognitive processes which results in a more 
outdated and limited repertoire of action capabilities (Osborn & Jackson, 
1988; Weick et al., 1999). As a consequence, mindlessness results in a 
decreased ability to manage unexpected events, which are rife in these 
contexts, effectively leading to a potential catastrophe. On the other hand, if 
HROs are able to cultivate mindful organising, it is argued that through this 
collective capability they are able to solve problems that arise from these 
trying conditions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Vogus, 2011). 
 In today’s business environment, change has become exponential 
with the start of the fourth industrial revolution and many organizations are 
operating in increasingly complex, dynamic and interdependent 
environments under time pressure. Therefore, HROs that are able to suppress 
mindlessness in these conditions are an important source of insight for many 
modern organizations to learn how to avoid their own tendency to drift toward 
mindlessness. Although research in the field is moving to modern 
organizations (e.g. Carlo, Lyytinen, & Boland, 2012), most of the empirical 
research on mindful organising has been conducted in hospitals. We chose to 
conduct our study in a nuclear power plant, as these kinds of organizations 
get to the heart of reliable performance. They are interesting to examine 
because it is in these environments that mindful organising is likely to be best 
embodied and much can be learned from the way these HROs operate. 
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5.2.2. Participatory communication and mindful organising 
Organizations have begun to see the value in engaging and 
‘representing’ as many individuals and groups in the formulation, 
modification and execution of work activities (Cheney et al., 1998). This 
active participation and sharing of diverse ideas among many different 
stakeholders are said to enhance a shared purpose and collectively desired 
outcomes (Kassing, 2001). In these “democratic” workplaces, individuals are 
given access to information about their work as well as the space to express 
their opinions which may affect decision making in the broader 
organizational context (Cheney et al., 1998; Mohrman et al., 1986). 
Workplace democracy is built on practices that are designed to encourage 
participatory communication or employee ‘voice’ (Cheney, 1995). That is, 
practices that allow for employees and teams to be actively engaged in the 
running of the organization by offering diverse opinions, suggestions and 
corrective feedback with the intent of improving organizational functioning. 
In high risk environments full of unexpected events, like HROs, the 
collective sense making needed for anticipating potential threats and quickly 
containing such threats (mindful organising) requires participatory 
communication from everyone, especially those on the front-line (Ford, 2018; 
Novak & Sellnow, 2009; Vogus & Rerup, 2017). This is because the 
complexity of the ever-evolving environment and interdependence within the 
organizational system necessitates that organizational hierarchies flatten so 
that each person operating in the system is sharing what they notice, and 
groups are digesting and comprehending new insights together. If sense 
making and decision making is reserved for only a few senior people or 
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managers within the organizational system, the nuances of the evolving 
complex environment organizational members face are likely to be lost 
(Novak & Sellnow, 2006). This would leave teams vulnerable to missing 
important details that could lead to catastrophic events. 
5.2.3. Participation climate and safety for upward dissent 
Whether employees and teams engage in the participatory 
communication practices (such as expressing diverse opinions, suggestions 
and corrective feedback) that are needed for mindful organising or not is 
dependent on whether they perceive that the organization and leaders 
genuinely encourage and listen to employees’ ideas, suggestions, criticisms 
and general feedback. The concept of psychological safety is essential in 
understanding participatory communication (Detert & Burris, 2007). A team 
is said to have high psychological safety if all members believe that the team 
is safe to take interpersonal risks (Edmondson, 1999). A lack of psychological 
safety stops individuals and teams from engaging in what Edmondson (1999) 
calls ‘learning behaviours’- sharing information, seeking feedback, talking 
about errors, asking for help and experimenting. Team members are likely to 
withhold from sharing their unique knowledge, admitting errors, discussing 
problems or asking for help if they believe that doing so may lead to potential 
threat or embarrassment (Edmondson, 1999). The learning behaviours 
investigated in this psychological safety research align with the needed 
behaviours for the five processes of mindful organising. Therefore, we 
propose that in order for teams to enact and sustain mindful organising, there 
needs to be perceived encouragement of participatory communication 
(workplace democracy) under psychologically safe conditions. To test this, 
CHAPTER V: DEVELOPING MINDFUL ORGANISING IN TEAMS: A 
PARTICIPATION CLIMATE IS NOT ENOUGH, TEAMS NEED TO FEEL SAFE TO 
CHALLENGE THEIR LEADERS 
 
 155 
we propose that the interaction of two variables will predict mindful 
organising in a high-risk environment: participation climate and perceived 
safety for upward dissent. 
Participation climate is defined as the extent to which employees 
perceive that the company is interested in their opinions, encourages them to 
share their ideas and wants them to actively participate in the everyday 
functioning of the organization. Active communication and participation 
among teams on the front line are central to the creation and maintenance of 
mindful organising (Ford, 2018; Vogus & Rerup, 2017; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007). If team members believe that their company does not value or seek out 
their ideas, suggestions and feedback, they are unlikely to continuously 
engage in the communication practices and active engagement needed for 
mindful organising. Perceived safety for upward dissent is defined as the 
perceived safety employees feel to express disagreement, concerns or critical 
feedback to their superiors without fear of backlash. Mindful organising 
requires teams to be empowered to address any errors or deviations in 
performance through freely reporting their concerns and criticisms to 
management (Burgeon, Berger & Waldron, 2000; Vogus & Sutcliffe). 
Expressing critical or challenging views to managers entails considerable 
interpersonal risk and employees are unlikely to engage in such behaviour 
without perceived safety that voicing their disagreement will not lead to 
punishment or embarrassment (Edmondson, 1999).  
Although both variables represent a perceived climate for 
participatory communication, they differ in two important aspects: their 
content and referent. The content of participation climate is more general than 
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perceived safety for upward dissent. This is because the types of opinions, 
ideas and suggestions encouraged could be either “affiliative” as they tend to 
solidify or preserve the relationship between employees and the organization, 
or they could be “challenging” because the employee runs the risk of 
damaging their relationship with the organization (Van Dyne, Cummings & 
McLean Parks, 1995). The content of perceived safety for upward dissent 
focuses just on encouraging teams to express opinions, ideas and suggestions 
that are “challenging”. The referent is also wider in the case of participation 
climate than in the case of perceived safety for upward dissent. The referent 
for participation climate is the whole organization, whereas for perceived 
safety for upward dissent, taking into account our operationalisation (see the 
measures section), is just the immediate supervisor. When an employee 
answers about the organization, they may think about their immediate 
supervisor, but also about other supervisors, top managers, as well as 
organizational policies, practices, and procedures. 
5.2.4. Interaction of participation climate and perceived safety for 
upward dissent 
We believe that the organization creates the context for mindful 
organising by encouraging employee engagement, but it is not enough to 
foster mindful organising by itself. If a participation climate is not 
accompanied by the perception that one can take interpersonal risks by being 
critical of operations to their supervisor without fear of threat or humiliation, 
this participation will be weaker or will take the form of only “affiliative” 
kinds of participation. “Challenging” forms of participation are needed in 
order to foster mindful organising. The proposed interaction effect of these 
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conditions can more clearly be seen by examining the five processes of 
mindful organising. 
Preoccupation with Failure. Teams that are said to be collectively 
mindful pay close attention to, and discuss, any small errors as an indication 
of bigger system-wide vulnerabilities (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). They also 
remain suspicious and sceptical during quiet periods when an unexpected 
event has not happened in a while (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). The continuous 
attentiveness to any deviations in performance requires team members to 
believe that their involvement, observations and opinions are valued by the 
organization. However, without the perception that they are safe to report 
errors and discuss potential vulnerabilities to their supervisors, this mindful 
organising process is unlikely to develop. This is because the potential threat 
of discussing errors or emerging issues from defensive or punitive supervisors 
will cause team members to disengage in the analytical behaviours needed for 
preoccupation with failure.  
Reluctance to Simplify. Collectively mindful teams are reluctant to 
simplify their interpretations of current operations as it may mean omitting 
potentially vital information (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). They resist jumping 
to conclusions or relying on previous schemas to understand operations. They 
believe that it takes a complex system to serve a complex environment 
(Weick et al., 1999). It is evident that encouraging active participation from 
employees is vital for this element of mindful organising as employees need 
to feel encouraged to voice their observations and opinions in order to capture 
and discuss the details of operations. In addition, safety for upward dissent is 
vital for this dimension, as team members need to feel safe to take risks by 
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challenging possible simplifications of their current operations and by coming 
up with alternative interpretations to their manager. Employees would not be 
trying to uncover potential issues within the system by resisting simplifying 
interpretations if they felt their supervisors were unwilling to listen to critical 
feedback. 
Sensitivity to Operations. Collectively mindful teams stay focused on 
the “messy reality” of what is going on in the front line in the moment by 
constantly maintaining an up-to-date understanding of all events that occur 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). This is achieved by integrating the real-time status 
of all the various processes in the system into one picture that represents the 
overall situation and status of their operations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). This 
element of mindful organising requires constant interaction and collective 
story building among team members (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). If employees 
perceive as if their opinions, suggestions, and ideas matter and that their 
organization values and encourages their active involvement, they are more 
likely to interact more regularly and share their observations and ideas about 
their area of work in the system. This engagement adds to the creation and 
maintenance of the better, more accurate picture of the bigger system. This 
has to be accompanied by psychological safety for upward dissent because 
teams need to be able to focus on, and report on, negative events happening 
on the front line and not just positive events. If there is fear about discussing 
potential issues, then an inaccurate, positively skewed picture of current 
operations is likely to be projected by teams. 
Commitment to Resilience. Mindful organising also requires teams to 
be committed to bouncing back from any setbacks through growing employee 
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and organization-wide capabilities so that the organization can continue 
working under strain and bounce back from crises while learning from these 
adverse events (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). This commitment to bouncing 
back also means team members pay attention to which capabilities, 
knowledge and resources are needed in their teams in order to best respond 
to unexpected events (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). It also requires analysing 
any error or small failure that happens for its lessons to grow team-wide 
capabilities (Weick et al., 1999). Team members are unlikely to actively look 
for the capabilities, knowledge, and resources needed to enhance their team’s 
ability to bounce back if they do not feel as if their ideas are encouraged and 
valued by the organization. Without perceived safety to disagree with 
management, voice concerns and talk about mistakes and errors, the learning 
needed for commitment to resilience which entails looking for, and 
discussing, the team’s shortcomings and possible improvement areas would 
be hindered. Lack of safety for upward dissent may even result in teams 
hiding or ignoring these possible areas of growth and or inadequacy.  
Deference to expertise. Collectively mindful teams award decision 
making authority to those with the best expertise for the matter at hand, rather 
than those with the highest rank (Roberts et al., 1994). This involves having 
a good understanding of each member in the system’s expertise and 
capabilities and knowing which channels to follow to reach these members 
during unexpected events (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). If team members do not 
feel encouraged to get involved with the everyday functioning of the 
organization and to express their opinions and suggestions, it won’t be 
apparent who has the most expertise in any given situation and those with the 
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most expertise would not step up and voice their opinions when they are 
needed most. Deference of expertise directly speaks to the breaking down of 
formal ranks in decision making, and without a safe space to disagree with a 
superior, this vital function of mindful organising would be stifled.  
We believe that these participatory communication conditions need to 
be an ongoing norm within teams in order to facilitate mindful organising 
over time. Therefore, based on the arguments aforementioned the following 
is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 1: Perceived safety for upward dissent moderates the 
relationship between participation climate and mindful organising, so that 
the relationship will be positive and statistically significant when perceived 
safety for upward dissent is high, and non-statistically significant when 
perceived safety for upward dissent is low. 
5.2.5. The emotional and attitudinal outcomes of mindful organising  
There is some controversy in the current literature about the 
relationship between mindful organising and employees’ positive experience 
at work. Mindful organising requires continuous demanding commitment 
from employees on the front line so it can be taxing, effortful and costly 
(Levinthal & Rerup, 2006; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012; Vogus & Welbourne, 
2003; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). It is speculated that this, on top of the 
elevated physical, psychological and emotional demands teams face in high 
risk environments (such as hospitals and nuclear power plants), it may 
negatively impact affective responses at work (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012). 
However, despite the somewhat taxing nature of mindful organising, it is 
likely that aspects and outcomes of mindful organising gives teams much 
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needed resources to cope with the substantial demands these teams face in 
their environment (Vogus et al., 2014; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Sutcliffe et 
al., 2016). Mindful organising is likely to cultivate increased job control, team 
effectiveness, social support, learning and empowerment. These resources 
will make it easier for teams in high-risk environments to cope in the 
complex, dynamic and interdependent work environments they face. Vogus 
et al. (2014) found that mindful organising gives nurses resources to cope in 
trying conditions but was strenuous and had negative consequences in more 
“neutral” conditions. Therefore, based on the Job Resources-Demands (JDR) 
model (Bakker & Demerouti, 2006), we speculate that the resources offered 
by mindful organising counterbalance the demands in taxing, high risk 
settings.  In addition to the JD-R model, the relationship between mindful 
organising and job satisfaction can also be examined using traditional needs 
theory (Maslow,1981). Teams are likely to feel that their safety needs are met 
by their organization if there are high levels of mindful organising in their 
team, contributing to their satisfaction at work in an industry where safety is 
of paramount importance (Huang et al., 2016).  
We expect that high levels of mindful organising will lead to higher 
levels of team job satisfaction in HROs. To our best knowledge, examining 
how mindful organising affects team job satisfaction has never been 
investigated. The notion that a team can share similar levels of job satisfaction 
comes from the idea of “affective team climates”, as researchers found that 
teams working together in the same organizational context can have 
homogenous emotional reactions (De Rivera, 1992; George, 1990). This is 
due to the fact that members of a group have shared cognitive perceptions of 
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their work environment and this predicts shared affective responses over time 
(González Romá, Peiró & Bravo, 1996). Therefore, if a team collectively 
engages in mindful organising (has homogenous mindful organising scores), 
this should predict their shared affective response to their job (job 
satisfaction). We predict that this relationship will be positive given the 
resources mindful organising gives team members in trying, high-risk 
conditions and given that mindful organising is likely to meet teams safety 
needs.  
Turnover intention is defined as the extent to which an employee 
would leave the company if they could. Turnover intention has become an 
important indicator in organizations as it shows the level of commitment 
employees have toward the organization and the likelihood of retaining 
employees. The scale used in the present study (see measures section) focuses 
on the desirability to leave the organization “I would leave this organization” 
and controls for the ease of leaving the organization “if I could”. It is 
unsurprising that most management literature has found an inextricable link 
between job satisfaction and turnover intention as those with high levels of 
satisfaction in their job are likely to want to continue working in such a 
fulfilling environment (Tett & Meyer, 1993; Coomber & Barriball, 2007; 
Kim & Kao, 2014). Some research has been conducted on mindful organising 
and turnover, such as in hospitals (Vogus et al, 2014) and in this context 
mindful organising lead to lower turnover intention. In high-risk 
environments, we argue that the team satisfaction employees experience from 
engaging in mindful organising will decrease their desirability to leave their 
organization. This relationship can be explained by social exchange theory 
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(Emerson, 1976).  Teams with high levels of mindful organising are likely to 
be more satisfied with their jobs and perceive that their safety needs are met 
are more likely to “pay back” their organization by committing to stay in their 
jobs. In other words, we expect that mindful organising will result in lower 
turnover intention, through increasing teams’ satisfaction at work.  
Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Job satisfaction mediates the relationship between 
mindful organising and turnover intention. 
5.2.6. Integrated model 
We expect that in a high risk, high safety orientated environment like 
a nuclear power plant, the importance of perceived safety for upward dissent 
is critical for facilitating the relationships between our study variables. 
Without the perceived psychological safety to be candid about “challenging” 
feedback and ideas or feeling safe to admit fault, mindful organising will be 
stifled. The positive impact of mindful organising on team satisfaction which 
will reduce individual’s desirability to leave the organization will then be 
stifled too. Therefore, the relationships between the variables in our model 
will be largely dependent on perceived safety to express challenging views to 
leaders. Such that, if teams do not feel safe to express these challenging 
opinions to leaders, participation climate will not result in lower turnover by 
fostering higher mindful organising and more satisfied teams. On the other 
hand, participation climate in an environment where teams feel safe to 
express “challenging” opinions to leaders will result in lower individual 
turnover intentions through fostering mindful organising and increasing team 
satisfaction.  
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Therefore, the following is hypothesized:  
Hypothesis 3: Perceived safety for upward dissent moderates the 
negative indirect effect of participation climate on turnover intention through 
mindful organising and job satisfaction, so that the effect is negative and 
statistically significant when perceived safety for upward dissent is high and 
non-statistically significant when perceived safety for upward dissent is low. 
The study model is represented in Figure 1. The hypothesized 
relationships and interactions are studied in a nuclear power setting that relies 
heavily on team work. Mindful organising is a team variable and the 
operationalisation of perceived safety for upward dissent, participation 
climate and job satisfaction has also been on a team level. Turnover intention, 
however, is an individual variable and an individual’s intention to stay in an 
organization is dependent on personal variables. Therefore, turnover intention 
was measured at an individual level.  
Figure 1. Hypothesized MSEM model. 
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A time-lagged study was conducted in two nuclear power plants 
belonging to the same company, where participants answered the 
corresponding questionnaire in 2014 (Time 1) and in 2016 (Time 2).  
5.3.2. Participants and Sampling 
In 2014 (Time 1), 58 teams comprising of 615 employees participated 
in the study, yielding a response rate of 76.3%. In 2016 (Time 2), 54 teams 
comprising of 607 employees participated in the study, yielding a response 
rate of 72.5%. The final sample included 47 teams (comprising 425 
employees), which were those that answered both in 2014 (N = 427) and in 
2016 (N = 425) and had at least 2 subjects each time (Kozlowski & Bell, 
2003). The average group size was 9.06 (SD = 5.67). The largest team size 
included 28 members and the smallest team size included 3 members. In our 
sample of teams, all the areas and departments of the plant were represented 
(operations, maintenance, engineering, radiological protection, etc). We 
expect that mindful organising is important for all departments, as mindful 
organising is critical for safe performance and safety is the main priority in 
nuclear power plants. 
Regarding participants’ age, at Time 1, 3.3% were under 30 years, 
19.1% were between 30 and 45 years, and 77.6% were older than 45 years. 
At Time 2, 2% were under 30 years, 25.5% were between 30 and 45 years, 
and 72.5 % were older than 45 years. As our sample showed participant 
withdrawal from Time 1 to Time 2, we conducted a response-nonresponse 
analysis. First, we tested for mean differences on participation climate and 
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perceived safety for upward dissent among the subjects collected in 2014 that 
were included in the sample of the study (individuals who responded in both 
Time 1 and Time 2) and the ones that were not included in the study (those 
who responded only at Time 1). Results of a t-test indicated that respondents 
did not differ from non-respondents in participation climate (t (615) = −0.04, 
p > 0.05) and perceived safety for upward dissent (t (615) = −0.59, p > 0.05). 
Further, we compared subjects collected in 2016 that were included in the 
sample of the study (individuals who responded at both Time 1 and Time 2) 
to those who were not included (individuals who only responded in Time 2) 
with respect to variables collected at Time 2 (mindful organising, job 
satisfaction and turnover intention). Results of the t-test indicated no 
differences on mindful organising (t (604) = 0.99, p > 0.05), job satisfaction 
(t (603) = 1.73, p > 0.05), and turnover intention (t (538) = 0.84, p > 0.05). 
5.3.3. Procedure 
Data was collected in the form of hardcopy questionnaires. 
Participation was voluntary and confidentiality was guaranteed. The 
questionnaires administered in the current study were part of a wider battery 
of questionnaires titled “Questions about Safety” which also evaluated safety 
culture and other safety issues. The questionnaire was administered at Time 
1 (2014) and at Time 2 (2016). The researchers were on site during both Time 
1 and Time 2 of data collection. They explained the aims of research to 
participants and were available to answer any questions participants may have 
had. 
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The participation climate, perceived safety for upward dissent, 
turnover intention and job satisfaction scales were created by the IDOCAL 
research team. The mindful organising scale was adapted from Vogus and 
Sutcliffe’s (2007b). Participants were asked to rate their agreement with each 
item on a 5-point Likert scale, with 5 indicating the highest agreement and 1 
indicating the lowest agreement. Since limited previous validation tests have 
been conducted for these scales, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted 
in the present study.  
5.3.4.1. Participation climate 
The items in the scale are “This company sincerely encourages the 
employees’ participation in its daily functioning”, “This company encourages 
its staff to express their ideas and suggestions”, and “This company is 
interested in listening to its employees’ opinions”. Internal consistency 
reliability was .93. 
5.3.4.2. Perceived safety for upward dissent  
The items in the scale are “I can freely express any disagreements I 
have with my supervisor”, “I can tell my supervisor when things are not going 
well” and “I feel free to talk to my supervisor about any problems and 
difficulties I have in my job without any fear at all”. Internal consistency 
reliability was .94.  
5.3.4.3. Mindful organising  
The scale used to measure mindful organising is 9-items validated 
Spanish version of the Vogus and Sutcliffe’s (2007b) original scale (Renecle, 
Tomás, Gracia, & Peiró, 2020).  Some sample items are: “When discussing 
CHAPTER V: DEVELOPING MINDFUL ORGANISING IN TEAMS: A 
PARTICIPATION CLIMATE IS NOT ENOUGH, TEAMS NEED TO FEEL SAFE TO 
CHALLENGE THEIR LEADERS 
 
 168 
emerging problems with co-workers, we usually discuss what to look out for”, 
“We talk about mistakes and ways to learn from them”, “When crisis occurs, 
we rapidly pool our collective expertise to attempt to resolve it.” Internal 
consistency reliability of the scale was .95. 
5.3.4.4. Job satisfaction  
This scale consists of three items that assesses participant’s global 
levels of satisfaction with their job, team and the company as a whole. The 
items in the scale asked participants to “please indicate, in general, how 
satisfied you are…” “with your job” “with your work unit or team” and “with 
your company”. This scale was found to have discriminant validity from 
related constructs in a recent study by López de Castro, Gracia, Tomás and 
Peiró (2017). Internal consistency reliability was .85. 
5.3.4.5. Turnover intention  
A one item scale which states “I would leave this organization if I 
could” was used to measure turnover intention. It focuses on the desirability 
to leave the organization (“I would leave this organization”) and controls for 
the ease of leaving the organization (“if I could”). Internal consistency could 
not be calculated as this is a single item measure. 
5.3.5. Analysis 
Given that three of the measures were created by our research team 
and were not validated elsewhere, confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) of the 
four scales (participation climate, perceived safety for upward dissent, 
mindful organising, and job satisfaction) were carried out in order to gain 
evidence of the validity of these measures. This was done by testing the 
measurement model at the individual level using Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 
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1998–2010). Two alternative CFA models (a one factor model with all the 
items loading onto one single factor and a two-factor model with all the items 
loading onto two separate factors) were conducted and compared for the 2014 
data, namely the perceived safety for upward dissent scale and the 
participation climate scale. Likewise, two CFA models (a one factor model 
with all the items loading onto one single factor and a two-factor model with 
all the items loading onto two separate factors) were conducted and analysed 
for the 2016 data, namely the mindful organising and job satisfaction scale. 
The turnover intention scale was omitted since it is a one item measure. All 
the variables were measured with Likert response scales, thus, considering 
the ordinal nature of the data (Field, 2013) the method of estimation used was 
ULSMV. Model fit was evaluated by considering the chi-square statistic as 
well as a few other goodness of fit indices, namely: the root mean square error 
of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990), the comparative fit index (CFI; 
Bentler, 1990) and the Tucker Lewis index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973). 
RMSEA values of .10 or more indicate poor fit, values between .08 and .05 
indicate fair fit or a reasonable error of approximation, and values below .05 
indicate good fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Browne & Du Toit, 1992). CFI 
values close to 1 indicate good fit, with values above .95 considered 
acceptable fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). TLI values near 1 indicate good fit and 
values approaching 0 indicate poor fit, with the conventional cut off used 
being .90 for acceptable fit (Tucker & Lewis, 1973). We used the following 
criteria for comparing the alternative models: (1) whether the differences 
between TLI and CFI values of the competing models were larger than .01 
(Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Widaman, 1985), and (2) whether the differences 
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between RMSEA values were larger than .015 (Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby 
& Paxton, 2008). These criteria indicate whether there is a notable disparity 
between the models and when these differences in practical fit indices are 
detected, the model showing better fit will be selected.  
Mindful organising is a social construct that operates within the 
actions and interactions of teams, therefore each individual’s score was 
aggregated to form a team mindful organising score as is common practice in 
measuring this variable (e.g. Ausserhofer et al. 2013; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 
2007b). Since the analysis was done on a team level (except for turnover 
intention), similarly, the antecedent variables (perceived safety for upward 
dissent and employee participation) and outcome variable (job satisfaction) 
were also aggregated to analyse the team level responses. Beforehand, it was 
essential to demonstrate that each member’s score was similar enough to 
those in their team, so as to justify aggregating these scores. In order to do so, 
we ran three kinds of analyses. Firstly, average deviation indexes (ADI; 
Burke, Finkelstein, & Dusig, 1999) were computed and analysed for each of 
the five scales to ensure within-team agreement. Since all the scales used a 5-
point Likert response scale, the cut-off value for the ADI was .83 (Burke & 
Dunlap, 2002), therefore, we concluded that there was within-team agreement 
when the ADI values were ≤ .83. Secondly, we examined the extent to which 
employees from the same team shared similar perceptions in the study 
variables by computing the intra-class correlation coefficient ICC(1) (Bliese, 
2000). ICC(1) provide an estimate on the proportion of total variance 
attributable to within-team homogeneity, indicating how much the studied 
variables are shared within the teams. Recommended cut-off values for 
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ICC(1) typically range between .05 and .20 (Bliese, 2000). Finally, we carried 
out one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) to ascertain whether there was 
statistically significant between-team discrimination in perceived safety for 
upward dissent, participation climate, mindful organising, and job 
satisfaction among teams. Turnover intention was operationalised at the 
individual level. 
Multilevel structural equation modelling (MSEM) with Mplus was 
conducted to test the proposed model in which the interaction of perceived 
safety for upward dissent and participation climate leads to mindful 
organising, and job satisfaction mediates the relationship between mindful 
organising and turnover intention. All variables were measured at the team 
level, except turnover intention, which was measured at the individual level. 
Thus, the proposed model in this study was a 2x(2à2)-2-1 model (Preacher 
et al., 2016, Zhang et al., 2009). The model was tested using robust maximum 
likelihood estimation (RML).  
To test Hypothesis 1, the statistical significance of a3 (the coefficient 
estimating the moderator effect of perceived safety for upward dissent in the 
relationship between participation climate and mindful organising) was 
tested. To further probe the interaction effect we used the Process macro for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2018) to estimate the slopes of the relationship between 
participation climate and mindful organising at high and low values (one 
standard deviation above and below the sample mean) of perceived safety for 
upward dissent, and to plot the corresponding regression lines. 
To test the significance of the indirect effect stated in Hypothesis 2, 
we used bias-corrected (BC) bootstrap confidence interval (CI) method 
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(MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004) as implemented in Mplus. A 
bootstrap sample size of 5000 was used. The b1c1 indirect effect was 
calculated, where b1 is the coefficient estimating the relationship between 
mindful organising and job satisfaction, and c1 is the coefficient estimating 
the relationship between job satisfaction and turnover intention. Mediation is 
supported when the BC bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect 
does not include the zero value. 
Finally, to test the conditional indirect effect stated in Hypothesis 3 
we also used BC bootstrap confidence interval method as implemented in 
Mplus. A bootstrap sample size of 5000 was used. The (a1+a3W)b1c1 
conditional indirect effect was calculated, where W is the moderator variable 
(perceived safety for upward dissent), a1 is the coefficient estimating the 
relationship between participation climate and mindful organising, and a3, b1 
and c1 are the coefficients estimating the relationships previously stated. The 
conditional indirect effect is supported when the BC bootstrap confidence 
interval for the difference in the indirect effect (diff_IE) among different 
levels of the moderator do not contain zero (Preacher et al., 2007), which 
implies that the strength of the indirect effect (a1b1) depends on the level of 
the moderator variable (W). 
5.4. RESULTS 
5.4.1. Confirmatory factor analysis 
The hypothesized 2-factor model with the variables measured at Time 
1 showed a satisfactory fit to data ( 2 = 12.49, df = 8, p > .05; RMSEA = .04; 
CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.00), and all the items showed statistically significant 
factor loadings in their corresponding factors (p < .01). For the participation 
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climate scale, factor loadings ranged from .92 to .95. For the perceived safety 
for upward dissent scale, factor loadings ranged from .94 to .96. The 
differences between the two models were non-negligible (ΔRMSEA = .25, 
ΔCFI = .07, ΔTLI = .12), indicating the two-factor model as the best fitting 
model, and thus, providing support for the discriminant validity of the two 
constructs (participation climate and perceived safety for upward dissent). As 
expected, the 1-factor model with the variables measured at Time 1 
(participation climate and perceived safety for upward dissent) showed 
unsatisfactory fit to data ( 2 = 322.77, df = 9, p > .05; RMSEA = .29; CFI = 
.93; TLI = .88), and all the items showed statistically significant factor 
loadings onto the one factor ranging from .84 to .88 (p < .01).  
The hypothesized 2-factor model with the variables measured at Time 
2 showed an adequate fit to data ( 2 = 216.50, df = 53, p > .05; RMSEA = 
.09; CFI = .98; TLI = .97), and all the items showed statistically significant 
factor loadings in their corresponding factors (p < .01). For the mindful 
organising scale, factor loadings ranged from .79 to .91. For the job 
satisfaction scale, factor loadings ranged from .80 to .90. The differences 
between the two models were notable (ΔRMSEA = .08, ΔCFI = .06, ΔTLI = 
.07), showing that mindful organising and job satisfaction were identified as 
two different constructs. The 1-factor model with the variables measured at 
Time 2 (mindful organising and job satisfaction) also showed unsatisfactory 
fit to data ( 2 = 696.85, df = 54, p > .05; RMSEA = .17; CFI = .92; TLI = 
.90), and all the items showed statistically significant factor loadings onto the 
one factor ranging from .65 to .91 (p < .01).  
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5.4.2. Justification of data aggregation  
The results showed that the average ADI value was below the 
proposed cut off of .83 for the mindful organising scale (M = .58, SD = .17), 
the perceived safety for upward dissent scale (M = .68, SD = .29), the 
participation climate scale (M = .66, SD = .23), and the job satisfaction scale 
(M = .58, SD = .26), indicating that there was strong consensus within teams. 
The ANOVA values indicated significant differences among team’s scores 
for perceived safety for upward dissent (F(46,380) = 1.92, p < .01), and 
participation climate (F(46,380) = 3.02 p < .01). However, the ANOVA 
values for mindful organising (F(46,378) = 1.29 p > .05) and job satisfaction 
(F(46,377) = 1.29 p > .05) were non-significant. The ICC(1) values for the 
variables included in the model indicated that 9% of the variance of perceived 
safety for upward dissent, 18% of the variance of stimulating employee 
participation, 3% of the variance of mindful organising, and 3% of the 
variance of job satisfaction, were respectively explained by the clustering 
structure (i.e., team) of the data. These values show the degree to which group 
members’ responses are influenced by group membership. The above indices 
all together provided a reasonable justification for data aggregation.  
5.4.3. Hypothesized model 
Correlations between our study variables can be found in Table 1. 
Although both participatory communication variables (participation climate 
and perceived safety for upward dissent) were highly correlated with one 
another, a correlation of .68 is below the widely accepted cut-off of .85 for 
factor discrimination (Kline, 2005). All the study variables were measured 
and analysed on a team level (N = 47), except turnover intention, which was 
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measured at an individual level (N = 425). Participation climate was 
positively and significantly related to perceived safety for upward dissent (r 
= .68, p < .001), mindful organising (r =.40, p <.001) and job satisfaction (r 
= .29, p <.05). Perceived safety for upward dissent was positively and 
significantly related to mindful organising (r =.36, p <.05) and job satisfaction 
(r =.29, p <.05). Job satisfaction was positively and significantly related to 
mindful organising (r =.56, p <.01), and negatively and significantly related 
to turnover intention (r =.-21, p <.001).  
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among Team Level Study Variables 
Variable M SD 1 2     3     4    5  
1.Perceived safety for 
upward dissent  
3.98 .49 --  
2. Participation Climate 
3. Mindful organising 
4. Job Satisfaction 













  -- 
.40**  -- 
.29*  .56*  -- 
-.13  -.27  -
52** -- 
 
Note. * p < .05, **p < .001 
 
The multilevel structural equation model ran showed excellent fit ( 2 
= 8.02, df = 9, p > .05; RMSEA = .00; CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.03; SRMRwithin = 
.00; SRMRbetween = .09). All hypothesized pathways were significant (see 
Figure 2). Even though there was not a direct relationship between 
participation climate and mindful organising (a1 = .11, p > .05), the pathway 
for the interaction effect of participation climate and perceived safety for 
upward dissent on mindful organising was positive and statistically 
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significant (a3 = .30, p < .05), providing initial support for Hypothesis 1. The 
results of the analysis carried out to interpret this interaction effect showed 
that the slope of the relationship between participation climate and mindful 
organising was positive and statistically significant (B = .26, p < .05; CI 95% 
= [.03, .49]) when perceived safety for upward dissent was high (+1 SD), but 
this slope was non-significant (B = -.03, p > .05; CI 95% = [-.31, .25]) for low 
values (-1 SD) of perceived safety for upward dissent (see Figure 3), 
providing further support for Hypothesis 1. 
Figure 2. Unstandardized parameter estimates for the hypothesized model. *p 
< .05, **p <.001 
 
Figure 3. Interaction effect of perceived safety for upward dissent and 
employee participation on mindful organising. 
CHAPTER V: DEVELOPING MINDFUL ORGANISING IN TEAMS: A 
PARTICIPATION CLIMATE IS NOT ENOUGH, TEAMS NEED TO FEEL SAFE TO 




The pathway from mindful organising to job satisfaction was positive 
and significant (b1 = .74, p < .001). In addition, the pathway from job 
satisfaction to turnover intention was negative and statistically significant (c1 
= -.63, p <.001), and the BC bootstrap CI for the estimated indirect effect 
(b1c1 = -.47; CI 95% = [-.77, -.16]) did not include the zero value. Therefore, 
job satisfaction mediated the relationship between mindful organising and 
turnover intention, confirming Hypothesis 2. 
Finally, we tested Hypothesis 3 by examining the conditional indirect 
effect. When perceived safety for upward dissent was high (1 SD above the 
mean), the indirect effect of participation climate on turnover intention 
through mindful organising and job satisfaction, was more negative compared 
to when perceived safety for upward dissent was low (1 SD below the mean). 
The confidence interval for the difference between indirect effects at high and 
low values of the moderator did not include the zero value. These results 
provided support for Hypotheses 3. The Bias Corrected Bootstrap Confidence 
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Intervals for the Indirect and Conditional Indirect Effects can be found in 
Table 2. 
Table 2.  
BC Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for the Indirect and Conditional Indirect 
Effects 
 Estimate 95% CI 
Indirect effect (b1c1) -.47 [-.77, -.16] 
Conditional indirect effect (a1+a3W)b1 c1   
W mean – 1 SD  (3.51) -.57 [-1.11, -.03] 
W mean + 1 SD  (4.44) -.69 [-1.36, -.03] 
Difference between indirect effects .13 [.01, .26] 
 
Note. BC = bias-corrected; CI = confidence interval; a1 = coefficient 
estimating the relationship between participation climate and mindful 
organising; a3 = coefficient estimating the moderator effect of perceived 
safety for upward dissent in the relationship between participation climate 
and mindful organising; b1 = coefficient estimating the relationship between 
mindful organising and job satisfaction; c1 = coefficient estimating the 
relationship between job satisfaction and turnover intention; W = moderator 
variable (perceived safety for upward dissent); SD = standard deviation. 
5.5. DISCUSSION 
The present study set out to add to the current theoretical and 
empirical understanding of mindful organising through two main aims. 
Firstly, to test whether having perceived safety for upward dissent and 
participation climate together leads to higher mindful organising over time. 
Secondly, to assess whether mindful organising has a positive impact on team 
job satisfaction and whether this increased team satisfaction results in lower 
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individual turnover intention. The results obtained were in line with what was 
expected.  
5.5.1. Effect of perceived safety for upward dissent and participation 
climate on mindful organising 
Perceived safety for upward dissent significantly moderated the 
relationship between employee participation and mindful organising. The 
aforementioned relationship was stronger for high values of perceived safety 
for upward dissent than low values, thus supporting Hypothesis 1. When 
perceived safety for upward dissent is present, the relationship between 
employee participation and mindful organising becomes positive and 
significant and as perceived safety for upward dissent becomes stronger so 
does the relationship between employee participation and mindful organising. 
At low levels of perceived safety for upward dissent, however, the 
relationship between mindful organising and participation climate becomes 
non-significant. This is in line with the argument that in order for mindful 
organising to develop, teams need to not only be encouraged to actively 
participate but also need to feel as if they can voice their concerns and 
disagreements with their superiors without fear of backlash. If teams are only 
encouraged to participate and share their ideas, but do not feel safe to be 
critical or disagree with management, mindful organising may not develop. 
The more teams feel safe and free to point out faults and concerns to their 
superiors the more likely mindful organising will develop in an environment 
that encourages participation. These two mechanisms (perceived safety for 
upward dissent and climate for employee engagement) work together to 
predict mindful organising and the presence of one does not lead to mindful 
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organising without the other. These results are promising since the data are 
longitudinal, showing that the interaction of perceived safety for upward 
dissent and participation climate at time one leads to mindful organising at 
time two, giving some evidence of a possible dynamic relationship between 
these variables. 
5.5.2. Mindful organising, job satisfaction, and turnover intention 
The present study sought out to test empirically whether mindful 
organising has a positive impact on job satisfaction given the controversy 
around this relationship. The results of the pathway between mindful 
organising and team job satisfaction showed a strong positive and significant 
relationship, supporting Hypothesis 2. This suggests that in a tough work 
environment like a nuclear power plant, the arguments that mindful 
organising offers teams much needed resources to cope with the strenuous 
demands of their working environment. Therefore, the fact that mindful 
organising has such a strong positive effect on team job satisfaction shows 
that even though being collectively mindful can be taxing, it is far better for 
team’s positive affective responses at work in HROs to engage in mindful 
organising than to not engage in mindful organising. Unsurprisingly, teams 
with high levels of mindful organising were more satisfied with their job and 
therefore team members in these teams had less intention to leave the 
organization. This is in line with the social exchange theory argument (insert 
citation) which posits that the satisfaction teams feel from having their basic 
safety needs met by their organization and from rewards they gain through 
mindful organising will lead to them wanting to reciprocate the commitment 
they perceive those in the organization have towards them by committing to 
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staying in the company. These results provide evidence of the sustainability 
of mindful organising as it not only improves reliable and safe performance, 
but it also positively impacts emotional responses to the work environment.  
5.5.3. Theoretical contributions and practical implications 
Theoretically, this research contributes to the current understanding 
of mindful organising in HROs. It confirms that mindful organising is a team 
level construct as the aggregation indexes of teams showed favourable 
consensus in the mindful organising scores.  
We build on our current understanding of predictors of mindful 
organising by showing that democratic high-risk organizations that value 
employee input and engagement in the functioning of the company will only 
develop a mindful orientation toward safety if there is perceived 
psychological safety to voice challenging opinions to supervisors. Mindful 
organising scholars have speculated about the importance of participatory 
communication in fostering mindful organising (e.g. Ford, 2018; Sutcliffe et 
al., 2016; Vogus & Rerup, 2017; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015), however there 
has been little empirical investigation into which specific communication 
conditions predict mindful organising in an applied, “high risk” setting. Our 
study adds to the current understanding of how voice, psychological safety 
and participatory communication are important for mindful organising. The 
current speculation posits that both encouraging employee participation and 
safety to express challenging opinions are important for mindful organising 
(Vogus & Rerup, 2017; Sutcliffe et al., 2016; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). We 
add to these speculations by showing that in a high-risk applied setting, 
encouraging teams to express opinions and be actively involved in the 
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functioning of the organization is not enough to foster mindful organising. 
Teams need to feel safe from threat or embarrassment to disagree with 
management and express challenging opinions in order for general 
participatory communication to lead to mindful organising.  
The present study also offers some insight into how mindful 
organising impacts teams’ subjective experience at work and therefore 
individuals’ intentions to leave the organization. This adds to the current 
empirical evidence about the benefits of mindful organising in HROs, by 
extending quantitative research beyond performance-related outcomes. So 
far, mindful organising has been shown to lead to greater safety and more 
reliable performance in HROs (e.g. Barton, Sutcliffe, Vogus & DeWitt, 
2015). We have obtained evidence of the role of mindful organising, at least 
in HROs, to reduce turnover intentions through the increasing team job 
satisfaction. This can be very important in industries such as nuclear power 
plants where replacing employees with a highly specialized knowledge can 
be a difficult feat. More holistically, without the specific communication 
mechanism of a high participation climate and perceived safety for upward 
dissent, mindful organising may not develop and the benefits that come with 
mindful organising such as increased job satisfaction and lower turnover 
intentions may not be seen. Although much work still needs to be done to 
further understand this novel construct, the present research offers an 
important piece of the mindful organising puzzle.  
Practically, these results could be used by decision makers in high-
risk organizations looking to create more meaningful changes, interventions, 
and management practices to foster mindful organising. In stimulating 
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mindful organising, this research shows that possible interventions or 
trainings should not only focus on teaching the principles of mindful 
organising, but also the importance of genuine encouragement of employee 
participation in sharing ideas and creating safe space for teams to voice 
opinions and concerns that are critical about everyday operations. Strong 
emphasis should be placed on psychological safety for upward dissent as this 
condition is vital in fostering mindful organising, the collective capability that 
underpins high reliability and safety (Weick et al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007). Supervisors need to ensure that they do not respond defensively or 
punitively to challenging ideas, questions or help seeking behaviour in order 
to encourage talking about errors, challenging assumptions and admission of 
fault (Edmondson, 1999). This finding is especially relevant in organizational 
cultures that have high power distance between people and there is a large 
reliance on hierarchical order, such as the medical sector.  Our research shows 
organizational decision makers that it is in interest to foster mindful 
organising, beyond the positive impact on performance, as it contributes to a 
more positive working experience and in turn less desire to leave the 
company. Given the present emphasis on retaining current employees in the 
nuclear power sector, we give evidence of an integrated model of conditions 
needed to lower turnover intention that could help decision makers in creating 
meaningful retention strategies in nuclear power plants.  
5.5.4. Limitations and directions for further research  
Although much can be learned from the results of the present study, 
there are some limitations to this research. The fact that the data is a self-
report measure may have an impact on how truthful the answers were to the 
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questionnaire. This is especially relevant given that all the employees were 
from a nuclear power plant, where safety is highlighted as important, so 
participants may have given into social desirability bias and rated their levels 
of mindful organising as higher than they actually were. Furthermore, given 
that participation was voluntary and convenience sampling was used, this 
may have attracted atypical respondents with special interests in safety which 
could affect the generalizability of the data. That being said, most behavioural 
science research relies on self-report measures and these kinds of measures 
form the basis of much well-known theory (Field, 2013). Some authors argue 
that people’s perception of a given reality is often more powerful than the 
objective truth about such a reality (Hendriks, Putte & Bruijn, 2015). The 
literature on mindful organising and previous studies using the mindful 
organising scale (e.g. Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) also use self-report measures 
and convenience sampling. In addition, confidentiality and anonymity were 
guaranteed and participants were not asked to give demographic details that 
could be traced back to them, which would have enhanced the truthfulness of 
responses. 
Given that the two mediator variables (mindful organising, job 
satisfaction) and the outcome variable (turnover intentions) were all measured 
at the same time (Time 2) we miss out on any potential for the dynamic 
development of these relationships. However, we used a time-lagged design 
with two-data collection points, allowing us to overcome the limitations 
associated with cross-sectional research. The use of a time-lagged design 
made it possible to test the hypothesized relationships of participation climate 
and perceived safety for upward dissent on mindful organising more 
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rigorously. Another limitation of the present study is that the turnover 
intention measure only consists of one item. Although short scales for 
measuring performance have been used before in the literature (e.g. Baer & 
Frese, 2003), shorter scales raise concerns about content validity, so it is 
recommended that future studies replicate these findings with a larger 
turnover scale. Finally, the sample size was small with only 47 teams taking 
part in both Time 1 (2014) and Time 2 (2016) collection, this decreases the 
statistical power of the SEM and may have had an effect on the results 
(Rosnow & Rosenthal, 2013). However, the sample size is close to the 
recommended team level analysis sample size cut off of 50 teams (Hox, Maas 
& Brinkhuis, 2005). 
The current research shed light on an important mechanism of how 
participation and perceived safety to share critical opinions interact to cause 
mindful organising over time. However, more research is still needed to better 
understand the set of variables that contribute to mindful organising. It could 
be particularly interesting to explore further communication-related variables 
that are important for fostering mindful organising (Ford, 2018). In this paper 
we have also suggested that the relationship between mindful organising and 
satisfaction is especially important in difficult environments, however, this 
relationship could be different depending on the importance of safety in 
different industries. Future research could further explore this by collecting 
data on mindful organising and job satisfaction in different teams in different 
industries. It would also be interesting to explore whether safety culture or 
the priority that different teams in different industries give to safety, 
moderates the relationship between mindful organising and job satisfaction. 
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Finally, future research about mindful organising should extend to other 
important outcomes in industries outside of the medical sector, such as safety 
performance or safety outcomes, that remains underdeveloped with 
quantitative research (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). 
5.5.5. Conclusion 
The hype around mindful organising will no doubt continue, however 
much work still needs to be done before this construct can be fully understood 
and utilized in organizations. The current research gave greater insight into 
mechanisms that may work together to foster mindful organising, namely 
perceived safety for upward dissent, and climate for employee engagement. 
Furthermore, the impact of mindful organising on job satisfaction was found 
to be positive which lead to less intention to leave the organization. Through 
adding further predictor variables to the study model and increasing the 
sample size, further exploration could be done on the factors that predict 
mindful organising, adding to international mindful organising theory in a 
meaningful way. Building onto mindful organising research is important as it 
could create insight that can furnish leaders with vital information on how to 
foster mindful organising leading to the error-free, reliable performance that 
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6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite rapid advancements in technology and safety management 
systems, most organizations that operate in high-risk environments still 
experience errors and accidents that have dire consequences for their workers, 
customers and their communities. It is estimated that everyday more than 
960,000 people get injured on the job and around 5,330 die due to work 
related injuries and diseases (Mekkodathil et al., 2016).  Traditionally, safety 
research interested in improving the safety standards of particular industries 
or organizations would analyse accidents and errors to try to understand how 
to avoid them. This approach has since been criticized as not enough, as 
accidents and errors represent an absence of safety. In order to better manage 
safety and risk, we also need to uncover models and frameworks that 
represent the billions of cases where safety is present, and nothing goes wrong 
(Hollnagel, 2018). From these models and frameworks, we can extrapolate 
lessons about how to achieve higher safety standards in other settings.  
One safety framework which has received rising attention is high-
reliability organization (HRO) theory. High-reliability organizations (such as 
air traffic control centres or nuclear power plants) operate in trying conditions 
filled with constant risks and potential for error, and in these environments 
one error could lead to catastrophic consequences. What makes HROs 
remarkable is that they manage to operate almost error-free and maintain 
consistently stable performance (Rochlin et al., 1987). Through analyses of 
how these organizations managed to achieve such high resilience and 
reliability, researchers found that HROs designed for safety on a systems 
level and had a very intricate understanding of their operations with highly 
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mapped our procedures and protocols (Schulman, 2004). Beyond that, they 
exhibited the social and relational infrastructure that allowed them to expertly 
manage unexpected events (Weick & Roberts, 1993). This social and 
relational infrastructure meant that teams working in these environments have 
a collective capability to anticipate, and quickly recover from, unexpected 
events and small errors so as to maintain stability within the system (Weick 
et al., 1999). This team capability has been called “mindful organising”, 
which is said to underpin the success of HROs (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). As 
our technologies become more sophisticated, modern organizations are 
experiencing higher levels of uncertainty, complexity and interdependence 
than ever before, which increases the number of unforeseen events occurring 
in modern organizations. This raises key questions for safety researchers 
about the new determinants of safety management in organizations (Griffin 
et al., 2014) as the ability to detect errors and unexpected events and quickly 
recover from them is becoming increasingly more relevant. 
Mindful organising appears to have great potential in helping 
researchers and practitioners to create more resilient teams and organizations. 
However, a recent special issue on mindful organising highlights that mindful 
organising theory and empirical research is still limited, and is criticized for 
not being socially embedded enough, being too limited in focus and being too 
narrow in its level of analysis (Martínez-Córcoles & Vogus, 2020).  This 
makes mindful organising difficult to sustain in practice. Of particular 
relevance, is the lack of research positioning team mindful organising within 
other important safety related variables, contextual variables (i.e. safety 
climate) and individual safety behaviours. In fact, the safety behaviours that 
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teams engage in collectively has barely been studied, as most research on 
safety behaviour looks at individual behaviours such as safety compliance 
and safety participation (Neal et al, 2000) and individual proactive safety 
behaviours (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2006; Curcuruto et al., 2015; Curcuruto et 
al., 2019) Extending our understanding of safety to the behaviours that teams 
engage in together expands our lens to the multileveled factors at play that 
could be enhancing more resilient and reliable performance in high-risk 
environments.  
In a review of safety proactivity in organizations, Curcuruto and 
Griffin (2016) highlight that although the current literature shows that there 
appears to be positive links between climate dimensions (Zohar, 2008), team 
models such as mindful organising (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick et al., 
1999) and individual behaviour models (e.g. Curcuruto et al., 2013; Hofmann 
et al., 2003; Parker & Collins, 2010), there is limited integration across levels 
and more empirical research is needed to better understand how these various 
factors relate to one another. This is especially important as creating 
meaningful safety models from a human behaviour perspective requires 
analysis of the complex systems and factors that affect, and are affected by, 
this behaviour. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly valuable to analyse 
organizational systems from a multi-levelled perspective to have a more 
holistic picture of these complex behavioural systems. 
Within the current mindful organising literature, there are major gaps 
in our understanding of which contextual safety factors relate to mindful 
organising and how mindful organising may influence individual safety 
behaviour (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). It is widely accepted that strong 
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organizational safety cultures translated into strong safety climates are 
powerful drivers of team and individual behaviour. Originally, early authors 
positioned mindful organising as “an enactment of safety climate” (Vogus & 
Sutcliffe, 2007), arguing that mindful organising may help to facilitate the 
behaviours associated with prioritizing safety on a team level. Since then, it 
has become apparent that mindful organising fundamentally differs from 
group safety climate conceptually and empirically (Renecle et al., 2020). 
However, the notion that mindful organising could facilitate the behaviours 
associated with prioritizing safety has never been tested empirically. In fact, 
the nature of the relationship between mindful organising and group safety 
climate is poorly understood, and no study to date has looked at the role of 
mindful organising in facilitating the relationship between group safety 
climate and individual safety behaviour. This is interesting because mindful 
organising has been criticized as “unstable” and in need of constant 
reinforcement. Building our understanding of contextual factors that may aid 
in creating and sustaining mindful organising can help in advancing how 
theoretically robust and practically relevant mindful organising can be 
(Martínez-Córcoles & Vogus, 2020). 
The enactment of mindful organising on a team level has shown to 
improve objective safety outcomes (e.g. fewer medication errors (Vogus & 
Sutcliffe, 2007), and lower rates of mortality in patients (Madsen et al., 2006). 
Although there is value in analysing the direct impact of mindful organising 
on these outcomes, these models do not show us which individual safety 
behaviours are stimulated by team level mindful organising leading to 
increased reliability and fewer accidents. Models using objective indicators 
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of safety (e.g. medication errors) are also specific to certain environments and 
industries, not offering much insight to other organizations about the how 
mindful organising may effect more generalisable, individual behaviours. 
The recent study conducted by Gracia et al. (2020)  is the only research that 
has looked at the impact of mindful organising on the more general individual 
safety indicators of participation and compliance. Yet we still do not know 
what role mindful organising plays in predicting a more articulated cluster of 
extra role safety behaviour such as safety citizenship behaviours (SCBs) 
(Hofmann et al., 2003) and in preventing safety violation (Hansez & Chmiel, 
2010). These individual safety behaviours have shown to be crucial for 
sustaining reliability in increasingly volatile, uncertain and complex 
environments (Curcuruto et al., 2015). Furthermore, little is known about the 
impact mindful organising has on individual cognitive-motivational states 
that could end up increasing desired safety behaviour in individuals. Recent 
studies (Curcuruto & Griffin, 2018; Curcuruto, Parker, & Griffin, 2019) 
showed the these safety-specific cognitive-motivational states are crucial in 
influencing individuals’ to engage in highly valuable extra role safety 
behaviours in the workplace. Examining these relationships could help us to 
better understand value of mindful organising. It is possible that it is not team 
mindful organising alone that leads to better safety outcomes, but rather, it 
could be the individual motivational states and extra role safety behaviours 
stimulated by mindful organising that also play a big role in organizations 
achieving better safety outcomes. 
The present research aims to position mindful organising as a 
collective, discursive form of safety related proactivity (Curcuruto & Griffin, 
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2016) which leads to increased individual safety behaviour through affecting 
individual cognitive-motivational states. It does so by conducting two studies 
with two samples of chemical workers. The first study will assess whether 
mindful organising mediates the relationship between group safety climate 
and safety compliance and safety citizenship behaviours. The second study 
will explore whether mindful organising affects role breadth self-efficacy, 
leading to increased safety compliance and safety citizenship behaviours.  
6.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
6.2.1. Mindful organising  
Mindful organising is the collective ability of teams to anticipate, and 
recover from, unexpected events and errors. It encompasses various 
behaviours and norms that are seen in the actions and interactions of team 
members. It was originally discovered by Weick et al. (1999) during field and 
case study research on the human characteristics that made HROs manage to 
operate almost error free when the potential for errors and catastrophe is so 
high. They found that teams exhibited a highly attentive pattern of 
interrelating that allowed them to quickly detect when something was about 
to go wrong, and then act to maintain the stability of the organizational 
system. This ability allows teams, and the organizations in which they 
operate, to exhibit extreme resilience and reliability in their performance. 
Therefore, mindful organising has also called “the principles of high 
reliability” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2011). Mindful 
organising is a fragile construct, as it is enacted and re-enacted by those on 
the front line and it is a team level emergent phenomenon (Vogus & Sutcliffe 
2012; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Since its inception, mindful organising has 
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been positioned within high reliability theory and has not been a big feature 
of mainstream safety behaviour research. This could largely be due to the fact 
that mindful organising research is still in its infancy, with most studies 
investigating mindful organising being qualitative in nature, limiting our 
understanding of mindful organising’s nomological network (Martínez-
Córcoles & Vogus, 2020; Sutcliffe et al., 2016). 
Mindful organising is created and maintained through five interrelated 
processes, namely: (1) a preoccupation with error, (2) a reluctance to simplify 
interpretations, (3) sensitivity to operations, (4) a commitment to resilience 
and (5) deference to expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). A preoccupation 
with error means that teams continuously try to anticipate everything that 
could go wrong and take any small deviation in performance as an indicator 
of potentially bigger problems (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991).  A reluctance to 
simplify interpretations means that teams actively avoid simplifying their 
interpretations of events happening in their work as it could lead to incorrect 
conclusions (Schulman, 1993).  This is seen in teams questioning 
assumptions made by others and allowing uncertainty to build up before 
making a diagnosis of a situation (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Sensitivity to 
operations means teams remain aware of all of the details of current 
operations in any given moment (Weick et al., 1999). It also means teams 
keep managers informed of the realities of what is happening on the front line 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Commitment to resilience means teams are able 
to quickly recover from unexpected events and errors, achieving stability of 
the system (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). It also means that teams actively try to 
develop and enhance their ability to bounce back from unexpected events 
CHAPTER VI: ENHANCING SAFETY IN HIGH RISK OPERATIONS: THE ROLE OF 




(e.g. through learning from errors) (Van Dyck et al., 2005). Deference to 
expertise means that when teams are faced with unexpected events, decision 
making migrates to those with the best expertise or first-hand knowledge of 
the event, rather than to those with the highest rank (Roberts et al., 1994). It 
is through the first three processes that teams are able to anticipate when 
something is amiss or something unexpected is about to happen and it is 
through the last two processes that teams develop the ability to quickly 
contain, bounce back, and recover from, unexpected events and errors (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2007). Thus, mindful organising is about collective anticipation 
and containment-recovery.  
In the present study, we posit that mindful organising is a form of team 
level safety proactivity (Curcuruto & Griffin, 2016). Safety proactivity is 
defined by encompassing three key elements (Parker & Collins, 2010): (1) it 
is self-initiated, (2) it is anticipatory and future focused, and (3) it is change-
orientated. These features differentiate safety proactivity from proficient 
behaviour and adaptive behaviour (Griffin, Neal & Parker, 2007). Proficient 
behaviour in a high-risk context entails following rules and procedures to 
maintain a safe environment and adaptive behaviour entails reactively 
supporting safety in unpredictable changing environments (Curcuruto & 
Griffin, 2016). Adaptive behaviour bares more similarity to proactive safety 
behaviour than proficient behaviour, but it involves less initiative and 
anticipatory thinking. Mindful organising is an emergent phenomenon 
created and sustained by teams on the front line (self-initiated) (Sutcliffe et 
al., 2016), it involves teams initiating actions and communication about 
possible emerging issues and creating capacity to better respond to 
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unexpected events in future (anticipatory and future focused) (Weick et al., 
1999), it also focused on improving safety levels by changing the ways of 
working and growing team and system wide capabilities to best respond to 
unexpected events and errors (change-orientated) (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
6.3. STUDY 3: THE ROLE OF MINDFUL ORGANISING IN LINKING 
SAFETY CLIMATE TO SAFETY BEHAVIOURS 
6.3.1. Group safety climate and mindful organising 
Safety climate is defined as shared perceptions about safety policies, 
procedures and practices (Zohar, 2008). Employees develop a collective 
understanding about the priority given to safety through internally consistent 
patterns of actions concerning safety from management and peers (Zohar & 
Luria, 2005). From this, employees form a consensus about what is valued. 
Safety climate has a subjective normative influence on individual and group 
behaviour (Zohar, 2008). This means that individuals and groups will 
conform to the group by repeating the patterns of action of others out of a 
desire to fulfil other’s expectations and gain acceptance into the group or 
organization (Zohar, 2003). Safety climate differs from safety culture as 
safety culture refers to the underlying assumptions and values about safety 
that guide behaviour, whereas safety climate is the direct perceptions of the 
priority given to safety by individuals and groups. Safety culture is more 
difficult to directly measure as it represents implicit processes and intangible 
values, whereas safety climate is more accessible to conscious evaluation 
(Zohar, 2008; Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016).  
Safety climate is also multileveled in that it can be conceptualized on 
an organizational level and on a group level. Zohar (2008) posits that 
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organizational safety climate is reflective of the safety policies put into 
practice by senior management. In other words, if senior management 
consistently implements and enacts policies that prioritize safety above other 
competing demands, such as efficiency, employees are likely to perceive a 
high organizational safety climate. Group safety climate, on the other hand, 
is derived mainly from the safety practices that are executed by lower level 
leaders and team members, which may differ substantially from the 
implemented policies by senior management (Zohar, 2008). This is due to the 
fact that safety practices at a unit level depend on line managers discretion 
and interpretation of formal policies and procedures. It is also often the case 
that the policies and procedures implemented by senior management do not 
cover all the situations that teams may face in their work as the complexities 
of high-risk environments result in countless possible situations leaving the 
evaluation and implementation of practices to be prioritized up to lower level 
formal (and possibly informal) leaders (Zohar, 2008).   
Safety climate has been linked to increased motivation to work safely, 
engaging in safer behaviour as well as fewer adverse safety outcomes (such 
as accidents and injury) (Nuhrgang et al., 2011). There are many theories as 
to why and how a high safety climate positively impacts safety behaviour, 
motivation and outcomes. The current literature on safety climate have 
explained the link between safety climate and safety motivation or safety 
behaviour through arguments using self-determination theory, psychological 
empowerment, social-exchange theory as well as theories about normative 
influence (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016). The utility of each theory depends 
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largely on the context, level of analysis (individual, team or organizational) 
as well as the safety variables in question.  
The current study examines the effect of group safety climate on team 
mindful organising. Group safety climate was chosen to be included over 
organizational safety climate, because we believe the team level perception 
of the priority given to safety will be a more powerful and consistent driver 
of team safety behaviour. To our knowledge, no study exists that examines 
the direction and nature of the relationship between team mindful organising 
and safety climate and almost all safety climate research focuses on individual 
safety behaviour outcomes or collective objective indicator outcomes. We 
argue that group safety climate creates the psychosocial platform for teams to 
engage in the five processes of mindful organising through normative 
influences. We posit that mindful organising is an emergent, team level 
phenomenon that needs constant reinforcement in teams.  
A weak group safety climate is likely to stifle mindful organising, 
whereas a strong group safety climate will influence team members to 
prioritize engaging in safer actions and practices over more efficient or 
quicker actions. The three processes to do with anticipation (preoccupation 
with error, reluctance to simplify interpretations and sensitivity to operations) 
require continuous attention and vigilance to detect any anomaly or change 
within the organization’s internal or external system (Vogus, 2011). The 
anticipatory processes of mindful organising also require constant collective 
sensemaking as well as quick, real time feedback between team members 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). If teams do not believe that pursuing safety and 
safe outcomes is prioritized, expected and rewarded above other competing 
CHAPTER VI: ENHANCING SAFETY IN HIGH RISK OPERATIONS: THE ROLE OF 




demands, it is highly unlikely that they will be able to sustain the continuous 
effort needed to engage in the process of anticipation. The two processes to 
do with containment (deference to expertise and commitment to resilience) 
have to do with creating capacity to contain unexpected events by using 
various team members knowledge and experience in a flexible manner 
(Vogus, 2011) as well as devoting time and energy towards growing team 
capabilities for bouncing back (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). It is unlikely that 
teams will take the personal responsibility, time and attention needed for 
quickly acting to contain unexpected events if they do not believe that 
pursuing safety is of utmost importance within their workgroup.  
6.3.2. Mindful organising and safety behaviours  
Our understanding of safety at work has followed the mainstream 
organizational behaviour models that distinguish work related behaviour 
according to: In-role behaviour (task performance) and extra-role behaviour 
(contextual performance) (Katz & Khan, 1966). In-role safety behaviours are 
generally labelled “safety compliance” and refer the tasks and activities 
outlined by formal procedures and rules that employees are expected to 
follow to maintain minimum levels of safety (Neal et al., 2000). Extra-role 
safety behaviours are generally called “safety participation” and refer to a 
wider set of behaviours that may contribute to developing an environment 
that supports safety, such as participating in voluntary safety activities or 
helping coworkers with safety tasks (Neal & Griffin, 2006). High risk 
environments are facing more uncertainty and change than ever before, 
making it difficult to predict and formalize ideal behaviours through setting 
up procedures and rules (Griffin et al., 2007). It is therefore unsurprising that 
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the available research shows that safety management systems that focus more 
on stimulating safety participation have better safety outcomes (Curcuruto & 
Griffin, 2016; Hofmann et al., 2003; Zacharatos et al., 2005) Thus, safety 
management approaches need to encourage both safety compliance (to ensure 
reliability in routine situations) and safety participation (to ensure that safety 
citizenship and initiative grow capacity for reliability in unpredictable 
situations) (Zohar, 2008).  
Within the safety participation paradigm, individuals may also engage 
in safety citizenship behaviours (SCBs), which are prosocial, discretionary 
actions carried out by employees that are necessary for managing risk in 
safety critical industries (Curcuruto et al., 2019; Hofmann et al., 2003). These 
SCBs can have various typologies, in that they can be affiliative (prosocial, 
cooperative behaviours that solidify the relationship with others and the 
organization) or challenging (behaviours that enact organizational change and 
challenge the status quo through innovation, problem solving or idea 
generation) (Curcuruto & Griffin, 2018; Hofmann et al., 2003; Van Dyne et 
al., 1995). These behaviours can also be either people-targeted (aimed at 
improving the quality of work experiences of the performance of people) or 
organization targeted (aimed at improving the organization itself) (Laurent, 
Chmiel, & Hansez, 2020; Organ et al., 2006; Williams & Anderson, 1991). 
Another distinction made, is whether the SCB is either protection/prevention 
focused (aims to mitigate risks in order to avoid the potential negative 
consequences of these risks) or promotion focused (aims to enhance safety so 
as to increase positive outcomes for the organization) (Curcuruto et al., 2019; 
Van Dyne et al., 1995).  
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Mindful organising has been attributed to higher reliability and better 
safety outcomes in various studies (e.g. Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Dierynck et 
al., 2016; Madsen et al., 2006; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) These studies all 
look at safety outcomes (such as number of medication errors). Of the limited 
quantitative studies that exist, there is only one study linking mindful 
organising to more general indicators of safety behaviour (Gracia et al., 
2020). This study showed that empowering leadership created the context for 
mindful organising which in turn predicted individual safety compliance but 
did not predict general individual safety participation. No study to date has 
looked at the impact of team mindful organising on individual safety 
citizenship behaviours. This limits our understanding of which individual 
safety behaviours are stimulated by team mindful organising, helping to 
achieve better safety outcomes and higher reliability. The present research 
wanted to investigate the impact of mindful organising on a variety of safety 
behaviours on the individual level, within a context of a high group safety 
climate. In other words, we wanted to investigate whether mindful organising 
mediates the impact of a strong group safety climate on individual safety 
behaviour, and if so, which safety behaviours? 
We posit that group safety climate creates the necessary psychosocial 
platform to create and sustain the five processes of mindful organising by 
reinforcing expectancy-value perceptions of safety priorities (Parker et al., 
2010). Therefore, we believe that in a context where team members perceive 
that safety is a priority above other competing demands, mindful organising 
is likely to develop.   
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Mindful organising represents a set of safety proactivity principles 
and norms that help teams to anticipate and contain risks and unexpected 
events. Consistently engaging in these behaviours and norms are likely to 
encourage further individual safety proactivity, such as SCBs. Therefore, the 
present study examines whether a high safety climate in teams leads to higher 
mindful organising, and whether mindful organising in turn leads to SCBs 
such as helping, initiative and voice. Helping refers to behaviours that help 
others with safety related responsibilities; it is an affiliative, promotive, and 
people-targeted SCB (Curcuruto et al., 2019). Voice refers to raising safety 
concerns to others; it is a challenging, promotive, and people-targeted SCB 
(Curcuruto et al., 2019). Initiative refers to making changes to ways of 
working to make it safer; it is a challenging, promotive, and organization-
targeted SCB. We posit that the norms established through collectively 
engaging in the behaviours required for the anticipation (preoccupation with 
error, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations) and the containment 
(commitment to resilience and deference to expertise) processes of mindful 
organising will increase individual’s propensity to engage in SCBs. This is 
because consistently engaging in team level proactivity towards safety 
enacted through mindful organising is likely to influence individuals to be 
more proactive in enhancing individual capacities for safety by raising safety 
concerns they see to their colleagues and leaders (voice), independently make 
changes to their ways of working to make it safer (initiative) as well as 
helping others with safety related issues (helping). We argue that although a 
high safety climate may set the foundation for encouraging individual SCBs 
such as voice, initiative and helping, it is through the influence of team 
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mindful organising that these individual behaviours are likely to be enacted. 
Therefore, the following is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 1: Mindful organising mediates the relationship between 
group safety climate and voice(1a), initiative (1b), helping (1c) so that the 
relationship is positive and significant. 
Engaging in team level mindful organising will then increase 
individual’s propensity to adhere to general safety rules and procedures and 
discourage them going against these rules, especially for routine tasks. Thus, 
the present study wanted to examine whether mindful organising mediated 
the relationship between safety climate and safety compliance. We believe 
that the heightened attention to safety risks and possible errors and mishaps 
or “heedful interrelating” that comes from engaging in the processes of 
mindful organising (Weick et al., 1999), is likely to reduce slip-ups and lack 
of adherence to safety rules and procedures. Similarly, it is likely that teams 
with a high safety climate that engage in the five processes of mindful 
organising create a norm of a high commitment to safety and safety 
behaviours. It is highly unlikely that individuals working within units will 
actively go against formalised safety rules. Therefore, the following is 
hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 2: Mindful organising mediates the relationship between 
group safety climate and safety compliance so that the relationship is positive 
and significant. 
Hypothesis 3: Mindful organising mediates the relationship between 
group safety climate and safety violation, so that the relationship is negative 
and significant. 
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Figure 1. Study 1 model  
 
6.3.3. Sample and Procedure 
The data used in this research was collected within a sample of 
Russian-based chemical plant workers (N = 1112) comprising of 98 teams. 
Participation was voluntary and all workers were informed that the data 
would be used for scientific research and to gain insight into safety culture 
improvements in each plant. The average length of tenure was 4.7 years (SD 
= 9.58). Participants were employed in production (49%), chemical treatment 
(25%), packaging (22%) or maintenance (4%). Employees in the sample 
worked in various departments within the plant such as secondary production 
(42%), primary production (18%), filter making (17%), in the warehouse 
(14%), quality assurance (4%), engineering (3%) or other areas (2%). In 
terms of safety roles, 12% of respondents were either a team safety head or 
manager and majority of participants were ordinary workers (88%). The 
questionnaire was administered in Russian and the scales below were 
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translated from English (the original versions) to Russian using the back-
translation methods with two bilingual experts and industry personnel.  
6.3.4. Measures  
All of the following scales were measured using 5-point Likert scales, 
with 5 indicating the highest score in the dimension studied and 1 being the 
lowest score in the dimension studied.  
6.3.4.1. Group safety climate 
Group safety climate is the perceived level of importance given to 
safety at the group level. Group safety climate was measured using a 16-item 
scale (α = .94) taken from Zohar and Luria (2005). An example item is “My 
direct line manager frequently tells us about the hazards in our work”.  
6.3.4.2. Mindful organising 
Mindful organising is a team’s collective capability to anticipate and 
contain errors and unexpected events. Mindful organising was measured 
using a 9-item scale (α = .93) taken from Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007). An 
example item is “We talk about mistakes and ways to learn from them.” 
6.3.4.3. Safety citizenship behaviours 
Safety citizenship behaviours are discretionary and prosocial 
activities essential for managing risk in safety critical industries (Curcuruto, 
Conchie & Griffin, 2019). For the present study, we analysed three SCBs, 
namely: voice, initiative and helping. Voice was measured using a 4-item 
scale (α = .91), an example item is “rate the extent to which you voluntarily 
raise safety concerns in planning sessions” Initiative was measured using a 4-
item scale (α = .84), an example item is “rate the extent to which you 
voluntarily try to make policies and procedures safer”. Helping was measured 
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using a 6-item scale (α = .90), an example item is “rate the extent to which 
you voluntarily help teach safety procedures to new crew members”. 
6.3.4.4. Safety compliance  
In order to analyse safety compliance, we measured whether 
individuals comply with the safety protocol of the chemical plant and whether 
individuals violate safety protocol. Both scales were taken from Hansez and 
Chmiel (2010). Although the compliance scale is a positive indicator of 
adhering to safety protocol and the violation scale is a negative indicator of 
adhering to safety protocol, conceptually we treated both scales as indicators 
of compliance. Safety compliance was measured using a 5-item scale (α = 
.81), an example item is “rate the extent to which you voluntarily use 
protection, even if it is hard to find.” Safety violation was measured using a 
5-item scale (α = .91) and is inversely scored, an example item is “rate the 
extent to which you neglect some safety rules when performing familiar or 
routine work.” 
6.3.5. Analyses 
To test our proposed model, we ran a multilevel structural equation 
model (MSEM). Group safety climate and mindful organising were analysed 
on the team level and safety compliance, routine violation and the SCBs were 
analysed on the individual level.  
First, confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) of the seven scales (group 
safety climate, mindful organising, voice, initiative, helping, safety 
compliance and safety violation) were carried out in order to gain evidence 
of the discriminant validity of these measures. A seven-factor model with all 
the items loading onto seven separate factors using individual level data was 
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run with Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2010). Thereafter, five alternative 
CFA models were conducted, and the fit of these models was compared with 
the seven-factor model. The alternative models are: (1) a model with all the 
items of the seven scales loading onto one single factor, (2) a six factor model 
with all items loading onto their corresponding factor but with group safety 
climate and mindful organising loading onto one single factor, (3) a five 
factor model with all items loading onto their corresponding factor and the 
three SCBs (helping, initiative and voice) loading onto one single factor, (4) 
a six factor model with all items loading onto their corresponding factor but 
with safety compliance and safety violation loading onto one single factor, 
(5) a four factor model with group safety climate and mindful organising 
loading onto their corresponding factor, the three SCBs (helping, initiative 
and voice) loading onto one single factor and the two compliance variables 
loading onto one single factor.  
Model fit was evaluated by calculating the chi-squared statistic, the 
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990), the 
comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) and the Tucker Lewis index (TLI; 
Tucker & Lewis, 1973). RMSEA values below .05 indicate good fit, values 
of between .08 and .05 show a reasonable error of approximation and values 
of .10 or more indicate poor fit, (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Browne & Du 
Toit, 1992). For the CFI values, values above .90 are considered acceptable 
fit and values close to 1 indicate good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). TLI values 
near 1 indicate good fit, with the conventional cut off being .90 for acceptable 
fit (Tucker & Lewis, 1973). When comparing alternative models, we used the 
following criteria: (1) whether the differences between TLI and CFI values 
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of the competing models were larger than .01 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; 
Widaman, 1985), and (2) whether the differences between RMSEA values 
were larger than .015 (Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby & Paxton, 2008). These 
criteria indicate whether there is a notable disparity between the models and 
when these differences in practical fit indices are detected, the model showing 
better fit will be selected. Complementarily, the difference in chi-squared 
statistics along with the difference in degrees of freedom was also used to 
check for statistically significant differences among competing models, using 
a χ2 table. If the difference is significant, the model with the smaller chi-
square value is argued to have better fit to data (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 
2003).  
Second, to evaluate the within group agreement and between group 
discrimination for group safety climate and mindful organising, we calculated 
aggregation indices and ANOVA , respectively. Therefore, we calculated 
different aggregation indices (average deviation index (ADIs), Rwg values, 
intraclass correlation statistics), and ANOVAs. 
Third, we ran a multilevel structural equation model to assess our 
proposed mediation model and the pathways between our variables. Monte 
Carlo (MC) confidence intervals were used for testing the significance of the 
indirect effects, as it is argued to be a more viable and robust method for 
calculating confidence intervals for complex and simple indirect effects when 
working with a multilevel model (Preacher & Selig, 2012).  
6.3.6. Results 
6.3.6.1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
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Table 1 shows the goodness of fit indices of the CFA with all seven 
variables included in the study loading onto seven separate factors, and four 
alternative models.  
 
Table 1 
CFA goodness of fit indices for the study model and alternative models. 
Model χ2 (df) p RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR 
7-factor model: the 
seven study variables 







.050 .966 .964 .039 
Alternative model 1: 
the seven study 
variables loaded 






.147 .699 .686 .159 
Alternative model 2: 
six factor model with 
mindful organising 
and group safety 
climate loading onto 
the same single 
factor and initiative, 
helping, voice, safety 
compliance and 








.073 .926 .922 .065 
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Alternative model 3: 
five factor model 
with the SCBs 
(initiative, helping, 
voice) loading onto 
the same single 
factor and mindful 
organising, group 
safety climate, safety 
compliance and 








.054 .959 .957 .043 
Alternative model 4: 




loading onto the 













.066 .939 .936 .057 
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Alternative model 5: 
four factor model 
with group safety 




factor, the three 
SCBs (helping, 
initiative and voice) 
loading onto one 
single factor and the 
two compliance 
variables loading 







.069 .934 .931 .060 
 
The differences between the 7-factor model and the alternative model 
1 (ΔRMSEA = .097, ΔCFI = .267, ΔTLI = .278), alternative model 2 
(ΔRMSEA = .019, ΔCFI = .040, ΔTLI = .042), alternative model 4 
(ΔRMSEA = .016, ΔCFI = .030, ΔTLI = .028) and alternative model 5 
(ΔRMSEA = .019, ΔCFI = .036, ΔTLI = .034)  were notable, indicating that 
the study model had a better fit to the data. However, the differences between 
the 7-factor model and alternative model 3 (where initiative, voice and 
helping loaded onto a single factor) were negligible (ΔRMSEA = 0.004 0, 
ΔCFI = .007, ΔTLI = .007). Therefore, we examined the difference in chi-
square statistics of the 7-factor model and alternative model 3, and found that 
the difference between the chi-square statistics were statistically significant 
(Δχ2 = 629.15, Δdf = 11, p < .001). Given that the 7-factor model has a smaller 
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chi-square value, it is considered to have better fit to data. Thus, the evidence 
above supports the discriminant validity of the seven scales. 
6.3.6.2. Aggregation Indices 
The results of the within-team agreement and inter-rater reliability 
analyses for group safety climate and mindful organising provided adequate 
justification for aggregating the data to the team level. The ADI values were 
.66 (SD = .19) for group safety climate and .62 for (SD = .21) for mindful 
organising, both were below the .83 cut off indicated for 5-point Likert 
response scales (Burke & Dunlap, 2002). The rwg(J) values were .91 for group 
safety climate and .90 for mindful organising, both were above the .70 cut-
off (Bliese, 2013). The ICC(1) values were .06 for both variables, thus above 
the recommended .05 cut-off (Bliese, 2000). ANOVA results for group safety 
climate (F (98,1013) = 1.78, p < .001) and mindful organising (F (98,1010) 
= 1.68, p < .001) indicated adequate between-team discrimination.  
6.3.6.3. Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables 
Descriptive statistics and the correlations between the study variables 
can be found in Table 2.  
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Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among Study Variables 




4.08 .76 --       
2. Mindful 
organising 
3.97 .75 .64**  --      
3. Safety 
Compliance 
4.35 .67 .41** .44** --     
4. Safety 
Violation 





.31** .44** .43** .12** --   
6. Initiative 
(SCB) 
3.09 .92 .31** .44** .40** .11** .80** --  
7. Helping 
(SCB) 
3.35 .98 .38** .49** .48** .15** .78** .72** -- 
 
Note. * p < .05, **p < .001 
 
6.3.6.4. Multilevel SEM analysis 
The results of the MSEM analysis indicated that the hypothesized 
multilevel mediation model showed a satisfactory fit (χ2 =21.73, df = 15, p > 
.05; RMSEA = 0.02 ; CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.00; SRMR-within = .01; SRMR-
between = .06). All hypothesized pathways were significant (see Figure 2).  
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The pathway from group safety climate to mindful organising was 
positive and statistically significant (b = .73, p < .001). In addition, the 
pathways from mindful organising to voice (b = .86, p < .001), initiative (b = 
.78, p < .001), helping (b = .824, p < .001), safety compliance (b = .54, p < 
.001) and safety violation (b = -.49, p < .001) were all statistically significant. 
Moreover, regarding the indirect effects (mediation effects), none of the 95% 
Monte Carlo (MC) confidence intervals (CI) include the zero value. Group 
safety climate had a positive statistically significant indirect effect on voice 
(IE = .63,, 95% MC CI = 0.40, 0.91), initiative (IE = .57,, 95% MC CI = 0.36, 
0.82), helping (IE = .60, 95% MC CI = 0.40, 0.84) and safety compliance (IE 
= .40, 95% MC CI = 0.27, 0.53) through mindful organising. As expected the 
indirect between relationship of group safety climate on safety violation 
through mindful organising was negative and significant (IE = -0.36, 95%  
MC CI = -0.53, -0.21).  
To further examine full vs partial mediation, we tested an alternative 
model that included the direct paths from group safety climate to the five 
outcomes. The extra paths were not statistically significant (p > .05) and the 
partial mediation model did not improve model fit (χ2 =32.87, df = 10, p > 
.001; RMSEA = 0.05 ; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.98; SRMR-within = .01; SRMR-
between = .05).  
6.3.7. Conclusions 
The results obtained were in line with the hypothesized model in that 
mindful organising fully mediated the relationship between group safety 
climate and all five individual safety behaviours (voice, initiative, helping, 
safety compliance and safety violation), so that the relationship was 
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significant and positive for safety compliance and the SCBs (initiative, voice, 
helping) , and the relationship was negative and significant for safety 
violation. These results confirm hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.  
6.4. STUDY 4: THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL CAPABILITY DRIVERS 
IN LINKING TEAM MINDFUL ORGANISING TO INDIVIDUAL 
SAFETY BEHAVIOURS 
6.4.1. Mindful organising and role breadth self-efficacy 
The model examined in study one looks at the contextual and social 
influences of a strong group safety climate and mindful organising on 
individual safety citizenship behaviours (SCBs), safety compliance and 
violation. Although this offers us an insightful framework of the multileveled 
factors at play that predict desirable safety behaviours, it does not take into 
account the means through which mindful organising affects individual 
behaviour. When we only take into account the contextual and social drivers 
of individual safety proactivity, we end up treating the individual as a passive 
agent within the system, wholly influenceable by the social expectations and 
desired behavioural models in their organization (Parker et al., 2010). There 
is a great body of research that analyses the individual as an active element 
of the system, able to initiate changes and drive improvement, development 
and resilience themselves (Curcuruto et al., 2016). This research stream 
shows that there are multiple psychological mechanisms that drive individual 
proactivity. Therefore, the next step of our research is to investigate how 
mindful organising affects certain cognitive-motivational states that could 
drive individual behaviour.  
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A prominent driver of proactive behaviour is an individual’s 
perceived capability to achieve short term, proactive goals. In high risk 
contexts rife with unexpected events, it can be daunting to engage in safety 
citizenship behaviours such as initiating changes, voicing concerns or taking 
the lead in managing safety by helping or guiding others to be safer in the 
moment. Believing in one’s own ability to be able to successfully carry out 
these daunting activities is likely to be a powerful motivator for engaging in 
these activities. Therefore, the present study wanted to examine whether 
individual capability drivers such as self-efficacy played a role in facilitating 
individual safety citizenship behaviours in a context where teams engage in 
mindful organising. In particular, we wanted to examine whether role breadth 
self-efficacy played an important role in mediating the relationship between 
team mindful organising and individual safety behaviours.  
Role breadth self-efficacy refers to “employees perceived capability 
of carrying out a broader and more proactive, interpersonal and integrative 
set of work tasks and goals to do with safety beyond prescribed requirements” 
(Curcuruto & Griffin, 2016 p.121). An important distinction to make is that 
role-breath self-efficacy does not refer to an individual’s capability, 
knowledge and skills to carry out important extra role behaviours and tasks. 
Rather, it refers to an individual’s confidence to perform such tasks stemming 
from their own subjective judgement of their capability, knowledge and skills 
(Bandura, 2001). It encompasses how confident employees feel to analyse 
safety issues and propose solutions, come up with new methods to improve 
safety, help to facilitate safety goals in their team as well as discuss how to 
improve safety with others (Curcuruto et al., 2016). Role breadth self-efficacy 
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has been shown to lead to individual proactivity in work performance 
(Griffin, Neal & Parker, 2007). It has also been associated with challenging 
behaviours to disrupt the status quo and suggest improvements (McAllister et 
al., 2007). 
Engaging in the five processes of mindful organising boosts a team’s 
ability to understand and diagnose the risks they face (through the anticipation 
processes) as well as enhances a team’s ability to successfully navigate 
unexpected events and contain errors (through the containment processes) 
(Vogus, 2011). We believe that individuals that form part of a team that is 
able to collectively manage unexpected events and small errors effectively 
are likely to develop more confidence in their individual ability to fulfil their 
extra-role tasks to enhance safety. This increased role-breadth self-efficacy is 
likely to lead to higher proactivity to carry out safer practices in the 
organization such as engaging in helping, voice and initiative.  
We posit that the anticipation processes of mindful organising 
(preoccupation with error, reluctance to simplify and sensitivity to 
operations) will lead to higher role breadth self-efficacy to voice safety 
concerns to others. Preoccupation with error entails teams continuously 
searching for, detecting and voicing concerns about potential errors and 
anomalies (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Reluctance to simplify entails 
challenging assumptions and trying to uncover blind spots in operations 
through rich discussions about possible categories and labels (Schulman, 
1993). Sensitivity to operations means teams make sure to be aware of the 
realities of operations on the front line and communicate these challenges and 
realities to one another and to leaders (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). These three 
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actions and activities increase the range of situations that each individual team 
member becomes more self-assured to address and discuss, increasing their 
confidence to correctly identify, and voice, a wide range of safety issues. This 
increased role breadth self-efficacy is likely to motivate these team members 
to engage in voicing safety concerns to others on their own accord, over and 
above mindful organising and what is required by their formal job 
description. Therefore, the following is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 4: Role breadth self-efficacy mediates the relationship 
between mindful organising and voice so that the relationship is positive and 
significant. 
We argue that the containment processes of mindful organising 
(commitment to resilience and deference to expertise) will lead to higher role 
breadth self-efficacy to engage in initiative (initiating changes to ensure safer 
practices) on an individual level. This is because commitment to resilience 
has to do with growing team capabilities to quickly recover from unexpected 
events so teams are can act swiftly and make changes to bounce back from 
errors (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Deference to expertise has to do with 
knowing where the best expertise in the system are, and quickly acting to 
ensure that the best expertise are utilised to make decisions during unexpected 
events so that errors can be contained and stability can be achieved (Roberts 
et al., 1994). This often means that those that can see the most and are the 
closest to a potential problem are the ones with the best expertise in the matter 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Engaging in this resilient action and deference to 
expertise on a team level is likely to increase an individual’s confidence in 
their own ability to initiate changes in the moment to quickly act to ensure a 
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safer workplace, this increased confidence in their capability to initiate these 
actions, will then lead to them engaging in initiating changes to increase 
safety. Therefore the following is hypothesized:  
Hypothesis 5: Role breadth self-efficacy mediates the relationship 
between mindful organising and initiative so that the relationship is positive 
and significant. 
Mindful organising creates a broader awareness of the work and 
knowledge of others in a team (through sensitivity to operations, commitment 
to resilience and deference to expertise) , this is likely to enhance each 
individual’s understanding of which team members are likely to need support 
or help with safety protocol and practices. This, coupled with the knowledge 
and experience in managing safety that comes from engaging in mindful 
organising continuously as a team is likely to build individuals perceived 
confidence in successfully helping the less experienced to follow and achieve 
safety goals. The enhanced role breadth self-efficacy to engage in extra role 
helping will increase an individual’s propensity to actually reach out to less 
experienced or knowledgeable colleagues to assist them with safety related 
matters.  Therefore, the following is hypothesized:  
Hypothesis 6: Role breadth self-efficacy mediates the relationship 
between mindful organising and helping so that the relationship is positive 
and significant. 
It is expected that the relationship between mindful organising and the 
SCBs (helping, voice and initiative) through role breadth self-efficacy will be 
stronger than for safety compliance and violation. We believe that mindful 
organising will have a significant positive impact on individuals’ subjective 
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judgement of whether they are capable of pursuing important safety tasks that 
do not form part of their formal roles, which will strongly predict SCBs, 
which are extra-role safety behaviours. Safety compliance and violation, on 
the other hand, are in-role behaviours and will not be as strongly influenced 
by an individual’s confidence in their ability to perform activities above and 
beyond what is formally required of them. However, we wanted to do still 
argue that in a context where teams engage in mindful organising which 
sparks higher role breadth self-efficacy, that it will lead to higher compliance 
with safety rules and less violation of such rules. In a context where 
individuals have high role breadth self-efficacy from engaging in mindful 
organising, there is likely to be a high commitment to upholding safety 
procedures and rules. We therefore hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 7: Role breadth self-efficacy mediates the relationship 
between mindful organising and safety compliance, so that the relationship 
is positive and significant. 
Hypothesis 8: Role breadth self-efficacy mediates the relationship 
between mindful organising and safety violation, so that the relationship is 
negative and significant. 
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Figure 3. Study 2 model 
  
6.4.2. Method 
6.4.2.1. Sample and procedure 
The data used in this research was collected within a sample of 
Ukraine-based chemical plant workers (N = 443) comprising of 50 teams. 
Participation was voluntary and all workers were informed that the data 
would be used for scientific research and to gain insight into safety culture 
improvements in each plant. Majority of participants (60%) had been working 
in the company for more than 10 years, 33% had been working in the 
company for 5 to 10 years, 3% had been working in the company for 2 to 5 
years, 2% had been in the company for less than 5 years and 2% did not 
indicate their tenure in the company. Participants were employed in primary 
and secondary production (30%), the filter production workshop (12%), the 
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warehousing department (15%), quality assurance department (13%), the 
engineering department (8%) and 22% came from other departments. The 
questionnaire was administered in Russian and the scales below were 
translated from English (the original versions) to Russian using the back-
translation methods with two bilingual experts and industry personnel.  
6.4.2.2. Measures  
All scales were measured using 5-point likert scales, were 5 indicated 
the highest value and 1 indicated the lowest value in the respective measures. 
Given the negative wording of the scale for safety violation, it was reverse 
scored. 
Mindful organising. Mindful organising is a team’s collective 
capability to anticipate and contain errors and unexpected events. Mindful 
organising was measured using a 9-item scale (α = .94) taken from Vogus and 
Sutcliffe (2007). An example item is “We talk about mistakes and ways to 
learn from them.” 
Role breadth self-efficacy. Role breadth self-efficacy is the 
confidence individuals have in their own ability to carry out a more 
participative and broader set of safety tasks beyond formalised role 
requirements. It was measured using a 5-item scale (α = .93) taken from 
Curcuruto, Mearns and Mariani (2016). An example item is “Feeling 
confident in devising new methods to improve safety in my work area”. 
Safety citizenship. Safety citizenship behaviours (SCBs) are 
discretionary and prosocial activities essential for managing risk in safety 
critical industries (Curcuruto, Conchie & Griffin, 2019). For the present 
study, we analysed three SCBs, namely: voice, initiative and helping. Voice 
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was measured using a 4-item scale (α = .92), an example item is “rate the 
extent to which you voluntarily raise safety concerns in planning sessions” 
Initiative was measured using a 4-item scale (α = .87), an example item is 
“rate the extent to which you voluntarily try to make policies and procedures 
safer”. Helping was measured using a 6-item scale (α = .90), an example item 
is “rate the extent to which you voluntarily help teach safety procedures to 
new crew members”. 
Safety compliance. Safety compliance is the degree to which an 
individual complies with the safety protocol of the chemical plant. Safety 
Violation is the extent to which an individual violates safety protocol. Both 
scales were taken from Hansez and Chmiel (2010). Safety compliance was 
measured using a 5-item scale (α = .82), an example item is “rate the extent 
to which you voluntarily use protection, even if it is hard to find.” Safety 
violation was measured using a 5-item scale (α = .94) and is inversely scored, 
an example item is “rate the extent to which you neglect some safety rules 
when performing familiar or routine work.” 
6.4.2.3. Analyses 
To test our proposed model, we ran a multilevel structural equation 
model (MSEM). Mindful organising was analysed on the team level and role 
breath self-efficacy, safety compliance, safety violation and the SCBs were 
analysed on the individual level. First, confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) of 
the seven scales (mindful organising, role breath self-efficacy safety 
compliance, safety violation, voice, initiative, and helping) were carried out 
in order to gain evidence of the discriminant validity of these measures. A 
seven-factor model with all the items loading onto seven separate factors 
CHAPTER VI: ENHANCING SAFETY IN HIGH RISK OPERATIONS: THE ROLE OF 




using individual level data was run with Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–
2010). Thereafter, four alternative CFA models were conducted, and the fit 
of these models was compared with the seven-factor model. The alternative 
models are: (1) a one factor model with all the items of the seven scales 
loading onto one single factor, (2) a six factor model with mindful organising 
and role breath self-efficacy both loading onto the same single factor and all 
the other items loading onto their corresponding factors, (3) a five factor 
model with the three SCBs (voice, initiative, and helping) loading onto the 
same single factor and all the other items loading onto their corresponding 
factors, (4) a six factor model with safety compliance and safety violation 
both loading onto the same single factor and all the other items loading onto 
their corresponding factors and (5) a four factor model with the three SCBs 
(voice, initiative, and helping) loading onto the same single factor, safety 
compliance and violation loading on to the same factor and mindful 
organising and role breadth self-efficacy loading onto their corresponding 
factors. Model fit was evaluated by calculating the chi-square statistic, the 
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990), the 
comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) and the Tucker Lewis index (TLI; 
Tucker & Lewis, 1973). RMSEA values below .05 indicate good fit, values 
of between .08 and .05 show a reasonable error of approximation and values 
of .10 or more indicate poor fit, (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Browne & Du 
Toit, 1992). For the CFI values, values above .90 are considered acceptable 
fit and values close to 1 indicate good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). TLI values 
near 1 indicate good fit, with the conventional cut off being .90 for acceptable 
fit (Tucker & Lewis, 1973). When comparing alternative models, we used the 
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following criteria: (1) whether the differences between TLI and CFI values 
of the competing models were larger than .01 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; 
Widaman, 1985), and (2) whether the differences between RMSEA values 
were larger than .015 (Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby & Paxton, 2008). These 
criteria indicate whether there is a notable disparity between the models and 
when these differences in practical fit indices are detected, the model showing 
better fit will be selected. Additionally, the difference in chi-square statistics 
along with the difference in degrees of freedom was also used as a criteria to 
check for statistically significant differences among competing models. If the 
difference is significant, the model with the smaller chi-square value is argued 
to have better fit to data (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003).  
Second, the aggregation indices (average deviation indices (ADIs), 
Rwg values, intraclass correlation coefficient ICC(1)) and ANOVAs, were 
calculated for mindful organising to evaluate the within group agreement and 
between group discrimination, respectively.  
Third, we ran a multilevel structural equation model to assess our 
proposed mediation model and the pathways between our variables. Monte 
Carlo (MC) confidence intervals  were used for testing the significance of the 
indirect effects, as it is argued to be a more viable and robust method for 
calculating confidence intervals for complex and simple indirect effects when 
working with a multilevel model (Preacher and Selig, 2012).  
6.4.3. Results 
6.4.3.1. Confirmatory factor analysis 
Table 3 shows the goodnes of fit indices of confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) carried out for alternative models. We examined the 
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distintiviness of the seven study variables through a seven-factor model (with 
all seven variablesin the study loading onto seven separate factors), and 
compared the fit of this model with four alternative models.  
 
Table 3 
Goodnes of Fit Indices of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) for the 
Alternative Models 
 
Model χ2 (df) p RMS
EA 
CFI TLI SRMR 
Seven-factor model: the 
seven study variables 




.000 .057 .919 .910 .040 
Alternative model 1: the 
seven study variables 









.000 .134 .531 .500 .136 
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Alternative model 2: six 
factor model with 
mindful organising and 
role breath self-efficacy 
loading onto the same 
single factor and 
initiative, helping, voice, 
safety compliance and 
safety violation each 




.000 .079 .839 .824 .061 
Alternative model 3: five 
factor model with the 
SCBs (initiative, helping, 
voice) loading onto the 
same single factor and 
mindful organising, role 
breath self-efficacy, 
safety compliance and 
safety violation each 




.000 .061 .903 .894 .043 
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Alternative model 4: five 
factor model with safety 
compliance and safety 
violation loading onto the 
same single factor and 
mindful organising, role 
breath self-efficacy, 
initiative, helping and 




.000 .069 .879 .868 .084 
Alternative model 5: four 
factor model with the 
three SCBs (voice, 
initiative, and helping) 
loading onto the same 
single factor, safety 
compliance and violation 
loading on to the same 
factor and mindful 
organising and role 
breadth self-efficacy 





.000 .072 .864 .853 .085 
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The differences between the theorized seven-factor model and the 
alternative model 1 (ΔRMSEA = .07, ΔCFI = .39, ΔTLI = .41), alternative 
model 2 (ΔRMSEA = .02, ΔCFI = .08, ΔTLI = .09), and alternative model 4 
(ΔRMSEA = .01, ΔCFI = .04, ΔTLI = .04) were notable, indicating that the 
seven-factor model had a better fit to the data. The differences between the 
theorized seven-factor model and alternative model 3 (where initiative, voice 
and helping loaded onto a single factor) were notable for the CFI and TLI 
values (ΔCFI = .02, ΔTLI = .02), however, there were no relevant differences 
in the RMSEA values (indicate here the value). Therefore, we examined the 
difference in chi-square values for the theorized seven-factor model and the 
alternative model 3, and we found a statistically significant difference (Δχ2 = 
153.96, Δdf = 11, p < .001). Given that the theorized seven-factor model had 
a smaller chi-square value, we concluded that it was the best fitting model. 
Thus, the evidence above supported the discriminant validity of the seven 
scales. 
6.4.3.2. Aggregation indices 
The results of the within-team agreement and inter-rater reliability 
analyses for mindful organising provided adequate justification for 
aggregating the data to the team level. The average ADI value was .50 (SD = 
.19), which is below the .83 cut off for a 5-point Likert-type scale (Burke & 
Dunlap, 2002). The rwg(J) value was .94, above the .70 cut-off (Bliese, 2013). 
The ICC(1) value was .09, which is above the recommended .05 cut-off 
(Bliese, 2000). Additionally, ANOVA results for mindful organising (F 
(49,379) = 1.80, p < .05) indicated adequate between-team discrimination.  
6.4.3.3. Descriptive statistics 
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Descriptive statistics and the correlations between the study variables 
can be found in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables 
Variable Range M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Mindful 
organising 









1 - 5 4.69 .48 .37** .39** --    
4. Safety 
Violation 
1 - 5 1.36 .73 -.24** -.20** -.48** --   
5. Voice 
(SCB) 














Note. * p < .05, **p < .001 
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6.4.3.4. Multilevel analysis of the study model 
The results of the MSEM analysis indicated that the hypothesized 
multilevel mediation model showed a satisfactory fit (χ2 = 0.61, df = 5, p >.05; 
RMSEA = 0.00 ; CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.00; SRMR-within = .001; SRMR-
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Regarding the multilevel mediation, at the team level (between level), 
mindful organising had a positive statistically significant indirect effect (IE) 
on voice (IE = 0.84, p < .001, MC CI = 0.09, 2.14), initiative (IE = 0.68, p < 
.001, MC CI = 0.16, 1.18) helping (IE = 1.00, p < .001, MC CI = 0.20, 2.31) 
and safety compliance (IE = 0.31, p < .001, MC CI = 0.11, 0.55) through role 
breath self-efficacy. As expected the indirect between relationship from 
mindful organising to safety violation through role breath self-efficacy was 
negative and significant (IE = -0.65, p < .001 MC CI = -1.09, -0.17).  
To further examine full vs partial mediation, we tested an alternative 
model that included the direct paths from mindful organising to the five 
outcomes. The extra paths were not statistically significant (p > .05). The 
partial mediation model was a complete model (with no degrees of freedom) 
that showed satisfactory fit (χ2 = 0.45, df = 0, p <.01; RMSEA = 0.00; CFI = 
1.00; TLI = 1.00; SRMR-within = .000; SRMR-between = .006). However, 
the difference between the chi-square statistics provided by the hypothesized 
full mediation model and the partial mediation model was not statistically 
significant (Δχ2 = 0.16, Δdf = 5, p > .05). Considering all together, and 
according to the parsimony principle, the full mediation model was selected 
against the alternative partial mediation model. These results confirmed that 
role breath self-efficacy fully mediated the relationship between mindful 
organising and SCBs and individual safety behaviours.  
At the within (individual) level, role breadth self-efficacy showed a 
positive and significant relationship with voice (b = .76, p < .001), initiative 
(b = .70, p < .001),  helping (b = .71, p < .001) and safety compliance (b = .26, 
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p < .001). However, at the individual level, role breadth self-efficacy was not 
related to safety violation (b = -.15, p > .05). 
6.4.4. Conclusions 
The results obtained in study two confirmed the hypothesized model 
in that role breadth self-efficacy fully mediated the relationship between 
mindful organising and all five individual safety behaviours (voice, initiative, 
helping, safety compliance and safety violation,) so that the mediated effect 
was significant and positive for the SCBs (voice, initiative, helping) and 
safety compliance and the mediated effect was negative and significant for 
safety violation.  
6.5. DISCUSSION 
Understanding safe systems from a human behaviour perspective is a 
major feat, not only because human beings are fallible and somewhat 
unpredictable, but because human behaviour is so complex and multifaceted 
that we cannot begin to measure every element at play. What we can do, is 
create models that synthesize and measure some of the major factors and 
conditions known in research on safer systems and see how these major 
factors relate to one another and try to understand why. That is what we tried 
to achieve in this study. It is argued that engaging in mindful organising 
underpins the success of highly reliable and resilient organizations, however, 
as it stands the applicability and usefulness of mindful organising in safety 
management theory and practice is limited. This is largely because mindful 
organising studies have been criticised as being too narrow in focus, not 
socially embedded enough and one-dimensional in their level of analysis 
(Martínez-Córcoles & Vogus, 2020). The present research set out to expand 
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our understanding of mindful organising’s nomological network and in doing 
so, position mindful organising within other important contextual factors and 
individual behaviours to do with safety.  
We were interested in examining how mindful organising may be 
affected by organizational features like safety climate and how mindful 
organising may influence individual self-efficacy and safety behaviours, with 
a special focus on discretional safety actions like safety citizenship 
behaviours. Therefore, we wanted to answer the following research questions: 
Does mindful organising mediate the relationship between group safety 
climate and individual safety behaviours? If so, which individual safety 
behaviours? Do individual capability drivers (such as self-efficacy) act as 
underlying mechanisms through which team mindful organising influences 
individual safety behaviours? The results shed light on some multilevel 
factors that may be important for creating safer workplaces in high risk 
environments.  
The first study results show that when a work group perceives their 
team members and supervisor prioritise safety over other demands, this will 
lead to team members collectively trying to commit to anticipating errors and 
unexpected events, and recovering from them, through the five processes of 
mindful organising. Engaging in mindful organising leads to extra-role safety 
behaviours such as helping others with safety related tasks and issues, 
initiating changes in ways of working to make them safer as well as voicing 
safety concerns and issues to others. Engaging in mindful organising in a team 
where safety is perceived to be a major priority also increases compliance to 
safety rules and procedures and leads to less violation of these rules and 
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procedures. Further enquiry into the link between mindful organising and 
individual safety behaviours in Study 4 showed that mindful organising 
increases confidence in the ability of workers to carry out a broader range of 
proactive, interpersonal and integrative tasks to do with safety, over and 
above what is formally required of them. This increased confidence has a 
significant influence on team members carrying out SCBs as well as 
complying to safety rules and not violating these rules. When team members 
feel that they are going be successful in reaching their goals if they engage in 
activities and tasks that uphold safety beyond what is formally required of 
them, it will act as a strong motivator to actually carry out these tasks.  
6.5.1. Theoretical and practical contributions 
The present research attempts to position mindful organising within 
the broader, more mainstream safety literature. Previous studies speculate that 
there could be a reciprocal relationship between mindful organising and 
safety climate. Our research findings show that when teams perceive that 
safety is prioritised by their supervisor and team members, mindful 
organising is stimulated and acts as collective regulatory mechanism which 
translates the perceived group safety priorities to team members safety 
behaviours, sustaining not only compliance with prescribed safety standards 
but also team members engagement in extra role behaviours (voice, initiative 
and helping) that are not expected by formal job descriptions or the safety 
systems in place. This shows us that a high safety climate could be an 
important driver in creating and sustaining mindful organising, which appears 
to need constant reinforcement as it is enacted and re-enacted by those on the 
front-line (Vogus & Suctliffe, 2012). Although we did not test the impact of 
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mindful organising on safety climate, we believe that it is more likely that a 
strong sense for prioritising safety above other demands will be an important 
prerequisite of mindful organising rather than the other way around. We 
speculate that teams engaging in mindful organising could strengthen and 
solidify a high group safety climate, but mindful organising is unlikely to 
develop if there is not a strong safety climate to begin with. This is because 
the five processes of mindful organising require ongoing attention, effort and 
commitment toward anticipating and containing error, which requires 
continuously choosing the action to ensure safer practices and minimising 
error over any other action to pursue other goals (efficiency and speed). 
Without the perception that safety is prioritised, rewarded and expected above 
competing demands, we believe that mindful organising would be stifled.  
Regarding outcomes of mindful organising, the present research 
shows that mindful organising increases team members’ confidence in their 
ability to perform a wide range of safety related tasks leading to higher safety 
adherence and extra-role safety behaviours. This shows us that the magic of 
mindful organising in enhancing reliability and resilience in organizations 
may also come from its impact on team members’ self-efficacy in their safety 
roles leading to the increase of team members’ SCBs and higher compliance 
to safety rules. Individuals who may not originally have the self-efficacy to 
engage in a wide range of extra role tasks and actions to do with enhancing 
safety, through being in a team that engages in mindful organising will start 
to grow their confidence in performing these tasks.  
Through engaging in the anticipation processes of mindful organising 
(preoccupation with error, reluctance to simplify and sensitivity to 
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operations), the range of situations that team members becomes more self-
assured to address and discuss is increased, growing their confidence to 
correctly identify, and voice, a wide range of safety issues. This, in turn, 
makes them more likely to perform the SCB of voicing safety concerns on 
their own. Furthermore, engaging in the containment processes of mindful 
organising boosts an individual’s confidence in their own ability to initiate 
changes in the moment to quickly act to ensure a safer workplace. This 
increased confidence in their capability to initiate these actions, will then lead 
to them engaging in initiating changes to increase safety. The processes of 
sensitivity to operations and deference to expertise will lead team members 
to identify colleagues that may need support or assistance with safety protocol 
and practices. This, coupled with knowledge and experience of how to 
manage safety that comes from engaging in mindful organising, is likely to 
build team members’ perceived confidence in successfully helping less 
experienced colleagues to achieve safety goals. This belief in their ability to 
mentor or assist others is likely to lead these team members to reach out to 
their colleagues that need help with safety related issues when the situation 
arises. 
The present findings added to the growing empirical evidence that 
mindful organising is in fact a shared, team construct as the aggregation 
indices in both studies for mindful organising showed adequate within team 
agreement and between team discrimination. The findings of the two studies 
also expand our current understanding about the interplay between group 
normative influences (safety climate), mindful organising, individual 
capability perceptions as well as extra role and in-role safety behaviours. We 
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see that group safety climate and mindful organising are important for 
creating the context for increasing key safety behaviours. This insight 
broadens our understanding about how social norms and group behaviours 
influence individual confidence and safety proactivity and adherence. 
Practically, leaders in high-risk organizations face a complex and 
multifaceted challenge when it comes to managing safety, therefore it is 
essential that leaders in this setting balance their focus across individual, team 
and organizational levels (Curcuruto & Griffin, 2016); Griffin & Curcuruto, 
2016). The findings from this study offer leaders and practitioners in safety-
critical contexts with some insight into which factors are important to focus 
on when attempting to increase individual safety citizenship behaviours and 
adherence to safety rules and procedures (which have shown to directly result 
in better safety outcomes) (Christian et al., 2009; Curcuruto et al., 2015). It 
shows that on an organizational level, leaders must ensure that they put into 
practice policies and procedures that highlight the importance of vigilance 
and caution above sometimes competing demands for efficiency and high 
performance. Thereafter, they should measure and ensure that lower level 
leaders are enacting these policies and processes and that this priority of 
safety above other demands is felt and practiced on a team level so that they 
may have strong group safety climates. Along with this, leaders could train 
workers and lower level leaders on the principles of mindful organising, 
knowing that the strong group safety climates will provide the context to 
enhance and sustain these team level processes. From this, team members role 
breath self-efficacy, safety citizenship and higher adherence to safety will be 
stimulated. 
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6.5.2. Limitations and implications for future research 
Although this study offers valuable advancement of our current 
understanding of mindful organising and safety proactivity on various levels 
of analysis, the present study is not without its limitations. Firstly, the study 
was conducted in samples of chemical plant workers, which is a unique 
organizational context and therefore the study findings should be applied to 
other high risk settings with caution. That being said, these chemical plants 
are high-risk settings that face many of the same challenges as other high risk 
settings (small errors leading to accidents and unexpected events leading to 
failures in the system), meaning the lessons in safety behaviour models may 
still be useful for other industries with similar challenges. Future research 
should build on this model in other high risk environments to show the 
replicability of the study and test the generalisability of the study findings. 
Another major drawback of the present study is that it relies on self-report 
measures of behaviour. This opens up the possibility of inaccurate responses 
due to social desirability bias as workers operating in safety-critical units may 
be less inclined to respond honestly to questions about safety as they know 
that they ought to be taking safety seriously. We did however, ensure 
anonymity and confidentiality and gave employees an opportunity to 
withdraw their responses at any time. Future research should consider 
including other more objective indicators of safety behaviour and compliance 
such as peer and supervisor ratings of safety citizenship and compliance or 
incident reports. Another limitation of our study is that our measure of 
mindful organising is a nine item, one-dimensional scale that does not 
comprehensively measure the five processes of mindful organising, this limits 
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our enquiry into which factors of mindful organising may more strongly 
effect various individual behaviours. However, the nine item measure does 
encompass all five processes of mindful organising and has been successfully 
validated in various contexts (e.g. Renecle et al., 2020; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 
2007). Future research should consider validating a broader measure of 
mindful organising that allows for more granular measurement of mindful 
organising to more clearly see how the five factors relate to various safety 
behaviours.  
6.6. CONCLUSIONS 
The present study showed how a high group safety climate and team 
level mindful organising can enhance capability drivers of safer behaviours 
in a chemical plant setting. The study findings offer a multifaceted, 
multileveled safety behaviour model that enhances our current understanding 
of mindful organising as a construct and the multilevel factors affecting safety 
proactivity. Although much work still needs to be done before mindful 
organising can be theoretically and practically relevant within safety 
management research and practice, this study offers an interesting insight into 
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7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The present chapter will integrate the research findings of the four 
studies within this thesis. From this, we will highlight and discuss the main 
insights gained from this research and how the findings broaden the current 
understanding of mindful organising, rectifying and clarifying some of the 
shortcomings and confusions in the literature. Therefore, this section has four 
main parts. First, we revisit the main objectives of this research, the research 
questions we hoped to answer and summarize the main findings of each of 
the four studies included in this thesis. Then, we discuss and outline the major 
theoretical contributions of our research. Next, we present the main practical 
implications that can be derived from our research findings. Finally, we will 
discuss the general limitations of our four studies and the directions for future 
research in light of our findings.  
7.2. STUDY OBJECTIVES AND MAIN FINDINGS 
We became interested in the model of mindful organising as it 
represents a team-based collective capability that allows workers within high-
risk organizations to better manage errors and unexpected events that could 
lead to disasters. After reviewing the extant literature on this topic, we 
discovered that mindful organising has shown to lead to better objective 
safety outcomes in qualitative and quantitative research in different high-risk 
environments (e.g. Dierynck et al., 2016). However, despite the promising 
outcomes shown in most of the research into mindful organising, there are 
major gaps in our understanding of mindful organising as a concept. Given 
that majority of the studies done on mindful organising have been qualitative 
in nature (Martínez-Córcoles & Vogus, 2020; Sutcliffe et al., 2016), we do 
not know much about the nature and direction of mindful organising’s 
CHAPTER VII: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 250 
relationship with other important antecedent and outcome variables. It has 
become clear to us that mindful organising’s utility and applicability in 
research and practice is stunted as the current literature does not tell us much 
about the factors that are important for creating and sustaining mindful 
organising in organizations, beyond a handful of studies showing the 
importance of leader behaviour and specific organizational practices such as 
training and socialisation (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). Of particular relevance is 
the limited understanding of which social forces are important for sustaining 
mindful organising, making it difficult to socially embed in practice 
(Martínez-Córcoles & Vogus, 2020). Current research also does not 
investigate the impact mindful organising may have on individual 
motivational states and safety behaviours, which could be a vital mechanism 
through which high reliability and better objective safety outcomes is 
achieved. Examining these relationships also offers a more holistic and 
generalisable understanding of the impact of mindful organising on individual 
psychological and behavioural outcomes, rather than focusing on sector 
specific outcome variables. Another point of contention in this literature is 
that research is too narrow in its level of analysis (Martínez-Córcoles & 
Vogus, 2020), with few studies examining the how mindful organising may 
relate to individual variables. Conceptually, it has been unclear how mindful 
organising emerges in teams as well as how it differs from other team-related 
variables. We concluded that mindful organising has the potential to 
theoretically and practically change the way leaders and scholars understand 
team-based safety management. However, our current conceptualisation and 
understanding of this construct are far too limited for mindful organising to 
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be easily integrated into mainstream safety management systems and 
research.  
Our research wanted to help fill these major gaps and conceptual 
ambiguities in the mindful organising literature through four main aims. First, 
we wanted to statistically show that mindful organising is a distinct variable 
from constructs that may be conceptually similar by analysing their factor 
structures as well as testing whether mindful organising affects changes in 
individual safety behaviours over and above other important group safety 
variables. Second, we wanted to expand our understanding of the team level 
climate and communication conditions which may be important for mindful 
organising to develop, as mindful organising is not an enduring property 
within organizations that, once established, will continue to be practiced by 
teams (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2013). Rather, it needs to be enacted and re-
enacted by team members working together, which makes social forces that 
reinforce the re-enactment of mindful organising highly relevant to study in 
terms of being able to sustain mindful organising in practice. Third, we 
wanted to investigate the impact of mindful organising on individual safety 
behaviours and attitudes, while examining motivational and affective 
mechanisms that may act as mediators of these relationships. This allows 
gives us a deeper understanding of how mindful organising may be shaping 
the motivations and actions of team members, and how these may in fact 
contribute to better safety management. Lastly, we wanted to add to the small 
but growing body of quantitative mindful organising literature using multi-
level analyses, to help strengthen the methodological validity of mindful 
organising as a concept.  
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To reach the abovementioned objectives, we carried out four studies 
with different samples belonging to two nuclear power plants and two 
chemical plants across three countries: Spain, Russia and Ukraine. We 
summarize the main research questions and findings within each of our 
studies below, not going into too much detail as the detailed discussion of 
each study’s findings have already been presented in the previous chapters. 
We started our research by attempting to clarify the concept of 
mindful organising as there were ambiguities around whether mindful 
organising is distinct from safety culture and climate (e.g. Vogus & Sutcliffe, 
2007) and team learning (Sutcliffe et al., 2016). This led us to ask the 
question: is mindful organising a distinct construct from other important team 
safety variables? We attempted to answer this question in Study 1 where we 
adapted to Spanish and validated a mindful organising measure and provided 
evidence of internal factor structure validity, reliability of the scores, 
convergent validity and discriminant validity with related variables as well as 
incremental validity in the association with workplace safety outcomes 
(safety compliance and safety participation) above and beyond other team- 
related variables. In this study, we showed that the widely used mindful 
organising scale (by Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) does measure one underlying 
construct, and it does so reliably. The findings confirmed that mindful 
organising is positively related to team safety climate, organizational safety 
culture, and team learning, but these variables are distinct from one another 
when looking at their factor structure. We were also able to provide evidence 
that mindful organising affects safety behaviours (participation and 
compliance) over and above team safety climate, organizational safety 
culture, and team learning. This shows empirically that engaging in mindful 
CHAPTER VII: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 253 
organising is a distinct contributor to safer actions as it helps employees to 
engage in safety behaviours over and above team safety climate, 
organizational safety culture, and team learning.   
After clarifying mindful organising as a distinct construct from related 
team variables and testing the psychometric properties of our mindful 
organising measure, we wanted to expand our understanding of the needed 
team level communication conditions and climate for mindful organising to 
be created and sustained in Study 2. This was following speculations in the 
literature that conversations were the main driver of mindful organising 
(Sutcliffe et al., 2016) and that despite mindful organising being created and 
maintained through communication channels, there is hardly any enquiry into 
the communication conditions that lead to higher mindful organising or may 
stifle mindful organising (Ford, 2018). This led us to ask our second research 
question: which team level participatory communication conditions are 
important for mindful organising to develop? In Study 2, we draw on 
literature about psychological safety and voice and hypothesized a model 
where two participatory communication conditions interact to predict mindful 
organising. We found that perceived safety for upward dissent significantly 
moderated the relationship between participation climate and mindful 
organising. This showed for mindful organising to develop, teams not only 
needed to perceive that their participation (in sharing ideas and suggestions) 
within the organization was valued, but they also needed to feel safe to voice 
their concerns and disagreements with their superiors without fear of 
backlash. This perceived safety to disagree with supervisors turned out to be 
critically important, as our findings showed that without it, the relationship 
between a participation climate and mindful organising became non-
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significant. These results are promising since the data are longitudinal, 
showing that the interaction of perceived safety for upward dissent and 
participation climate at time one leads to mindful organising at time two, 
giving some evidence of a possible dynamic relationship between these 
variables. 
Study 2 also attempted to investigate the relationship between mindful 
organising and team’s subjective experience at work by investigating whether 
mindful organising has a positive impact on job satisfaction given the 
controversy around the relationship between mindful organising and 
employees affective responses at work (e.g. Rerup, 2006; Vogus et al., 2014). 
It has been argued that mindful organising is particularly draining for 
employees operating in high-risk environments with few adverse events, 
negatively impacting wellbeing (Vogus et al., 2014). If this is true, it suggests 
that mindful organising may not be sustainable in high risk environments that 
only sporadically experience adverse events, as employee’s wellbeing would 
suffer and they would not want to remain in their current, taxing positions. 
However, mindful organising has been observed in various case studies in 
HROs where employees engage in demanding, risky work but do not 
necessarily experience constant, ongoing adverse events (e.g. nuclear power 
plants) and these teams manage to sustain mindful organising as an ongoing 
practice. This led us to ask the following question in Study 2: what impact 
does mindful organising have on team’s subjective experience at work and 
team members’ propensity to leave their organization? We therefore tested 
(within our model) the impact of mindful organising on individual turnover 
intention, with team job satisfaction mediating the relationship. The results of 
the pathway between mindful organising and team job satisfaction showed a 
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strong positive and significant relationship. Team job satisfaction mediated 
the relationship between mindful organising and turnover intention, showing 
that through increasing a team’s job satisfaction, mindful organising resulted 
in lower turnover intentions. This suggests that in a nuclear power plant, it is 
far better for team’s satisfaction at work to engage in mindful organising than 
to not engage in mindful organising, even though being collectively mindful 
can be taxing. This suggests that mindful organising offers teams much 
needed resources to cope with the demands of their working environment, 
even if there are not continuous adverse events, leading to higher satisfaction 
and therefore, an increased desire to stay in their organization. These results 
provide evidence of the sustainability of mindful organising as it not only 
improves reliable and safe performance, but it also positively impacts job 
satisfaction and commitment.  
The holistic model in Study 2 also showed us the critical importance 
of teams feeling safe to disagree with supervisors. The findings showed that 
perceived safety for upward dissent moderated the negative indirect effect of 
participation climate on turnover intention through mindful organising and 
job satisfaction. This means teams feeling safe to disagree with supervisors 
facilitated the relationships between our study variables, and without it, a high 
participation climate would not lead to higher mindful organising, stifling 
team job satisfaction resulting in higher turnover intention for team members.  
Study 1 showed us that mindful organising is positively related to 
team safety climate and organizational safety culture but it conceptually 
distinct from these variables. Team safety climate refers to the perceived 
priority a team or organization give to safety above other competing demands. 
The nature and direction of the relationship between mindful organising and 
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safety climate are unclear. It is speculated that teams engaging in mindful 
organising may enhance the team’s safety climate (Sutcliffe et al., 2016), but 
in Study 3, we wanted to ask: Can team safety climate aid in fostering mindful 
organising? Team safety climate is a well understood, implemented and 
measured concept in organizations. Understanding the impact of team safety 
climate on mindful organising could help scholars and practitioners with 
enhancing this collective team capability into organizations. This is because 
focusing on team safety climate      could help to sustain and “socially embed” 
mindful organising in practice. Study 3 also wanted to examine the impact 
mindful organising may have on individual safety behaviours, as these 
individual behaviours may be contributing to the higher safety and reliability 
seen in organizations that have high mindful organising in their teams. This 
led us to ask the question: Does mindful organising increase individual in-
role and extra-role safety behaviours?  
To answer these questions, we tested a holistic mediation model 
which examined whether team mindful organising mediated the relationship 
between team safety climate and various individual safety behaviours. Our 
research findings confirmed this mediation model. This not only showed that 
team safety climate is an important prerequisite for mindful organising (with 
a strong positive and significant pathways between these two variables), but 
mindful organising did lead to higher in-role and extra-role safety behaviours. 
In other words, the results show that when teams perceive that safety is 
prioritised above all else (high safety climate), mindful organising is 
stimulated and increases team members’ propensity to not only comply with 
prescribed safety standards but also to engage in extra-role safety behaviours 
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(helping, voice and initiative) that are not expected of them by the formal 
rules and procedures.  
After confirming that mindful organising does stimulate individual 
safety compliance and safety citizenship behaviours, we wanted to further 
examine the possible motivational drivers that could be affecting these 
relationships in Study 4. We were particularly interested in the impact that 
mindful organising may have on individual role breadth self-efficacy. We 
speculated that the increased propensity of individuals belonging to teams 
that organise mindfully to engage in extra-role safety behaviours came from 
mindful organising increasing their self-efficacy to do so. In other words, 
individuals that engaged in the five processes of mindful organising in their 
team, feel more confident in their ability to engage in safety-enhancing tasks 
beyond their formal job description. To our knowledge, no study has looked 
at how mindful organising affects individual capability perceptions. This is 
despite the fact that it could explain some of the important individual 
motivation and behaviour changes that come about from mindful organising, 
aiding in the higher safety and reliability seen in various studies. This led us 
to ask the question: do capability motivational drivers mediate the 
relationship between mindful organising and individual safety behaviours? 
To answer this question, we ran a multilevel mediation model where role 
breadth self-efficacy (operationalised at the individual level) mediated the 
relationship between team mindful organising and safety citizenship 
behaviours and safety compliance (operationalised at the individual level). 
This mediation model was confirmed and the pathways showed that team 
mindful organising has a positive statistically significant impact on team 
members role breadth self-efficacy, and this role breadth self-efficacy 
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positively predicted team members in-role and extra-role safety behaviours. 
These findings suggest that being in a team that engages in mindful 
organising helps individuals who may not originally have the self-efficacy to 
engage in a wide range of extra-role tasks and actions to do with safety, grow 
their confidence in performing these tasks. This new-found confidence leads 
to team members going above and beyond what is required of them in the 
pursuit of safer practices. 
In summary, the insight gained from the four studies conducted 
allowed us to significantly extend mindful organising’s nomological network. 
In doing so, we managed to reach all three of our research objectives. First, 
by empirically distinguishing mindful organising from related team variables. 
Second, by uncovering three team level climates and norms to do with safety 
and communication that are important for fostering mindful organising. 
Third, by showing how mindful organising impacts team satisfaction, self-
efficacy and in-role and extra-role safety behaviours.   
7.3. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  
In this section, we integrate how the findings of our four studies help 
to move mindful organising research further by filling important research 
gaps and clarifying some inconsistencies and uncertainty within the literature. 
Taken together, the four studies conducted within this thesis helped to 
significantly expand our understanding of mindful organising. We were able 
to show that mindful organising can be reliably measured within various 
teams in four different high-risk organizations (two nuclear power plants in 
Spain, one chemical plant in Russia and one chemical plant in Ukraine) while 
maintaining a unidimensional factor structure, high internal consistency and 
adequate aggregation indices across all four samples. This helps to back up 
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and solidify the limited and mostly qualitative conceptual foundation of 
mindful organising (Martínez-Córcoles & Vogus, 2020; Sutcliffe et al., 2016) 
by showing that it is a concept that has cross-cultural relevance in a more 
traditional HRO setting (nuclear power plant) and in a non-traditional HRO 
setting (a chemical plant). This also adds to the limited empirical evidence 
that shows that mindful organising is in fact a team level emergent 
phenomenon and should be measured, analysed and monitored at the group 
level.  
Through this research, we were also able to clarify conceptual 
ambiguities within the current literature around the uniqueness of mindful 
organising and how it may relate to other similar team constructs. Mindful 
organising has been met with scepticism as some of the concepts within 
mindful organising show similarities to variables such as team transactive 
memory systems, team situational awareness, team learning and team safety 
climate. This made some authors question whether mindful organising is a 
unique concept and not just an amalgamation of various concepts that already 
exist in the literature. Therefore, in Study 1, we conceptually explored the 
similarities between mindful organising and other constructs that may appear 
to be similar such as organizational mindfulness, team situational awareness 
and team transactive memory systems. We then theoretically showed the key 
differences between mindful organising and these variables. In addition, we 
argued for and statistically showed the uniqueness of mindful organising 
when compared with team safety climate, organizational safety culture and 
team learning. From this, we were able to prove that mindful organising is 
not only distinct in its factor structure from these other team safety variables, 
but it also explains unique variance in safety participation and compliance 
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over and above these concepts. Based on this evidence we attempt to show 
that the five processes of mindful organising facilitate rich pathways and team 
dynamics that lead to a present and future mindful orientation towards safety 
(including a sustained interest in identifying potential errors, a shared 
reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, showing 
resilience in the face of difficulties and deferring decision-making power to 
those with the best expertise). These five critical processes are unique and 
they strengthen a team’s ability to consistently ensure safe performance in a 
complex socio-technical context.  
The present research also helps to position mindful organising within 
the broader, more mainstream safety literature by showing how it relates to 
other important safety variables such as team safety climate and individual 
extra-role safety behaviours. Mindful organising has been mentioned in 
reviews of the organizational, team and individual factors that enhance 
proactivity towards safety (eg. Curcuruto & Griffin, 2016). Apart from these 
speculations, there have not been empirical investigations into how mindful 
organising may relate to individual safety proactivity. Other than our 
investigation of the differences between mindful organising and safety 
climate in Study 1, the nature of the relationship between mindful organising 
and team safety climate was still unclear. We found that mindful organising 
acts as a collective regulatory mechanism which translates the perceived 
group safety priorities to the individual level, sustaining not only compliance 
with prescribed safety standards but also team members’ engagement in 
extra-role behaviours (helping, voice and initiative) that are not expected by 
formal job descriptions or the safety systems in place. This finding helps to 
position mindful organising more clearly within the mainstream safety 
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literature, adding to conceptual ambiguities which have kept mindful 
organising as a novel concept outside of the major frameworks and 
conceptual maps of the contextual, team and individual factors to do with 
safety. 
The present research also confirmed that mindful organising is 
valuable in high risk organizations as it showed significant positive effects on 
individual performance and affective outcomes. This is one of the biggest 
contributions we make to mindful organising literature as we not only gained 
valuable insight into the impact of mindful organising on individual 
attitudinal and safety behaviour outcomes, but we also managed to shed light 
on some of the affective and motivational drivers that are important in 
facilitating the relationship between mindful organising and these individual 
outcomes.  
Currently, mindful organising literature positions it as a team level 
capability that has shown in specific environments, especially in health care, 
to lead to better objective safety outcomes (e.g. Ausserhofer et al. 2013; 
Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007; Oliver et al., 2019). This leaves us with a very 
sector-specific and in most cases department-specific understanding of the 
value of mindful organising. It also leaves us with little to no insight into the 
possible individual behaviours that play a role in mindful organising leading 
to better objective safety indicators (such as fewer errors or accidents). This 
stunts our theoretical understanding of how mindful organising affects 
individual performance and it keeps mindful organising’s applicability very 
narrowly in the medical sector, where the vast majority of new studies are 
done. Our research shed some light on the impact of mindful organising on 
individuals’ self-efficacy and propensity to engage in extra-role and in-role 
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safety behaviours. The in-role and extra-role safety behaviours studied can be 
widely observed in various high-risk industries. We found that mindful 
organising positively impacts on team mebers’ confidence in their ability to 
perform various safety behaviours outside of what is required of them, this 
increased self-efficacy leads to higher instances of initiating changes to make 
work safer, helping others to operate more safely and voicing safety concerns 
to others. This increased self-efficacy also lead to higher compliance with 
formalised safety rules and procedures. These findings show that the possible 
benefits of mindful organising are likely to come, in part, from how it affects 
team members’ confidence to go above and beyond what is required of them, 
leading to higher individual safety proactivity and compliance.   
There has been hardly any research into the impact of mindful 
organising on workers affective responses to their work environment. The 
only study that considered the impact of mindful organising on worker’s 
affective responses at work used a sample of nurses and concluded that 
engaging in the five processes of mindful organising is somewhat strenuous 
and taxing, eventually draining workers well-being. However, if workers are 
operating in an environment with continuous adverse events then mindful 
organising is particularly helpful and can positively impact wellbeing. This 
led to the controversy around the sustainability of mindful organising in teams 
and environments that do not continuously experience adverse events. We 
showed that in high-risk settings outside of the medical sector, mindful 
organising had a positive impact on workers subjective experience at work. 
Mindful organising had a high positive statistically significant relationship 
with team job satisfaction, which in turn made team members more likely to 
want to stay in their current job. Although the workers within our sample 
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operate in environments that face many safety risks, these environments do 
not face consistently high adverse events. This provides contrary evidence to 
the claim that mindful organising is taxing and depletes workers resources, 
making them have a less positive experience at work in environments that are 
not consistently experiencing adversity. We posit that mindful organising 
gives teams’ resources to cope in all high-risk environments, regardless of the 
frequency of adverse events.  
The present research also helped to uncover team conditions that are 
needed to support the enactment of mindful organising. Currently, we have a 
very limited understanding of the factors that are needed to create and sustain 
mindful organising (Sutcliffe et al., 2016), making mindful organising 
difficult to sustain in practice (Martínez-Córcoles & Vogus, 2020). We 
uncovered certain conditions that are not only important for fostering mindful 
organising but are also essential for facilitating the relationships between 
mindful organising and positive individual attitudinal and behavioural 
outcomes. More specifically, in high-risk industries such as nuclear power 
plants and chemical plants, three factors were found to be essential for 
mindful organising to develop: a climate for participation, perceived 
psychological safety for upward dissent and a high team safety climate. We 
showed that teams need to feel safe from threat or embarrassment to disagree 
with management and express challenging opinions for a general 
participatory climate to lead to mindful organising. This perceived safety for 
upward dissent was a necessary precondition for the positive effects of 
mindful organising on satisfaction and turnover to be seen. This shows that 
mindful organising is largely dependent on team members perceiving a “no 
blame”, safe environment within their teams to express their views, even if 
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these views are challenging. Of particular relevance here is the role of 
supervisors in cultivating a climate in the team that makes team members feel 
as if they can be open and honest about what may be bothering them or what 
they do not agree with. This provides us with clues to a very specific factor 
that could help with mindful organising. We also showed that a high safety 
climate could be an important driver in creating and sustaining the fragile 
construct of mindful organising. The five processes of mindful organising 
require ongoing attention, effort and commitment toward anticipating and 
containing errors. This requires continuously choosing the action to ensure 
safer practices and minimisation of errors over any other action to pursue 
other goals (such as goals to do with efficiency and speed). Without the 
perception that safety is prioritised, rewarded and expected above competing 
demands, we believe that mindful organising would be stifled. We also found 
that this safety climate was a necessary precondition for mindful organising 
to lead to desired team members’ in-role and extra-role safety behaviours.  
7.4. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS  
Practically, this research gives leaders and decision-makers in high-
risk organizations tools and guidance for measuring and analysing mindful 
organising quantitatively. The studies within this thesis also offer leaders and 
decision-makers insight into the conditions needed for creating and sustaining 
mindful organising in their organizations. Our studies also show that if 
leaders and managers are able to create and sustain mindful organising, this 
will lead to better attitudinal outcomes and encourage favourable safety 
behaviour. This is in their interest as these safety behaviours have shown to 
be the main and direct antecedents of better safety outcomes (Curcuruto & 
Griffin, 2016). 
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Firstly, our research yielded a fully validated Spanish mindful 
organising questionnaire to be used in organizations within the numerous 
Spanish speaking countries around the world to measure the levels of mindful 
organising in their teams. We also showed how to aggregate mindful 
organising scores to a team level for better and more accurate analysis of this 
construct.  
Secondly, our research showed leaders in chemical and nuclear power 
plants, that when teams are able to engage in mindful organising, it leads to 
numerous benefits for the organization such as higher job satisfaction, lower 
turnover intention, higher role breadth self-efficacy, as well as higher in-role 
and extra-role safety behaviours. If leaders and decision-makers in these 
organizations want to reap the benefits of mindful organising, they will need 
to create the right conditions for mindful organising in their teams. They can 
start creating the right conditions for mindful organising by following three 
practical steps. Firstly, they need to ensure that they put into place practices 
that make workers feel that the organization wants them to be actively 
involved in everyday operations and values their comments, suggestions and 
opinions. Second, leaders need to ensure that team leaders or direct 
supervisors of teams do not blame or embarrass team members for expressing 
challenging views. Team members honestly expressing when they do not 
agree with management should be encouraged on all levels. Third, leaders 
should ensure that the organizational policies and practices prioritize safety 
above competing demands (such as efficiency or costs), and that team leaders 
and supervisors of teams are enacting these policies on a practical level and 
ensuring that team members know that their number one priority is safety, 
even if it means being less efficient.  




Although the present research has much theoretical and practical 
value, it is not without its limitations. The main limitations, common to all 
studies are described below. The specific limitations of each study are 
described in detail in each study’s corresponding chapter.  
One of the biggest limitations of the present research is that all four 
studies use self-report questionnaires as the main form of data. In addition, in 
all studies, participants were told that the questionnaire was concerned with 
safety and that the results may be shared with leadership to measure the levels 
of safety culture within the nuclear power plants and chemical plants. This 
introduces the possibility of error in the answers from respondents, as 
participants may have artificially inflated their responses on safety 
dimensions due to social desirability bias. However, we did try to control for 
this by ensuring strict confidentiality with the handling of responses and 
keeping biographical data to a minimum so that participants would not feel 
as if they could be recognized. Future studies could incorporate other means 
of measuring the study variables to introduce less subjectivity, such as 
observational data, or supervisor-rated data.   
Another major limitation of our studies is that most of our studies was 
cross-sectional in their design. Except for the relationship between our 
predictor variables and mindful organising in Study 2, all other relationships 
studied used data collected at the same time. This means that we were unable 
to assess the relationships between our variables over time and couldn’t 
ascertain the possible predictive power of mindful organising on our outcome 
variables or the dynamic relationship between our antecedent variables and 
mindful organising over time. Future studies should model the relationships 
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between mindful organising and antecedent and outcome variables over time 
to better understand the dynamic nature and strength of these relationships. 
Our research is also done in very highly standardized environments 
(chemical and nuclear power plants), which makes the generalizability of our 
study findings to less standardized and rigid environments questionable. That 
being said, these highly standardised environments are still high-risk settings 
that face many of the same challenges as other high risk settings (small errors 
leading to accidents and unexpected events leading to failures in the system), 
meaning the lessons in safety behaviour models may still be useful for other 
industries with similar challenges. Future research should build on this model 
in other high-risk environments to show the replicability of the study and test 
the generalisability of the study findings. 
One of the biggest limitations of our study is one of the biggest 
limitations of much of the empirical research on mindful organising, that the 
measure we use is a nine-item, one-dimensional scale that does not 
comprehensively measure the five processes of mindful organising. This 
limits our enquiry into which mindful organising processes may more 
strongly affect various individual behaviours. However, the nine-item 
measure does encompass all five processes of mindful organising is the most 
widely used and has been successfully validated in various contexts other than 
our study (e.g. Ausserhofer et al. 2013; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). Future 
research should consider validating a broader measure of mindful organising 
that allows for more granular measurement of mindful organising to more 
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8. CONCLUSIONS  
Here we present the most prominent conclusions that can be made from the 
present thesis. 
1. Mindful organising is a team level, emergent phenomenon that 
is conceptually and operationally distinct from other variables that 
may seem similar such as team safety climate, organizational safety 
culture, and team learning (Study 1). 
2. When teams perceive that they can safely express challenging 
views to their supervisors without fear of backlash and that their 
organizations value their opinions, suggestions and comments, 
mindful organising is likely to develop over time (Study 2). Mindful 
organising will then lead to higher job satisfaction in teams which will 
lower team members’ intention to leave the organization. 
3. When teams perceive that safety is prioritised above all else 
(high team safety climate), mindful organising is stimulated, which 
enhances team members within the team’s propensity to not only 
comply with prescribed safety standards but also to engage in extra-
role safety behaviours (helping, voice and initiative) that are not 
expected of them by the formal rules and procedures (Study 3).  
4. Mindful organising has a positive impact on team members’ 
confidence in their ability to perform safety-enhancing actions that do 
not form part of what is formally required of them (role breadth self-
efficacy). This increased confidence leads to engage in initiating 
changes to make work safer, helping others to operate more safely and 
voicing safety concerns to others. This increased confidence also 
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leads to higher compliance with formalised safety rules and 
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